ed. In prefentments or indictments by grand juries, and on impeachments by the houfe of commons, peers are to be tried by their peers alone; for, in all criminal cafes, they are privileged from the jurif diction of inferior courts, excepting on appeals for murder or robbery. Peers are alfo exempted from ferving on inquefts. And, in all civil cafes, where a peer is plaintiff, there must be two or more knights impannelled on the jury. The bishops, or fpiritual lords, have privilege of parliament, but have not the above privileges of perfonal nobility. In all criminal cafes, faving attainder and impeachment, they are to be tried by a petit jury. Moreover, bishops do not vote, in the house of lords, on the trial of any perfon for a capital crime. All the temporal and spiritual nobles that compose the house of lords, however different in their titles and degrees of nobility, are called peers (pares) or equals; because their voices are admitted as of equal value, and that the vote of a bithop or baron fhall be equivalent to that of an archbishop or duke. The capital privilege (or rather prero gative) of the house of peers confits in their being the fupreme court of judica ture, to whom the final decifion of all -civil caufes are confided and referred, in the last refort. This conftitutional privilege is a weighty counterpoife to his majesty's fecond prerogative of appointing the adminiAtrators of juftice throughout the nation; forafmuch as judges (who are immediately under the influence of the crown) are yet intimidated from infringing, by any fentence, on the laws or conftitution of these realms, while a judg ment, fo highly fuperior to their own, impends. The fecond great privilege of the house of peers confifts in their having the fole judicature of all impeachments commenced and profecuted by the commons. And this, again, is a very weighty counterpoife to his majefty's third prerogative of the executive government of thefe nations by his minifters, fince no minister can be fo great, as not justly to dread the coming under a judgment, from which the mightinels of his royal mafter cannot protect him. The third capital privilege of the house of peers fubfifts in their fhare, or particular department of rights, in the legiflature. This extends to the framing of any bills, at their pleasure, for the purposes of good government; faving always to the the commons their incommunicable right of granting taxes or fubfidies to be levied on their conftituents. But, on fuch bills, as on all others, the houfe of lords have a negative; a happy counterpoife to the power both of king and commons, fhould demands on the one part, or bounties on the other, exceed what is requifite. The change of the ancient Modus, in conferring nobility, has not hitherto, as I truft, been, of any confiderable detriment to the weal of the people. But, fhould fome future majefty, or rather fome future miniftry, entitle folk to a voice in the fecond eftate, on any confideration, fave that of eminent virtue and patriot fervice; might it be poflible that fuch minifters (hould take a surther ftride, and confer nobility for actions deferving of infamy; fhould they even covenant to grant fuch honours and dignities, in lieu of fervices fubverfive of the conftitution; a majority of fuch a peerage must either prove too light to effect any public benefit, or heavy enough to effect the public perdition. The The DEMOCRATICA L, or THIRD ESTATE.. HE ELECTION of commoners, to be immediate trustees and apt repre fentatives of the people in parliament; is the hereditary and indefeasible privi lege of the people. It is the privilege which they accepted, and which they re tain, in exchange of their original inherent and hereditary right of fitting with the king and peers IN PERSON, for the guardianship of their own liberties, and the inftitution of their own laws. Such reprefentatives, therefore, can ne ver have it in their power to give, delegate, or extinguifh the whole or any part of the people's infeparable and unextinguifhable fhare in the legislative power; neither to impart the fame to any one of the other eftates, or to any perfons or perfon whatever, either in or out of parliament. Where plenipotentiaries take upon them to abolish the authority of their own principals; or where any fecondary agents attempt to defeat the power of their primaries; fuch agents and plenipotentiaries defeat their own commiffion, and all the powers of the truft neceffarily revert to the conftituents. The The perfons of these temporary trustees of the people, during their fefsion, and for fourteen days before and after every meeting, adjournment, prorogation, and diffolution of parliament, are equally exempted, with the perfons of peers, from arrefts and durefs of every fort. They are alfo, during their feffion, to have ready access to the king or house of lords, and to address or confer with them on all occafions. No member of the houfe of commons no more than of the house of peers, fhall fuffer, or be queftioned, or compelled to witness or anfwer, in any court or place whatsoever, touching any thing said or done by himself or others in parliament; in order that perfect freedom of speech and action may leave nothing undone for the public weal. They have alfo, during feffion, an equal power with the house of lords, to punish any who fhall presume to traduce their dignity, or detract from the rights or privileges of any member of the house. The commons form a court of judicature, diftinct from the judicature of the houfe of lords. Theirs is the peculiar privilege to try and adjudge the legality of the election of their own members. They may fine and confine their own members, |