tuents, that his powers will not be abused. His abilities and force of character, should be a pledge that, what man can do for the good of the empire, he will accomplish. To others may be left the care of the subordinate arrangements. They may manage the routine of business, and the investments of the Company: they may digest the laws, or dictate judicial decisions: they may attend to the forms of court etiquette, and conduct diplomatic procedure: they may regulate the discipline of the troops, and arrange the details of provincial administration. But he is destined to preside and talents. over all; the soul of the system; the potent arm that puts in motion the whole machine of government; the mighty master-mind that illuminates and controuls the whole operations in subserviency to the grand design. His presence, by the efficiency of the means he employs, and the universality of his influence, should seem to be felt everywhere. His hand, by the well-arranged energies of administration, must appear always ready to reward the industrious and the good, to protect the weak, to stimulate the slothful, to fall upon the head of the insurgent and oppressor. And his should be that rare adaptation of character and talent, which will suit circumstances as they arise. For it is not to be forgotten, that whatever abilities may have been display

ed in the government of India, (and these have not been small) the arrangement and execution of plans of improvement so complicated and novel as the circumstances of that great empire demand, will, in all probability, require that new talents and new energies be called forth into action.

II.

Tranquillity.

The external security of the empire is an object of primary importance in itself: and, if not essentially necessary, will be greatly conducive, to the promotion of any scheme of amelioration. It is not amid the agitations of the tempest, but under the serene sky, that the husbandman prosecutes his labours, or scatters the seed of his future harvest. And, without that degree of tranquillity which peace creates, or that confidence which adequate means of defence (under Its necessity Providence) inspire, projects of internal improvement cannot be prosecuted by the individual, or by the government, with sufficient steadiness and success. Not only does war (though alas! too often necessary) violate the laws of humanity, but also induce a certain ferocity of character, and divert the attention from those arts of industry, from that application to mental and moral improvement, which are essential to civilisation. To provide against this evil, will be

and advan

tages.

a principal object of the policy of a wise and good government. But it is obvious, that, in proportion to the extent of the British empire in Hindostan; to the extreme length of boundary, unprotected by natural barriers, which it presents; and to the number of hostile, powerful, and restless tribes on this open limit, must be the difficulty of maintaining peace, and providing for the public safety. In the present improved state of modern tactics, to dream of securing the latter by a wall of defence, similar to that which defends China from the incursion of the Tartars, were as ridiculous as to environ France with a bound-hedge, or Britain with a breast-work, to defend them from external alarms and invasion. To commit the safety of our empire in India to a chain of military stations, extending the whole length of the exposed frontier, would be an expedient, if not ineffectual, yet extremely precarious and expensive. The attainment of a secure tranquillity, however, must appear an object of the first importance, not only to the stability, but also to the improvement of our empire in the East.

To what circumstances, then, must we look for the defence Means of oband tranquillity of our Asiatic possessions?

That policy, which placed the domains of the East India Company under the protection and controul of the state,

taining it.

though originally resisted with obstinacy, and at last acceded to with reluctance, must, upon reflection, appear to have been wise and salutary for both parties. On the one hand, a territory so vast, a trade so rich, and in some of its branches interfering with the interests of the mother coun try, mercantile or manufacturing, held exclusively by any one corporation, must necessarily be an object of jealousy to government, of umbrage, perhaps of injury, to the other commercial interests of the country, and therefore require to be put under a common controul. On the other, a private Company being less respectable in the eyes of foreign nations, and of resources more circumscribed, both more readily invites, and is less able to repel attack, than a great state. But, placed by the incorporating union under the broad shield, and defended by all the energies of the British government, the East India Company assumes a dignified and formidable attitude in the eyes of the world. She is, what Britain is. The whole weight of the empire goes to increase her respectability; the whole resources of the empire go to ascertain the permanence and safety of her possessions. This union, so important to both, and so greatly subservient to the peace and prosperity of Hindostan, ought to be sedulously maintained and strengthened. If ever a

time arrive, when this auspicious association shall be dissolved, by factious intrigue on the one side, or impolitic concession on the other, there can thenceforth be little reason to hope, that a possession so remote, so enviable, and thus separated from its great protector, will remain long either in internal peace, or in subjection to British influence.

force.

But the political connection of the territories of the Com- Military pany with our powerful nation, will not be enough of itself to maintain their tranquillity, or deter the neighbouring tribes from acts of hostility. The immense distance betwixt India and Britain will incessantly allure the envious and restless to invasion; and, without an adequate military establishment, and such arrangements for defence and for avenging aggression as may appear formidable, in the eyes of surrounding states, the permanency of our government in India must be very precarious. A respectable standing army, disposed in such places, and in such proportions, as local circumstances, the spirit of the country, the temper and views of contiguous powers, and the purposes of concentration and co-operation may require, seems, at least for the present, essentially necessary, both to the security of the empire, and to the steady prosecution of any plans of polity which may be adopted. And whoever considers the