its splendour; the invention may be grand and prolific; the powers of the imagination unbounded; the mind quick to discern, ardent to pursue, comprehensive to embrace: yet, unless an ordinary judgment be added, every thing will fail. The character, as the vessel without ballast, will want steadiness and direction. It may amuse or astonish; but it will seldom be productive of the highest advantage.

With the conduct of literary attainments the union is equally obvious. Not to mention the importance of this faculty in the prosecution of learning, its salutary improvement can certainly be expected from no other source. Where the connexion of learning and Common Sense happily subsists, no limits can be assigned to the benefits which the scholar may produce. If it be wanting, his adventitious advantages, like the fortifications of a revolted city, only make him the more formidable opponent of truth. Of the adaptation of learning to the most interesting purposes, a late elegant and accomplished scholars was a very honourable example. His various and extensive literature was uniformly directed by an enlightened judgment to objects of real importance to mankind. The best interests of social order and of religion stand indebted to his laborious and

5 Sir William Jones.

successful researches; and we have only to regret that his country and the world were so prematurely deprived of his superior talents.

Connected thus intimately with literature in general, criticism and the art of reasoning may be considered as its peculiar province. Of criticism, indeed, a nervous Common Sense, combined with learning and general information, is not an accessory only, but the very foundation. Criticism is surrounded with dangers. Extreme severity, curious and minute analysis, occasional or local or hasty prejudices may easily betray its decisions. Against these errors a sound judgment can alone prove an effectual guard. It prescribes that narrow and delicate boundary, from which if criticism declines, it becomes the engine of a party, and loses all the deference to which it has ever, when candidly exerted, a just and honourable claim. With regard to logic, it may be doubted whether it be any thing more than the transcription and arrangement of the dictates of Common Sense. It is on this ground that it rests. From this the art of reasoning derives its name, its divisions, its improvement, its prevalence, its solidity, its perfection, and even its existence, as a branch of general knowledge. The syllogistic method of reasoning, its principal boast, may be deemed one of the soundest discoveries of Common Sense to which the world was ever

witness. And the philosopher to whom we are indebted for the invention, amidst his general praise, obtained on this account not the least or most trifling part of his celebrity.

To the art of persuasion, the influence of an ordinary judgment is in every respect necessary. The frigid exposition of truth excites not the affections of the mind. Eloquence, to be effectual, must not only be formed on the cold dictates of science, but be enriched also with a deep and practical knowledge of the human heart. The elegant and measured composition of the closet, the subtilties of science, the difficulties of intricate argument, the nice refinements of language, are lost upon a mixed assembly. An oration, like an instrument, may be polished till it has no edge. It is the plain and impressive address to the Common Sense and common feelings of the mind, which enlightens and rouses those who hear. The polished periods of Isocrates are received with little interest. But when Demosthenes rises, and, leaving the study of words and the elaborate elegancies of expression, paints, in bold and vivid colours, the more prominent evils of their situation, represents Philip already at their borders, and honestly taxes them with a desperate security, the Athenians are roused,

• Aristotle.

and nothing is breathed but ardour and revenge. He is the disciple and the orator of Common Sense. His representations are so forcible, that they arrest the attention of men; so perspicuous and splendid, that, like the light of the sun, their effect is immediate and irresistible.

The dependence of moral philosophy on this important faculty is equally remarkable. The absurdities, which were involved in the systems of ancient ethics, owed their rise to a neglect of its dictates. The impracticable tenets of the Stoics, the licentious dogmas of Epicurus, and the perplexing doctrines of the Academics, were differently, but equally, removed from every rational limit. To systems so repugnant to Common Sense, the doctrines of Socrates form a memorable exception. Following the prescriptions of a discerning judgment, he drew off the attention of men from inquiries of impenetrable obscurity to the cultivation of piety and virtue. By the graceful exhibition of truth, enforced with the finest genius, with admirable powers of irony, and the command of a fascinating eloquence, the Sophists of his age were repressed, and such disciples were formed as have seldom been equalled, and never surpassed, in the republic of letters.

7 Xenophon and Plato.

With the science of natural philosophy the union is not less intimate. Till a grand and noble effort of Common Sense placed its prosecution on the true basis, centuries passed away without any considerable discoveries, or the improvement of what was already known. The ancient system of dialectics, useful and important when acting in its proper sphere, being applied to subjects to which it had no analogy, and being imposed on the world by the authority of a great name and the veneration of long and uninterrupted possession, the progress of physics was slow and fallacious. The most obstinate phenomena were disposed of by propositions of no distinct meaning; and the advances of the student, as of the traveller in a mistaken road, in proportion as they were diligent, only removed him further from accuracy and truth. The appeal, therefore, of the illustrious Bacon from barren argument to experiment and nature, was a sound and eminently important dictate of Common Sense. Perceiving that logic, when applied to philosophy, was considered as determining with equal precision as in cases of moral evidence, he boldly demanded a new and accurate standard: he declared that, not arguments, but facts; not what agreed with principles, but principles themselves; not the demonstration of syllogism, but of experiment and induction, were the