not on this account more friendly to the doctrine of grace, nor less liable to become the food of a self. righteous spirit. The way in which this spirit is cut up in the new testament is, not by reducing faith to an unfeeling speculation, but by denouncing the curse against every one who cometh short of perfect obedience. Gal. iii. 10.

It has been further said, "Faith purifies the heart, worketh by love, and discovereth itself sin cere by the performance of good works. Faith therefore is not holiness, love, or new obedience, unless the effect is the same with the cause, or the evidence with the thing proved." Faith certainly is not the same thing as holiness, or love, or new obedience. Neither is unbelief the same thing as unholiness, enmity, or disobedience; but it is not so distinct from either, as not to partake of the same general nature. It is not only the root of all other sin, but is itself a sin. In like manner, faith is not only the root of all other obedience, but is itself an exercise of obedience. It is called "obeying the truth," and "and obeying the gospel.' To say that faith includes no holiness, (which this objection certainly does) and yet pro- duces it, as the seed produces the plant, is to contradict the established laws of nature, according to which, every seed produces its own body. God can produce something out of nothing, but in the ordinary course of traduction every seed produces after its kind. If holiness therefore were not included in faith, it would not grow out of it.

Mr. M'LEAN does not agree with Mr. Sande

* Rom. vi. 17.-1 Pet. i. 22.-Rom. x. 16..

MAN in considering faith as a passive admission of the truth, but allows it to be an act or exercise of the mind.* A large part of his work however, is taken up in attempting to prove that it is a mere exercise of the understanding, exclusive of every thing pertaining to the will and affections. It is no part of the question between him and me, whether properly speaking, it has its seat in the understanding; for this it may have, and yet be influenced by the disposition. Unbelief hath its seat in the understanding as much as belief, yet it is not denied that this is influenced by the disposition. "It arises (says Mr. M'LEAN) not merely from ignorance, but also from the aversion of the will whereby the judgment is blinded, and most unreasonably prejudiced against the truth."-Nor had Mr. M'LEAN any just ground for construing what I had said in proof of faith in Christ, being such a belief as arises from a renewal of the spirit of the mind, as an attempt to " prove that faith is more than belief." p. 80. He allows unbelief to arise in part from disposition; yet I suppose he would not be thought by this concession to make it something more than unbelief. If unbelief may consist in such a discredit of the gospel as arises from aversion to it, and yet be nothing more than unbelief, faith may consist in such a credit of the gospel as arises from a renewal of the spirit of the mind and yet be nothing more than belief.

To this may be added, if faith in Christ be a duty commauded of God, an act of the human mind, an exercise of obedience to God, all which

* Reply, p. 74, 75.

+ Ibid p. 76.

Mr. M. acknowledges) it must be the effect of regeneration, or it will follow that they that are in the flesh may please God.

Mr. M'LEAN speaks much of simple belief, as Mr. SANDEMAN did of bare belief. Mr. S. manifestly intended hereby to exclude every " advance" of the sinner to Christ, as signified by such terms as coming to Christ, trusting in him, &c. from justifying faith. Such may be the intention of Mr. M'LEAN: if it be not, I do not understand the use of the epithet. He however cannot consistently reject every “advance" of the mind to Christ as belonging to justifying 'faith, since he acknowledges the soul to be active in believing. But while dwelling so much on simple belief, why does he not dwell also on simple unbelief? If belief be simple, so must unbelief, for they are opposites. And I readily acknowledge there are such things as simple belief and simple unbelief; but neither of them apply to the credit or discredit of the gospel. If a stranger, who has no claim on my confidence, relate a story of something that he has seen in a distant country, but which in no way concerns me, I may believe him, or disbelieve him: my faith in the one case, or my unbelief in the other, would be perfectly simple. But if it be a story of deep interest, if the undoubted veracity of the party have a claim on my confidence, and if my future course of life turns upon the credit or discredit that I give him, neither the one nor the other will be simple, but compounded of a number of moral principles which influence my decision: if to discredit his testimony,

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they are prejudices which blind me to the force of evidence; if to credit it, candour, or openness to conviction. It is thus in believing the gospel, which is a subject of the deepest interest, testified by a being whose veracity it is a crime to question, and of such consequence to a sinner, even in this life, that if he admit it, he must relinquish all his former courses and live a new life. Intrenched in prejudice, self-righteousness, and the love of sin, he continues an unbeliever till these strong holds are beaten down; nor will he believe so long as a wreck of them remains sufficient to shelter him against the arrows of conviction; nor, in short, till by the renovating influence of the Holy Spirit, they fall to the ground. It is then, and not till then, that the doctrine of salvation by mere grace through a mediator, is cordially believed..

Mr. M'LEAN in his arguing for what he calls simple belief, seems to be aware that it is not the proper opposite of unbelief as described in the scriptures. Hence he somewhere alleges, that we cannot reason from the nature of unbelief to that of belief, any more than from that of demerit to merit. But the disparity between demerit and merit, to which he refers, does not respect their nature but the condition of the party who is the subject of them. Merit is the desert of good, and demerit the desert of evil: they are therefore properly opposites, whatever may be the condition of the party as to being equally capable of exercising them; and it is fair in ascertaining their nature to argue from the one to the other.

Upon the whole, I see no reason to retract what I have in substance said before, that if faith and unbelief be opposites, (which to deny, were disowning that which is self-evident) the one can be no more simple or exclusive of the influence of the will, than the other.

Yours, &c.

LETTER III.

Containing a more particular inquiry into the consequences of Mr. Sandeman's notion of justifying faith.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

You will not conclude from any thing I have said, or may yet say, that I accuse every one who favours this doctrine of holding all the consequences which may be proved to arise from it; it is, however, a fair method of trying a principle by pointing out other principles to which it leads, which, if contrary to the scriptures, furhish reasons for rejecting it.

If the faith by which we are justified be a mere passive reception of light, or contain no exercise of affection, it follows:

First, That repentance is not necessary to forgiveness. It is allowed on all hands, that justification includes the forgiveness of sin. Whatever differences there be between them, they are not so different but that he that is justified is for