(0) Grot.

de Verit.

then Judge of Ifrael, about Three hun, dred Years after they had been in poffeffion of the promised Land. He farther fhews, from Lucian, that Ocellus Lucanus was a Scholar of Pythagoras; who lived, fure, long enough after Mofes, to fave our Author's Criticism, or to expofe it. Indeed, the beft Account we have in Heathen Antiquity, agrees exacly with the Hiftory of Mofes, concerning the Creation of the World. Ariftotle (o) himself was Annot. ad not fatisfied in his own Doctrine of the Eternity of the World, and he (p) Ariftot. (p) confeffes, that all the Philofophers LI.C.Io. afferted the Creation of it and as for (9) Meta- the manner of the Creation, (q) he fays, it was efteemed a very ancient Doctrine, and thought, by fome, to be the Doctrine of the most ancient Theologifts, That it was formed out (r)Tull de of Water. It is certain,that (r) Thales, I. 1. the first Greek Philofopher who treated De Legib, of these things, one of the Seven Wife Men of Greece, and the Wifeft of

c. 7. 1. 1.

de Cœlo,

phys. 1. 1.

C. 3.

Nat. Deor.

them,

them, in Tully's judgment, taught, That God formed all things out of Water.

of Reason,

The fame Gentleman has obferv'd, (5) That the Epicurean Deifts labour to (3) Oracl have their Vices imputed rather to a p. 93. Superiority of their Reason above that of others, than to a Servitude of their Reafon to their own Paffions; which fhews, Vice is naturally esteemed a bafe and low thing, It is but too plain, that this was his own cafe, as his unhappy Death declared.

This, I think, is fufficient to fhew, how little this Book deferves the vain Title of The Oracles of Reason: it will be hard to meet with any Book, which has less right to fo high a Pretence. I fhall take notice but of one thing more, and that is, (t) Mr. Gildon's At- (1) Ibid. tempt to prove the Materiality of the P. 187. Soul; his Arguments are as unlikely to prove it, as moft I have feen: but I fhall fhew the Notion to be abfurd in it felf, and impoffible to be maintained. C 4

4

The

The Effence of all Matter must be the fame, whether Extenfion, or any thing else, be affign'd as the Effence of it; and though we may be ignorant of the Effence of Matter, yet we know it cannot be effential to it to Think for then all Matter would neceffarily Think. But the difference in the feveral forts of Matter can be only in Accidents, that is, in Bulk, Reft, Motion, Situation, and Figure, none of which can render Matter capable of Thought. For if a different Bulk of Matter could produce Thought in it, and the Subtile Matter fhould be able to Think and Reason, though the Grofs cannot, then the Parts of a Stone would think, when it is ground to Duft; though when they are joined and compacted together, they make up a Body, as unlikely to think, as any thing we can imagine. If Reft could cause Matter to think, a Stone would be the moft thinking Creature in the World. If Motion

could

could cause it, then that which moves with most quickness, would, think moft, as Fire, and the Sun, and Stars: but Motion is only a fucceffive change of Place, and there is no reafon why Matter fhould think in one place, rather than in another; or why it should think, when it is moved in a Right Line, or in a Circle, or in any Curve Line, rather than when it lies fill. Again, There is no reafon why Matter fhould be able to think, or not think, according to its Situation or Position; why it fhould think in the Brain, rather than upon the Trencher; or when it is digefted, and reduced to Animal Spirits, rather than when it is in a more compacted Subftance, and has a different relation to the parts of Matter about it. Laftly, If any fort of Figure could produce Thought, Stones muft certainly think, as well as the beft of us; and fo, indeed, might any thing elfe: for what Body is there that may

not

not fubfift under all varieties of Figure?

Neither can any lucky conjun&ture of all these together produce a Power and Faculty of Thinking. For, imagine what Bulk, Reft or Motion, Situation and Figure you can, to meet together, they are all alike uncapable of fo much as one Thought; fince there is nothing in the Nature of any of these Accidents or Modifications of Matter, but it is as far from any Power of Thinking, as Matter it felf is; and therefore Thinking can no more arife from a combination of them together, than it can proceed from the amaffing together of Matter. All the Accidents, but Motion, have nothing Active or Operative in theïn, but are only Matter under different Modes and Relations. And Motion, whatever the Figure, or Bulk and Contexture of any Body may be, can be but Motion ftill: and fuppofe what Contexture or Modifications you will ;what