' of choosing evil.' When he gives other com'mandments, he shews that it is in our power to

keep them.' It is the will of God that man 'should obey the understanding, and he has ' received power to subject himself. Sometimes, again, this inward power is expressed in very different language. No one is born without 'Christ' and no one is born without having in himself the seeds of wisdom, and of justice, and of the other virtues.' 'What would be more unjust, than that those should be punished, 'who are not able to do what ought to be done?' 'Grace is poured upon all, excepting neither Jew nor Greek--nor old nor young; but coming to ' all equally.'

§ 3. These passages, and many more of the same tendeney, are evidently designed to shew, that mankind possess a 'power' or 'strength' which is the ground of responsibility. If the meaning be, that man has physical powers, moral means, and freedom; why are they produced against Calvinists, who admit this in the fullest extent? But if something more be intended, as is probably the case in several expressions and phrases, what is it? If it admit of no description or explanation, may not its existence readily be doubted? Is it baptismal grace? Then but a small part are under moral obligation! Is it a portion of the grace of Christ, afforded to

every child of Adam? Two considerations offer themselves against the doctrine: first, it wants evidence to support it; and, secondly, the supposition that internal grace is a requisite ground of moral obligation, is subversive of the very nature of moral government. Even supposing that every descendant of Adam has, from his birth, a portion of the grace of Christ, this would not alter the case. As the very notion of moral government implies a possible deviation from rectitude and a loss of the divine favour; if the ground of the obligation did not continue unalterably the same, through all vicissitudes and bereavements, the greater the moral impotence, in other words the depravity of the subject, the more free from obligation! If this be not utterly subversive of moral government, it is difficult to say what is. On this principle, our first father Adam, by his delinquency, must have removed himself from obligation to the Supreme Governor, because destitute of an essential requisite: and, for the same reason, the fallen angels are under no obligation to love their Maker, but must have removed themselves from his government, and have a ground of accusation against him, because his claims continue, and yet they have no inward grace, as a requisite of moral obligation.

64. Another ground of inconsistency, and

of much confusion, is the notion, that the Liberty which is essential to moral obligation, is a physical power. It is more than probable, that this idea was affixed to several of the words and phrases above quoted. Without doubt, however, this is a very common idea with the advocates of a self-determining power. The word 'Liberty' and the epithet 'free' prefixed to' will,' being positive terms, by the use of which the mind is too apt to be influenced in forming ideas; we are in danger of being betrayed into the notion that some positive idea is intended to be conveyed by them, and therefore that they express some physical power. But if we substitute negative terms conveying the very same ideas, the fallacy may be more easily detected. What is free-will, but unrestrained, unconstrained, unbound, or unforced will? Whatever terms are employed to express it, the idea is decidedly negative, as denoting a denial or exemption. Who can describe, who can conceive any thing more as implied in the idea of liberty or freedom? The will indeed is a physical faculty by which power is exerted, but its freedom is a negation of all foreign interference in its exercise.

§ 5. As another ground of embarrassment, in reference to moral obligation, we may notice

the supposition, that the efficacy of moral means does not essentially depend on a previous disposition of the heart. Moral means are objective considerations presented to the mind, in the way of persuasion or dissuasion; and the effect as either good or bad, in a moral sense, will be according to the manner in which the free-will stands affected towards them. The same moral means affect different free-volitions in a manner directly opposite; but this could not take place without some essential difference in the persons themselves. The will in both cases is equally free, and as a faculty it uniformly seeks apparent good. Consequently if there were not some principle in the mind more radical than free-will, moral means would affect every mind in the same manner. Now what can this principle be but the disposition of the heart, as either good or bad, light or dark, according to which the moral means appear either eligible or ineligible? A depraved state of mind sees nothing practically eligible in a holy life, though the person has no convincing argument against it; nay, though many arguments in its favour may be confessed by him to be unanswerable. On the other hand, a virtuous or gracious state of mind, styled in scripture "a good and honest heart," sees a holy life practically eligible; and the free-will chooses

accordingly. In both cases, the moral obligation is the same, though the results are diametrically opposite.

§ 6. Nearly similar to this is another perplexing prejudice, that an influence, or an efficiency, securing the certain result of moral actions, is incompatible with liberty: but this prejudice is occasioned by mistaken apprehensions of the true nature of liberty. A principle of grace, ameliorating and enlightening the mind, has no more tendency to diminish freedom, than had the spotless purity and superior unction of Jesus Christ to diminish his liberty. It was in consequence of confused notions of liberty, and its incompatibility with preventing grace, that some of the Fathers, (when duty was out of the question) advanced this crude sentiment, that the beginning must be from ourselves. If indeed they had confined this notion to the obligation of beginning from ourselves, it might well be admitted; for a defect of principle, as before shewn, does not alter the ground of obligation. A depraved descendant of Adam is as much obliged to love God, and to live in righteousness and true holiness, as Adam himself was in a state of integrity. The reason is, that both alike have the same ground of moral obligation-physical powers, moral means, and freedom. Take away any one

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