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our alliances with such tribes as, by their situation, their courage, their resources, their attachment, are most able, or most disposed, to counteract the intrigues, and intercept or repel the attacks, of our enemies. These remarks apply chiefly to the Mahrattas ; and the above seem to have been the views of policy which dictated the sacrifices made to the Poonah tribe after the late conquests : sacrifices which, considering the power and vicinity of this people, appear to have been both wise and moderate. But, with respect to Alliances adall the other country powers, should a steady plan of amelioration, rural commercial and political, be pursued, such alliances will be easily formed ; since it must soon appear to be both the interest and honour of the adjacent states to put themselves under the protection of Britain ; to form the most intimate relations with a government at once generous and powerful; who, blessing her subjects and friends, is formidable only to her foes; who demonstrates that she knows so well, both how to assert her own rights, and humble her aggressors,—to defend her allies, and rule but for the benefit of the human race.
The splendour of a policy so noble, will shine abroad, remote. and enable the government farther to secure the tranquillity of the Company's territories by arrangements with distant
powers. At length the importance of Egypt, as an avenue to Hindostan, is perceived ; and all our interest and exertions must be employed to prevent our enemies from regaining possession of that country. The friendship of Persia would prove a barrier on the west. On the east, an alliance with the Burman empire would establish our security in that quarter. The possession of the Cape of Good Hope would give us, in a great measure, the command of the navigation from Europe. Nor may it be accounted romantic to hope, that, in the course of time, our settlement in South Wales may be of essential advantage, in several respects, to the establishment and support of our empire in Asia.
III. Internal arrangements.
Besides these securities against external aggression, which seem necessary to obtain such a measure of domestic tranquillity, as is essential to a steady and successful prosecution of any scheme of reformation, there are certain internal objects of a general character, which will be highly conducive to this end.
Of these, order, being one of the most obvious, may be first mentioned. There must be a certain concentration in the economy of the empire. Nothing will contribute more to tranquillity and success, than compactness in the consti
tution and administration of affairs. A loose and detached policy, consisting of parts ill sorted or feebly connected, is ever ready to fall to pieces of itself; and, amid such concussions of society as may ordinarily be contemplated, especially in a new state of things, will probably soon sink into disorganisation and anarchy. But a scheme of government, intimately connected and harmoniously conspiring to one object, promises, in the natural course of events, to survive long, and prove efficient. This concentration may be local: and, in order promote it more perfectly, it is submitted, whether the seat of government in the Deccan, where the chief danger now lies, and where the bounds of the empire have 'of late been most enlarged, should not be removed from Madras on the coast, to Seringapatam, a central city, capable of being strongly fortified, and the ancient residence of majesty. An exactly organised system of communication, betwixt the capital and the remote parts of the empire, would contribute also, in a high degree, to the same desirable end. The lucidus ordo of detail, the methodised, systematic plan, is as indispensable in the constitution and administration of a government, as in the composition of a discourse. To insure the effect, the observance of unity of design and distribution is not less necessary, in the high
er departments of political economy, than in the plot and incidents of a well-wrought tragedy.
To this exact arrangement of parts may be added a gradual and judicious developement of the scheme. In doing this, it seems most expedient to begin with the superior parts; because these, being comprehensive and commanding in their nature and influence, involve and secure the lower; whereas to set out, as the timid and impolitic are apt to do, with trying the inferior, and thence proceeding to the higher, is as if an army, in the face of an enemy drawn up in extended line and expecting hourly the arrival of a powerful reinforcement, should prefer the slow and successive mode of firing by platoons or files, to the vollied discharge, which might at once achieve the victory *.
Much will depend upon a willing subordination of the conquered provinces. Far indeed will a wise government be from imagining they have gained every point, when they have only suppressed opposition, and extorted passive submission from their subjects. No: it is not the stillness of fear which produces torpor, but the tranquillity of satisfaction, and of good order, that is favourable to useful and ho
jection of the patives.
* Vide note L.
nourable activity: it is not the death-like calm, which frequently portends the desolating tempest, but that pleasing serenity which attends the higher order of operations and enjoyments in the universe, and is conducive to the production or display of all the beauties of the earth, of all the splendours of the heavens, that good rulers will seek to create, or delight to contemplate. But how is this pleasing result to be obtained ? How is the cordial subjection of the natives to be insured ? Those forces which are competent to repel invasion, may also be sufficient, in ordinary cases, to subdue disaffection. But, in executive policy, as in criminal jurisprudence, it is better to prevent than to punish the violations of law; and, under a prudent administration, an appeal to arms will always be the last resource, and very infrequent. Another measure, not less efficient, though less obvious, than the terrors of a standing army, offers itself to our adoption. It is the construction of cities in favourable situations, to be occupied by colonists and natives, in such proportions and with such privileges respectively, as circumstances may require. This is no theoretic suggestion. It has been tried, and tried with complete success. Alexander the Great, to whose policy we have already appealed, and of whose talents as a statesman the world seem hitherto to have