without intimating that there has ever been any controversy upon the subject. It was alfo with a view to the inftruction of youth, that I have been fo particular in my account of what we learn from the fcriptures concerning God, and all the branches of human duty; and, especially, that I have quoted fo much from the fcriptures themfelves on thofe fubjects. My intention was to appear as little as poffible in this matter myself, and to let the facred writers, to whofe more intimate acquaintance I wish to introduce my pupil, speak for themselves. There is, befides, an authority and energy in the language of the fcriptures, which is peculiar to themselves, and which cannot fail, when they are read and confidered with due attention, to make the moft favourable and the ftrongeft impreffions. I have, upon more occafions than one, complained that the fcriptures are too much neglected even by chriftians, though we cannot be too well acquainted with them, and there are no books that we can read with fo much advantage. I fhall be happy if I can make this work alfo fubfervient to my defign of recommending them, and more efpecially to young perfons. This part, which contains an account of what we learn from the scriptures, was far from being intended to fuperfede the ufe of them. It was rather intended to afford fome affistance for the better understanding of them, and thereby thereby to introduce my reader to the diligent study of them, and frequent meditation upon them, with more advantage. I had intended to have prefixed to this part a particular examination of what has been advanced concerning the doctrines and evidences of religion by Dr. Beattie, and especially Dr. Ofwald, who represent common fenfe as fuperfeding almost all reasoning about religion, natural or revealed, and who have advanced maxims which I cannot help thinking to be both ill-founded and dangerous. But finding, after I had made fome progrefs in this work, that it drew to a confiderable length, I thought it would be better to referve the remarks that I had made on those writers to fome other opportunity, when I might enter into a more particular examination of what Dr. Reid has advanced concerning this pretended new principle of common fenfe; and, in the mean time, to content myself with a few general remarks on the fubject, and an extract or two from Dr. Ofwald, that my reader may form fome idea of the nature and spirit of the principles that I mean to oppofe*. I am truly forry to complain of the conduct of any of the fincere friends of revelation, as I be * Since this was written I have published, in a separate vo·lume, An Examination of the writings of Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald. lieve Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald to be; but it appears to me, that their writings must neceffarily give a great, and a very plausible advantage to unbelievers; who, finding that it is not now pretended that religion in general, or christianity in particular, is founded on argument, will make no difficulty of rejecting them on the principles of common fenfe alfo, and will not be displeased to find that chriftian writers will argue the matter with them no longer. This common fenfe, which is from henceforth to be confidered as the first, and likewife the last refort with respect to religion, and the evidences of it, thefe writers represent as being the fame power or faculty by which we judge that the whole is greater than a part, and by which we diftinguish all other felf-evident truths from palpable abfurdities. By the very concise process of an appeal to this principle, they fay, that any man may fully fatisfy himself concerning the truth of the being, the unity, the attributes, and the providence of God, and alfo of a future ftate of retribution, and even (as Dr. Ofwald has given out, and has promised to prove at large) of the evidences of chriftianity. Upon this plan I might have faved myself the trouble of writing the preceding parts of this work, in which my object has been to prove the truth of the above-mentioned propofitions, contenting my felf felf with roundly afferting them; and, without replying to any of the objections of unbelievers, not hesitating to pronounce every man a fool (fee Dr. Ofwald's Appeal, p. 134.) who did not affent to them. But, notwithstanding, I have given all the attention I could to the treatife of Dr. Ofwald, who has written most fully on the fubject, I am by no means convinced that the propofitions above-mentioned are to be claffed among primary truths, or thofe to which every man must neceffarily give his affent (when the terms of them have been properly explained) without the help of other intermediate propofitions. And as I have no natural right to fet up my private judgment as the ftandard of truth, in oppofition to that of the rest of mankind, I do not fee but that an unbeliever is as much at liberty to affert the falfhood, as I am to affert the truth of fuch propofitions; and what would be gained by our reciprocally calling one another fools and blockheads? The fource of this umbrage that has been taken at reasoning about religion, appears to me to have been a mistake concerning the nature of it, and an expectation of a kind, or degree of evidence, that the nature of the cafe will not admit of; and which, indeed, is by no means neceffary for the purpose to which it is applied; being different from, or fuperior to, that evidence which, in other other fimilar cafes, does actually produce conviction, and influence the conduct; which, however, is evidently all that can be neceffary in the business of religion. If a lottery be proposed to me, in which I fee that there are a thousand prizes to one blank, I do not demur about purchasing a ticket, because it cannot be abfolutely demonftrated that I fhall be a gainer by it; a very high degree of probability having an effect upon the mind, that can hardly be distinguished from that of absolute certainty. If the Copernican hypothesis of the solar system be proposed to ine, I do not reject it, or even keep my mind in fufpenfe, because there is a poffibility of the Ptolemaic fyftem being true, and because the fun, immenfe as it is, and rapid as its motion muft be, may revolve round the earth. This is ftill more evidently the case with respect to the influence of teftimony upon the mind of man, though it can never amount to more than a very high degree of probability. For we reafon and act upon the fuppofition of there having been fuch a man as Julius Cæfar, of his having been ftabbed in the fenate-house, and of there being fuch a city as Pekin in China, juft as if we ourselves had been present at those scenes, or places; though there is a poffibility of all the books we have read having been contrived to impofe upon us and the world, |