decree of an ultimate event may be absolutely certain, though a condition precede it; and that the same remark is applicable to each event in the series. We therefore contend, on the firmest ground, first, that a 'decree' of absolute Election to glory, does not reject but include conditional events preceding the ultimate ones; secondly, that divine, effectual assistance, absolutely securing a performance of the conditions by the federates, is perfectly consistent with the idea of a covenant; and, finally, that though pardon, justification, and eternal salvation, be suspended on the conditions of repentance, faith, and obedience to be performed by us, yet the reward may be consistently bestowed, notwithstanding it be irreversibly determined' by the merciful and wise Jehovah, that his gracious and powerful assistance shall secure the performance of the condition and the ultimate event, 17. His Lordship would fain persuade his readers, that an exhortation to walk worthily, is incompatible with certainty of salvation, St. • Peter says, "Give diligence to make your calling and election sure: for if ye do these things 'ye shall never fall" therefore the salvation of these elect, of this chosen generation, was so far from being certain that it depended on their own diligence; their "not falling" was so far from being infallibly decreed that it 'depended upon their doing those things which 'the apostle commanded.'* Of St. Paul, writing to the Ephesians, it is observed, instead of ' representing their salvation as certain, he ' earnestly exhorts them to walk worthy of the 'vocation wherewith they were called; guards 'them against those deceits which bring down 'the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience, &c.' The Thessalonians by embracing Christianity, were now enabled to obtain 'salvation; but that this salvation was not 'certain and infallible, is evident from the 'numerous exhortations and precepts contained ' in these epistles.' The preceding discussions are virtually a reply to this objection. An exhortation, it is evident, is intended to furnish the person exhorted with a suitable motive of action and as rational beings are not expected to act without a motive, so the obedience exhorted to, which is a prerequisite to attain the end, requires the exhortation as an essential part of a suitable motive. 18. But so apt are we, when discussing moral and religious subjects, to use terms in a a lax and undefined manner, that the following question may be thought by many readers quite superfluous, What is MOTIVE?-However, I do * Refut. p. 205. + Ib. p. 207 Ib. p. 210. not think it superfluous to explain my own meaning when I use the term in an argument that requires precision of ideas. By MOTIVE I understand, that which actually moves and determines the free will of an agent to one choice rather than another. Is any thing beside the exhortation and the will required to effect this? Yes: for the will, however free, must in its elections • either move itself, or be moved by something else, in order to comply with, or to reject the exhortation. If it move itself, it is both the mover and thing moved; that is, it is at once both cause and effect. It has been often imagined by those who oppose Calvinism in this point, that the human Will is a self-moving power resembling the self-moving power of the divine Will, which, as they suppose, has no other cause of its activity and choice than itself: but it appears to me demonstrable, that the divine will is not of that character. For what is divine will, in accurate conception, but the medium of power? Power therefore moves the divine will. Even power however is never exerted, nor can consistently be conceived to be exerted, without a moving cause. And what can there be in God anterior, as to the order of our conception, to will and power, but his nature as infinitely good and wise? § 19. Now, if the divine will be not a selfmoving principle, much less is the human. The human will, as well as the divine, is the medium of active power, of which God is the proper source, without whose voluntary energy, there is no conceivable cause of its continuance. A self-determining human will, therefore, is a complete absurdity. But what does actually determine or move it to action? In a word, what is it beside the exhortation that constitutes the motive? We have proved it cannot be the will itself; it must, therefore, be some radical principle of prior consideration. The radical source, of all active power, or agency, is God; and this power, as flowing from him, is good, since nothing but good can possibly proceed from infinite goodness. Nevertheless, this power in a creature, as well as the will, stands related to defectibility, and the negative cause of that defectibility, as essential to a limited and dependent being; and the same active power may stand related to the indefectibility of God, by participation, in such a manner and degree, that the tendency of defectibility may be counteracted. Here, then, we see that the human will, which is a medium of power, and the power itself which directs it, stand related to two principles,—the cause of defectibility, and the cause of indefec-. tibility; but not in the same respect. The cause of the former, is inseparable from our limited nature; the cause of the latter, is in God, and at his disposal, not our own,—for to sup pose a dependent nature to be essentially related to the cause of indefectibility, is the same as to say, that indefectibility is essentially related to a defectible being, which is incompatible. § 20. Hence we perceive, that the human will may be the medium of active power power in pro: ducing good or evil, according as it stands related to either of the forc-mentioned principles. While under the influence of God, the cause of indefectibility, the effect must be good; but while under the influence of the cause of defectibility, which is a negative principle, the effect will be evil,-each in a moral sense. The former principle is from God, the latter from ourselves. These are essential constituent parts of motive, in a good or bad choice respectively. The other constituent part of a motive, is the objective consideration that solicits the will through the medium of the understanding. If objective considerations constituted the whole of a motive, every will would be moved alike; and indeed endless absurd consequences would follow: and, on the other hand, if the principle constituted the whole of a motive, all 'tations,' persuasions, and solicitations of the will, the heart, or active power, through the medium of the understanding, would be superfluous; which is contrary to universal experi exhor |
