the British government, to deliberate about such matters of common concern as may be laid before them, might be productive of various beneficial consequences. It would assist in obliterating appearances of subjugation, which must be ever galling in some degree to the vanquished. It would highly gratify the feelings of the rulers, and the partialities of the people, who, in general, retain a high respect for their native governors. It would cause the latter to appreciate the advantages of union, and give them a stake, in point of gratitude, of honour, and of interest, in the support of that establishment, by which they should be thus embodied. It would attach the hearts of the natives, and secure their submission to the constituted authorities, by giving it the appearance of obedience to their own rulers. It would concentrate the administration of the empire, and give it that compacted form of which it might be susceptible, and which, as we have before suggested, would be highly conducive to its security and interests. And, above all, it would enable the presiding powers to avail themselves of the wisdom of the native princes in forming their plans of reformation, and of a more dignified and perfect co-operation in conducting them to a happy consummation. We are sensible the apprehension, that such an association

Present go

vernors.

would afford the subordinate states facilities of combining against the ruling power, might be urged as a formidable objection to this measure. But this objection appears to be more specious than solid. Assuredly, that they are not constitutionally assembled, will not of itself prevent hostile confederacies: and, since all their intercourse and transactions must necessarily be conducted under the eye of the general government, their being legally convened, when duly considered, cannot be supposed even to facilitate such conspiracies.

It might be expected, from the national character of the Gentoos, that their native rulers would be mild in their sway, and endeared to their subjects. Such is the fact. The government of the Omrahs, Soubahs, Rajahs, &c. partakes much of the patriarchal character; and, though by the constitution uncontrouled, is, we are told, seldom tyrannically exercised. Each of them (generally speaking) acts as a patriot prince: each of them is regarded with reverence and with love, as the father of his people *. Those territorial arrangements existing in India, similar to the feudal system in Europe, which carry up the views of the subjects to the

*Dr Robertson's App. Disq. concerning India, p. 268.

throne, as not only the seat of authority, but the source of property, contribute greatly to confirm these attachments. To tear asunder ties so intimate and sacred, by displacing the Hindoo rulers, would be a measure violent, dangerous, highly inexpedient; and accordingly, by a wise policy, has been declined. But the other extreme, which is probably not less impolitic, has not been avoided with equal care. To strip the native princes of their splendour, and of those revenues which are necessary to maintain their consequence; to reduce them to be mere pageants of state and shadows of former royalty, is to make them appear, too obviously, to be the degraded tools of foreign dominion; is to deprive them, however well affected, of all influence with the natives, and of all power to promote either the British interests or those plans of policy which have the progressive civilization of the natives in view. While, then, they are intended to serve as an intermediate link in that great chain of policy, which binds the people to the presiding government, let them not, by being spoiled of their hereditary emoluments and honours, be so enfeebled as to be incapacitated for fulfilling that important office, and holding together, with sufficient firmness and dignity, the different parts of the great system. Let not solicitude, lest they be exalted so high as to be capable of doing injury, induce us to de

Laws.

press them so low, that they can prove of no essential service. Anxious that they may not possess power sufficient to disturb the tranquillity of the new order of things, or regain their ancient sovereignty, let us also beware, lest, by oppressive exactions, and by bereaving them of every remnant of their former greatness, we either inspire disaffection and instigate them to rebellion, or, having stripped them of all consequence, render them, if they maintain their allegiance, entirely useless and idly cumbersome to our government.

That political, and even juridical institutions have great influence in forming, or fixing, the manners of a people, is readily admitted; but, when sanguine theorists ascribe to them an efficacy almost omnipotent, forgetting at once the history of human governments, and the character of human nature, they only move our pity or our scorn. The truth is, that, except in a few extraordinary instances, both the general system of policy, and the particular laws of every state, have originated in circumstances previously existing, and indicate a spirit already operating. This is the fact with respect to the Indian legislation. It uniformly bears the mild and discriminating characters of a race, inoffensive and somewhat advanced in civilisation; and seems to have grown out of a state of things, which is known to have existed among that people from time immemorial. Every one

3

may recollect the high encomium bestowed by the celebrated Montesquieu upon the criminal jurisprudence of Hindostan. "The people of India," says he, "are mild, tender, and compassionate. Hence their legislators repose a great confidence in them. They have established very few punishments, these are not severe, nor are they rigorously executed."—" Happy climate, which gives birth to purity of manners, and produces lenity of laws *!" The latter part of this panegyric is not unmerited. Nor would it be wise in us to alter the character of this division of their code. Even any statute, providing a penalty for insubordination to the new order of things, would be impolitic. It could give no additional security to the established authorities, and would serve only to remind the Hindoos continually, that they were a conquered nation. Without introducing new penal statutes, let it be the ambition of the government of India, to assume, and, as far as circumstances will permit, liberally to exercise, that high prerogative of dispensing mercy, which belongs to the supreme power. In presiding over this interesting department of duty, the chief magistrate will have many opportunities of ingratiating himself

Spirit of Laws, vol. i. pp. 282, 283.

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