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Knowledge, or their pre-conceiv'd Notions and warping Prejudices?

As to his Challenge of naming any one fingle Point of Inspiration, or mere Revelation, wherein they are agreed. I fancy I can name him two. One is the Prophecy, That there fhall be falle Teachers, who fhall privily bring in damnable Herefres, even denying the Lord that bought them They are fufficiently agreed in the Truth of that, by unhappy Experience. Another thing of mere Revelation they are united and agreed in is, That Jefus Chrift the Mediator between God and Man, is Son of God, and Son of Man Had Chri ftians been fo prudent as to have refted in that infpired Definition, or general Declaration of that moft complete Mediator of Redemption; and Interceffion for the Salvation of the World, what Rivers of Ink, and Blood might have been faved for better Ufes!

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2. The fecond Ground of his Indignation and outrageous ill Treatment of Pofitives is, because they are not congenerate Means for carrying on and improving moral Righteoufnefs (I prefume he intendeds by that Expreffion congruous,, apt, or well fitted for that purpofe). With refpect to thefe, he openly declares, he receives [Mat*ters of Revelation] upon the natural Reafons and Fitnefs of the Things themfelves, and not upon Teftimony at all "That there is one, and but one certain and infallible Mark, or Criterion of Divine Truth, or of any Doctrine as coming from God, which we are obliged to comply with as a Matter of Re

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"ligion and Confcience: And that is the moral "Truth, Reason or Fitness of the Thing itself *," he elsewhere dogmatically pronounces that "there is nothing of that Sort, no manner of Con"nection between thefe Means and that End. "That every pofitive Law, of what Nature or "Kind foever, must be just and right, fuppo

fing it to be a Command from God, (speak"ing of that to Abraham for facrificing Ifaac) "how unreasonable or unfit foever it might ap"pear to our weak, imperfect, and limited Un"derstandings: But then the Question is, how "God fhould command any fuch Things, or "what Proof could be given of it if he did +." If therefore any of thofe Pofitives prefents itself in a different View, it is infufferable. "And if "there are any pofitive Laws in Religion, it "muft confift in keeping clofe to the original "Inftitution." This pofitive Writer, it seems, has not the least Charity, not one civil or respect ful Word, nor any the leaft Regard for these pofitive, instituted, folemn Parts of Christianity, but difcards them utterly in general and particular, as having no moral Reason, Fitness or Congruity in them, or any of them; but, what is ftill worse, all this Declamation is publish'd to the World, without producing any thing like Argument, unless railing Affertions, naked of good Reason, can be fuppofed to pass for such with any Lover of Truth. Now though I have already fhewn, at large, in the Mediatorial Scheme, the intimate Connexion, particular Aptnefs, and exact Fitness of thofe Means, to the End we are both agreed in, or, in other Words, the internal Evidence, or moral Truth of thofe Pofitives,

* Page 85, 86. VOL. II

+ Page 134.
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+ Page 110. fince

fince Revelation has difcover'd and applied them" to the Religion of the End; and, I may farther add from him, that (if fmall Things may be com pared to great) a New Scheme of End and Means, Principle and Confequence, Cause and Effect, is open'd to the Mind of Man, like a Sir Ifaac Newton's Principia, or Euclid's Elements, tho' certain Truths before, were never difcover'd before, I am neverthelefs ready to correfpond to this learned Author in further Manifefting the utter Invalidity of his few wretched inconfiftent Reafons to the contrary. As where he fays, "The Religion of the End differs in nothing, "from the Religion of the Means, but as the "Habit is different from its neceffary, corre"lative Acts, which mutually and reciprocally "ftrengthen, confirm, and improve each other, "and therefore the Means in Religion have as

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clear and neceffary a Relation to the End, as

any natural Means can have to their proper "End t." He before defcribes the Religion of the End," as confifting in moral Truth and

Righteoufnefs confidered as an inward Character, Temper, Difpofition or Habit in the "Mind;" and after says, "as all Religion lies "in the right Knowledge of God and ourselves, "in acting agreeably to the Relations we ftand to one another, &c. it is plain, that the

great Source and Fountain of all this must be Attention, Contemplation, or a close Appli"cation of the Mind to moral Truth, Reason, and Fitnefs of Things. This is the firft Spring and Origin of all moral Virtue and Religion, "and true Happinefs t.".

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* Page 144. + Page 416.

Page 416, 417.

IN In answer, I may alledge, that though God has the fame Right that a Father or Mafter has of giving Commands, and yet of not giving the Reafons of them to their Children, or Servants, ftill fo much better is he than a common Father or Mafter, that it has pleafed his Divine Wisdom, to lay the Obligation of his pofitive Commands and Inftitutions in the real Nature, moral Truth and Fitness of Things, as well as in the Authority of his own Commandment, that the Mind of Man may have a perpetual Evidence without any Error or Deception, that God has indeed commanded the Thing; whence follows, according to our Author's Criterion, our neceffity (without begging of Questions) of obeying and fubmitting thereto, as a Matter of Religion and Confcience. How can Deifts themselves refufe to receive and comply with them, if they have any Conscience or fincere Refpect to the Religion of the End, when it fo evidently appears to them, that thefe Pofitives are fo far from being mechanical Means of Salvation, as they formerly mifapprehended or misreprefented them, that their very Tendency and Defign is, to work and perfect moral Righteoufnefs more and more, by a moral, rational Operation?

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FOR, indeed, they are Divine Means, the very beft appointed in the World (I might call them fangenerate) to the Attention of the Mind, whereby, and upon that Occafion to improve and ftrengthen itself in its Duty, and Proficiency in all moral Righteoufnefs more and more, confulting the Temper, and cultivating that Character it ought to be poffeffed of, for fecuring the Favour of God, or letting its Light fhine beD 2

fore

fore Men. Attention is as it were the Stomach of the Mind and inward Man, and therefore must have fome Thing to digeft, to feed and recruit the Life of God in Man. Now if this fame Attention is neither starv'd nor diverted, but verily and indeed occupied to the full, as well as agreeably affected; and all the Faculties, Underftanding, Will, and Affections attract their Nourifhment and receive their Health and Vigour in Holiness and Righteoufnefs from the due Ufe of these Pofitives; and the outward and vifible Signs in the Two Sacraments are purpofely inftituted as Symbols to the Attention of the Mind, beftowing its folemn Attendance upon thofe holy Means for those holy Ends: Then the Use and Value of thofe Divine Means to our human Needs remain uncontestable by any, even by our Author himself; especially if, in the next Place, I can prove them according to his own Criterion, to be congenerate Means, viz. the beft adapted in the World, for the End of advancing in all Righteoufnefs, to higher Degrees, and greater Conftancy. Then there may be a real efficacious Connexion between these Means and that End, notwithstanding he peremptorily denies upon no Grounds at all, that there is any Connexion at all; then they may indeed be acknowledged fit and right, and continued with all fafety, by all reasonable "Men as rational, moral Means, notwithstanding, and in contempt of his not only fallible, but falfe, fcandalous, innumerable Affeverations of being abfurd, &c. Then, by his Leave, in Virtue of his own Conceffion, if they have moral Truth and Fitness in them, they may be inftituted of God, and appear worthy of him by his own way of proving and admitting any Thing to come from Him.

SURE

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