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one power in Europe. I say, sir, by any one power in Europe; for I defy our ministers to show that even the Queen of Hungary desired any such thing before it was resolved on. I believe some of her ministers were free enough to declare that the money those troops cost would have done her much more service; and I am sure we were so far from being called on by the Dutch to do so, that it was resolved on without their participation, and the measures carried into execution, I believe, expressly contrary to their advice.

A peace

pain of being entirely deserted by us.
was offered both by the Emperor and the French,
upon the terms of uti possidetis, with respect to
Germany; but, for what reason I can not com-
prehend, we were so far from advising the Queen
of Hungary to accept, that I believe we advised
her to reject it.

This, sir, was a conduct in our ministers so very extraordinary, so directly opposite to the interest of this nation, and the security of the balance of power, that I can suggest to myself no one reason for it, but that they were resolved to put this nation to the expense of maintaining sixteen thousand Hanoverians. This I am afraid was the true motive with our new ministers for all the warlike measures they resolved on. Nothing would now satisfy us but a conquest of Alsace and Lorraine in order to give them to the Queen of Hungary, as an equivalent for what she had lost. And this we resolved on, or at least pretended to resolve on, at a time when France and Prussia were in close conjunction; at a time when no one of the powers of Europe could assist us; at a time when none of them entertained a jealousy of the ambitious designs of France; and at a time when most of the princes of Ger

of Austria, that we had great reason to apprehend that the most considerable of these would join against us, in case we should meet with any success.

This resolution, sir, was so far from having any influence on the King of Prussia, that he continued firm to his alliance with France, and fought the battle of Czaslau after he knew such a resolution was taken. If he had continued firm in the same sentiments, I am very sure our troops neither would nor could have been of the least service to the Queen of Hungary. But the battle of Czaslau fully convinced him that the French designed chiefly to play one German prince against another, in order to weaken both; and perhaps he had before this discovered, that, according to the French scheme, his share of Silesia was not to be so considerable as he expected. These considerations, and not the elo-many were so jealous of the power of the house quence or address of any of our ministers, inclined him to come to an agreement with the Queen of Hungary. As she was now convinced that she could not depend upon our promises, she readily agreed to his terms, though his demands were now much more extravagant than they were at first; and, what is worse, they were now unaccompanied with any one promise or consideration, except that of a neutrality; whereas his first demands were made palatable by the tender of a large sum of money, and by the promise of his utmost assistance, not only in supporting the Pragmatic Sanction, but in raising her husband, the Duke of Lorraine, to the imperial throne. Nay, originally, he even insinuated that he would embrace the first opportunity to assist in procuring her house an equivalent for whatever part of Silesia she should resign to him.

This accommodation between the Queen of Hungary and the King of Prussia, and that which soon after followed between her and the Duke of Saxony, produced a very great alteration in the affairs of Europe. But, as these last powers promised nothing but a neutrality, and as the Dutch absolutely refused to join, either with the Queen of Hungary or with ourselves, in any of fensive measures against France, it was still impossible for us to think of restoring the house of Austria to such power as to render it a match for the power of France. We ought, therefore, still to have thought only of negotiation, in order to restore the peace of Germany by an accommodation between her and the Emperor. The distresses to which the Bavarian and French armies in Germany were driven furnished us with such an opportunity: this we ought by all means to have embraced, and to have insisted on the Queen of Hungary's doing the same, under the

Sir, if our ministers were really serious in this scheme, it was one of the most romantic that ever entered the head of an English Quixote. But if they made it only a pretext for putting this nation to the expense of maintaining sixteen thousand Hanoverians, or of acquiring some new territory for the Electorate of Hanover, I am sure no British House of Commons can approve their conduct. It is absurd, sir, to say that we could not advise the Queen of Hungary to accept of the terms offered by the Emperor and France, at a time when their troops were cooped up in the city of Prague, and when the terms were offered with a view only to get their troops at liberty, and to take the first opportu nity to attack her with more vigor. This, I say, is absurd, because, had she accepted the terms proposed, she might have had them guaranteed by the Dutch, by the German body, and by all the powerful princes of Germany; which would have brought all these powers into a confederacy with us against the Emperor and France, if they had afterward attacked her in Germany; and all of them, but especially the Dutch, and the King of Prussia, would have been ready to join us, had the French attacked her in Flanders. It is equally absurd to say that she could not accept of these terms, because they contained nothing for the security of her dominions in Italy. suppose the war had continued in Italy, if the Queen of Hungary had been safe upon the side of Germany, she could have poured such a number of troops into Italy as would have been sufficient to oppose and defeat all the armies that both the French and Spaniards could send to and

For

maintain in that country; since we could, by our | got the better of their discretion, as well as of

superior fleets, have made it impossible for the French and Spaniards to maintain great armies in that country.

No other reason can therefore be assigned for the Queen of Hungary's refusal of the terms proposed to her for restoring the tranquillity of Germany than this alone, that we had promised to assist her so effectually as to enable her to conquer a part of France, by way of equivalent for what she had lost in Germany and Italy. Such assistance it was neither our interest nor in our power to give, considering the circumstances of Europe. I am really surprised that the Queen of Hungary came to trust a second time to our promises; for I may venture to prophesy that she will find herself again deceived.

We shall put ourselves to a vast unnecessary expense, as we did when she was first attacked by Prussia; and without being able to raise a jealousy in the other powers of Europe, we shall give France a pretense for conquering Flanders, which, otherwise, she would not have done. We may bring the Queen of Hungary a second time to the verge of destruction, and leave her there; for that we certainly shall do, as soon as Hanover comes to be a second time in danger. From all which I must conclude, that our present scheme of politics is fundamentally wrong, and that the longer we continue to build upon such a foundation, the more dangerous it will be for us. The whole fabric will involve this unfortunate nation in its ruins.

III. But now, sir, let us see how we have Conduct of prosecuted this scheme, bad as it is, durthe war. ing the last campaign. As this nation must bear the chief part of the expense, it was certainly our business to prosecute the war with all possible vigor; to come to action as soon as possible, and to push every advantage to the utmost. Since we soon found that we could not attack the French upon the side of Flanders, why were our troops so long marching into Germany? Or, indeed, I should ask, why our armies were not first assembled in that country? Why did they continue so long inactive upon the Mayn? If our army was not numerous enough to attack the French, why were the Hessians left behind for some time in Flanders? Why did we not send over twenty thousand of those regular troops that were lying idle here at home? How to answer all those questions I can not tell; but it is certain we never thought of attacking the French army in our neighborhood, and, I believe, expected very little to be attacked ourselves. Nay, I doubt much if any action would have happened during the whole campaign, if the French had not, by the misconduct of some one or other of our generals, caught our army in a hose-net, from which it could not have escaped, had all the French generals observed the direction of their commander-in-chief; had they thought only of guarding and fortifying themselves in the defile [Dettingen], and not of marching up to attack our troops. Thank God, sir, the courage of some of the French generals

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their military discipline. This made them attack, instead of waiting to be attacked; and then, by the bravery of the English foot, and the cowardice of their own, they met with a severe repulse, which put their whole army into confusion, and obliged them to retire with precipitation across the Mayn. Our army thus escaped the snare into which they had been led, and was enabled to pursue its retreat to Hanau.

This, sir, was a signal advantage; but was it followed up? Did we press upon the enemy in their precipitate retreat across a great river, where many of them must have been lost had they been closely pursued? Did we endeavor to take the least advantage of the confusion into which their unexpected repulse had thrown them? No, sir; the ardor of the British troops was restrained by the cowardice of the Hanoverians; and, instead of pursuing the enemy, we ourselves ran away in the night with such haste that we left all our wounded to the mercy and care of the enemy, who had the honor of burying our dead as well as their own. This action may, therefore, on our side, be called a fortunate escape; I shall never give my consent to honor it with the name of victory.

After this escape, sir, our army was joined by a very large re-enforcement. Did this revive our courage, or urge us on to give battle? Not in the least, sir; though the French continued for some time upon the German side of the Rhine, we never offered to attack them, or to give them the least disturbance. At last, upon Prince Charles's approach with the Austrian army, the French not only repassed the Rhine, but retired quite out of Germany. And as the Austrian army and the allied army might then have joined, and might both have passed the Rhine without opposition at Mentz, or almost any where in the Palatinate, it was expected that both armies would have marched together into Lorraine, or in search of the French army. in order to force them to a battle. Instead of this, sir, Prince Charles marched up the German side of the Rhine-to do what? To pass that great river, in the sight of a French army equal in number to his own, which, without some extraordinary neglect in the French, was impracticable; and so it was found by experience. Thus the whole campaign upon that side was consumed in often attempting what so often appeared to be impracticable.

On the other side-I mean that of the allied army-was there any thing of consequence performed? I know of nothing, sir, but that of sending a party of hussars into Lorraine with a manifesto. The army, indeed, passed the Rhine at Mentz, and marched up to the French lines upon the frontier of Alsace, but never offered to pass those lines until the French had abandoned them, I believe with a design to draw our army into some snare; for, upon the return of the French toward those lines, we retired with much greater haste than we had advanced, though the Dutch auxiliaries were then come up and pre

tended, at least, to be ready to join our army. | I have heard, however, that they found a pretext for never coming into the line; and I doubt much if they would have marched with us to attack the French army in their own territories, or to invest any of the fortified places; for I must observe that the French lines upon the Queich were not all of them within the territories of France. But suppose this Dutch detachment had been ready to march with us to attack the French in their own territories, or to invest some of their fortified places, I can not join in any congratulation upon that event; for a small detachment of Dutch troops can never enable us to execute the vast scheme we have undertaken. The whole force of that republic would not be sufficient for the purpose, because we should have the majority of the empire against us; and, therefore, if the Dutch had joined totis viribus in our scheme, instead of congratulating, I should have bemoaned their running mad by our example and at our instigation.

IV. Having now briefly examined our past Prospects for conduct, from the few remarks I have the future. made, I believe, sir, it will appear that, supposing our scheme to be in itself possible and practicable, we have no reason to hope for success if it be not prosecuted with more vigor and with better conduct than it was during the last campaign. While we continue in the prosecution of this scheme, whoever may lose, the Hanoverians will be considerable gainers. They will draw four or five hundred thousand pounds yearly from this nation over and above what they have annually drawn, ever since they had the good fortune to be united under the same sovereign with ourselves. But we ought to consider even the Hanoverians ought to consider -that this nation is not now in a condition to carry on an expensive war for ten or twelve years, as it did in the reign of Queen Anne. We may fund it out for one, two, or three years; but the public debt is now so large that, if we go on adding millions to it every year, our credit will at last (sooner, I fear, than some among us may imagine) certainly be undone; and if this misfortune should occur, neither Hanover nor any other foreign state would be able to draw another shilling from the country. A stop to our public credit would put an end to our paper currency. A universal bankruptcy would ensue, and all the little ready money left among us would be locked up in iron chests, or hid in by-corners by the happy possessors. It would then be impossible to raise our taxes, and consequently impossible to maintain either fleets or armies. Our troops abroad would be obliged to enter into the service of any prince that could maintain them, and our troops at home would be obliged to live upon free quarter. But this they could not do long; for the farmer would neither sow nor reap if he found his produce taken from him by the starving soldier. In these circumstances, I must desire the real friends of our

With all their forces.

present happy establishment to consider what might be the consequence of the Pretender's landing among us at the head of a French army. Would he not be looked upon by most men as a savior? Would not the majority of the people join with him, in order to rescue the nation from those that had brought it into such confusion? This danger, sir, is, I hope, imaginary, but I am sure it is far from being so imaginary as that which has been held out in this debate, the danger of all the powers of the continent of Europe being brought under such a slavish dependence upon France as to join with her in conquering this island, or in bringing it under the same slavish dependence with themselves.

I had almost forgotten, sir (I wish future nations may forget), to mention the Treaty of Worms. I wish that treaty could be erased from our annals and our records, so as never to be mentioned hereafter: for that treaty, with its appendix, the convention that followed, is one of the most destructive, unjust, and absurd that was ever concluded. By that treaty we have taken upon ourselves a burden which I think it impossible for us to support; we have engaged in such an act of injustice toward Genoa as must alarm all Europe, and give to the French a most signal advantage. From this, sir, all the princes of Europe will see what regard we have to justice when we think that the power is on our side; most of them, therefore, will probably join with France in curtailing our power, or, at least, in preventing its increase.

fensive alliance, concluded on the 2d of September,

4 The Treaty of Worms was an offensive and de

1743, between England, Austria, and Sardinia. By it the Queen of Hungary agreed to transfer to the King of Sardinia the city and part of the duchy of Placentia, the Vigevanesco, part of the duchy of Pavia, and the county of Anghiera, as well as her claims to the marquisate of Finale, which had been ceded to the Genoese by the late Emperor Charles for which

VI. for the sum of 400,000 golden crowns, it had been previously mortgaged. The Queen of Hungary also engaged to maintain 30,000 men in Italy, to be commanded by the King of Sardinia. Great Britain agreed to pay the sum of £300,000 for the cession of Finale, and to furnish an annual subsidy of £200,000, on the condition that the King of Sardinia should employ 45,000 men. In addition to supplying these sums, Great Britain agreed to send a strong squadron into the Mediterranean, to act in secret convention, agreed to at the same time and concert with the allied forces. By a separate and place as the treaty, but which was never ratified nor publicly avowed, it was stipulated that Great Britain should pay to the Queen of Hungary an annual subsidy of £300,000, not merely during the war, but so long "as the necessity of her affairs should require." The terms of the Treaty of Worms relative to the cession of the marquisate of Finale to Sardinia were particularly unjust to the Genoese, since that territory had been guaranteed to them by the fourth article of the Quadruple Alliance, concluded on the 2d of August, 1718, between Great Britain, France, Austria, and Holland.-Coxe's Austria, chap. civ. Lord Mahon's Hist. of England, vol. iii., p. 231. Belsham's Hist. of England, vol. iv., p. 82, et seq.

The alliance of Sardinia and its assistance may, I admit, be of great use to us in defeating the designs of the Spaniards in Italy. But gold itself may be bought too dear; and I fear we shall find the purchase we have made to be but precarious, especially if Sardinia should be attacked by France as well as by Spain, the almost certain consequence of our present scheme of politics. For these reasons, sir, I hope there is not any gentleman, nor even any minister, who expects that I should declare my satisfaction that this treaty has been concluded.

It is very surprising, sir, to hear gentlemen talk of the great advantages of unanimity in our proceedings, when, at the time, they are doing all they can to prevent unanimity. If the honorable gentleman had intended that what he proposed should be unanimously agreed to, he would have returned to the ancient custom of Parliament which some of his new friends have, on former occasions, so often recommended. It is a new doctrine to pretend that we ought in our address to return some sort of answer to every thing mentioned in his Majesty's speech. It is a doctrine that has prevailed only since our Parliaments began to look more like French than English Parliaments; and now we pretend to be such enemies of France, I supposed we should have laid aside a doctrine which the very method of proceeding in Parliament must show to be false. His Majesty's speech is not now so much as under our consideration, but upon a previous order for that purpose; therefore we can not now properly take notice of its contents, any farther than to determine whether we ought to return thanks for it or not. Even this we may refuse, without being guilty of any breach of duty to our sovereign; but of this, I believe, no gentleman would have thought, had the honorable gentleman who made this motion not attached to it a long and fulsome panegyric upon the conduct of our ministers. I am convinced no gentleman would have objected to our expressing our duty to our sovereign, and our zeal for his service, in the strongest and most affectionate terms: nor

would any gentleman have refused to congratulate his Majesty upon any fortunate event happening to the royal family. The honorable gentleman would have desired no more than this, had he intended that his motion should be unanimously agreed to. But ministers are generally the authors and drawers up of the motion, and they always have a greater regard for themselves than for the service of their sovereign; that is the true reason why such motions seldom meet with unanimous approbation.

As to the danger, sir, of our returning or not returning to our national custom upon this occasion, I think it lies wholly upon the side of our not returning. I have shown that the measures we are now pursuing are fundamentally wrong, and that the longer we pursue them, the heavier our misfortunes will prove. Unless some signal providence interpose, experience, I am convinced, will confirm what I say. By the immediate intervention of Providence, we may, it is true, succeed in the most improbable schemes; but Providence seems to be against us. The sooner, therefore, we repent and amend, the better it will be for us; and unless repentance begins in this House, I shall no where expect it until dire experience has convinced us of our errors.

For these reasons, sir, I wish, I hope, that we may now begin to put a stop to the farther prosecution of these disastrous measures, by refusing them our approbation. If we put a negative upon this question, it may awaken our ministers from their deceitful dreams. If we agree to it, they will dream on till they have dreamed Europe their country, and themselves into utter perdition. If they stop now, the nation may recover; but if by such a flattering address we encourage them to go on, it may soon become impossible for them to retreat. For the sake of Europe, therefore, for the sake of my country, I most heartily join in putting a negative upon the question.

After a protracted debate, the address was carried by a vote of 279 to 149.

SPEECH

OF LORD CHATHAM ON AN ADDRESS TO THE THRONE, IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF TAXING AMERICA IS DISCUSSED, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, JANUARY 14, 1766.

INTRODUCTION.

MR. GEORGE GRENVILLE, during his brief administration from 1763 to 1765, adopted a plan for replenishing the exhausted treasury of Great Britain, which had been often proposed before, but rejected by every preceding minister. It was that of levying direct taxes on the American colonies. His famous Stamp Act was brought forward February 7th, 1765. It was strongly opposed by Colonel Barré, who thus indignantly replied to the charge of ingratitude, brought by Charles Townsend against the Americans, as " children planted by our care, nourished by our indulgence, and protected by our arms," &c. · They planted by your care?" said Colonel Barré: "No! Your oppressions planted them in America. They fled from your tyranny to a then uncultivated and inhospitable country, where they exposed themselves to almost all the hardships to which human nature is liable; and, among others, to the cruelties of a savage foe, the most subtle, and, I will take it upon me to say, the most formidable of any people on earth; and yet, actuated by principles of true English liberty, they met all hardships with pleasure, com

pared with those they suffered in their native land from the hands of those who should have been their friends. They nourished by your indulgence? They grew by your neglect of them! As soon as you began to care about them, that care was exercised in sending persons to rule them, who were, perhaps, the deputies of deputies to some members of this House-sent to spy out their liberties, to misrepresent their actions, and to prey upon them-men promoted to the highest seats of justice; some of whom, to my knowledge, were glad, by going to a foreign country, to escape being brought to the bar of a court of justice in their own. They protected by your arms? They have nobly taken up arms in your defense; have exerted a valor, amid their constant and laborious industry, for the defense of a country whose frontier was drenched in blood, while its interior yielded all its little savings to your emolument. And-believe me-remember I this day told you so that same spirit of freedom which actuated that people at first, will accompany them still. But prudence forbids me to say more. God knows I do not, at this time, speak from motives of party heat. What I deliver are the genuine sentiments of my heart. However superior to me in general knowledge and experience the respectable body of this House may be, I claim to know more of America than most of you, having seen and been conversant with that country. The people are, I believe, as truly loyal as any subjects the King has; but a people jealous of their liberties, and who will vindicate them, if they should ever be violated." This prophetic warning was in vain. The bill was passed on the 22d of March, 1765.

A few months after, the ministry of Mr. Grenville came abruptly to an end, and was followed by the administration of Lord Rockingham. That able statesman was fully convinced that nothing but the repeal of the Stamp Act could restore tranquillity to the colonies, which, according to Colonel Barré's predictions, were in a state of almost open resistance. The news of this resistance reached England at the close of 1765, and Parliament was summoned on the 17th of December. The plan of the ministry was to repeal the Stamp Act; but, in accordance with the King's wishes, to re-assert (in doing so) the right of Parliament to tax the colonies. Against this course Mr. Pitt determined to take his stand; and when the ordinary address was made in answer to the King's speech, he entered at once on the subject of American taxation, in a strain of the boldest eloquence. His speech was reported by Sir Robert Dean, assisted by Lord Charlemont, and, though obviously broken and imperfect, gives us far more of the language actually used by Mr. Pitt than any of the preceding speeches.

SPEECH, &c.

ing (for I love to be explicit), I can not give them my confidence. Pardon me, gentlemen [bowing to the ministry], confidence is a plant of slow growth in an aged bosom. Youth is the season

MR. SPEAKER, I came to town but to-day. | own, I advised them to do it—but, notwithstandI was a stranger to the tenor of his Majesty's speech, and the proposed address, till I heard them read in this House. Unconnected and unconsulted, I have not the means of information. I am fearful of offending through mistake, and of credulity. By comparing events with each therefore beg to be indulged with a second read-other, reasoning from effects to causes, methinks ing of the proposed address. [The address being I plainly discover the traces of an overruling inread, Mr. Pitt went on :] I commend the King's fluence.1 speech, and approve of the address in answer, as it decides nothing, every gentleman being left at perfect liberty to take such a part concerning America as he may afterward see fit. One word only I can not approve of: an "early," is a word that does not belong to the notice the ministry have given to Parliament of the troubles in America. In a matter of such importance, the communication ought to have been immediate!

|

There is a clause in the Act of Settlement obliging every minister to sign his name to the advice which he gives to his sovereign. Would it were observed! I have had the honor to serve the Crown, and if I could have submitted to influence, I might have still continued to serve: but I would not be responsible for others. I have no local attachments. It is indifferent to me whether a man was rocked in his cradle on this side or that side of the Tweed. I sought for merit wherever it was to be found. It is my boast, that I was the first minister who looked for it, and found it, in the mountains of the North. I called it forth, and drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race of men-men, who, when left by your jealousy, became a prey to the artifices of your enemies, and had gone nigh

I speak not now with respect to parties. I stand up in this place single and independent. As to the late ministry [turning himself to Mr. Grenville, who sat within one of him], every capital measure they have taken has been entirely wrong! As to the present gentlemen, to those at least whom I have in my eye [looking at the bench where General Conway sat with the lords of the treasury], I have no objection. I have 'Chas. Butler says in his Reminiscences, "Those never been made a sacrifice by any of them. who remember the air of condescending protection Their characters are fair; and I am always will recollect how much they themselves, at the mo with which the bow was made and the look given glad when men of fair character engage in his ment, were both delighted and awed; and what they Majesty's service. Some of them did me the themselves conceived of the immeasurable superi honor to ask my opinion before they would en-ority of the speaker over every other human being gage. These will now do me the justice to that surrounded him."

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