ceived fupplies, with 300 foldiers, for the most part artillerymen, from the English fquadron, under fir J. B. Warren. Four hundred Corficans, in the pay of the English government, with a number of Neapolitan deferters and others, allo paid by England, added to the ratives of Porto-Ferrajo, and the English, raised the garrifon of that place to the number of 1500 effective men. It was invefted, on the land fide, by a French army 5000 frong. Batteries were railed, and the town and fortrels bombarded. Attempts were made twice to storm it; but the affailants were repulfed with great lofs. A fally was made by the befieged, led on by Mr. Grant, and the principal batteries of the French were destroyed. The befieging army was re-enforced, new batteries were conftructed, and the bombardment was ready to be recommenced, when, in the beginning of Auguft, the inhabitants of Porto-Ferrajo were fummoned to furrender, by the count of Ventura, the minifter of their new fovereign, the king of Etruria, with a promife of amnesty. The garrifon fent for anfwer, that they acknowledged no authority but that of the grand duke of Tufcany. The bombardment was recommenced from new batteries of four mortars, which did great damage.

When fir J. B. Warren failed from Leghorn, in the beginning of Auguft, to watch the motions of the enemy at Toulon, and to act as circumstances might require on the coufts of either France or of Spain, Le left a divifion of his fquadron to

cover Porto-Ferrajo. On the 14th of September the admiral returned. His force, together with the fhips ftationed before off the harbour of Porto-Ferrajo, amounted to seven fhips of the line, three frigates, and two brigs, and carried troops deftined for the relief of the brave gar, rifon. The flips of war were prevented from entering the harbour by the enemy's batteries. The troops, to the number of 3000, with a detachment of failors, were landed at different points, as near PortoFerrajo as poffible. At the fame inftant, the befieged made a fally, and got poffeffion of the battery, which contributed principally to prevent the English iquadron from entering the harbour. The English had advanced about a mile and a half from the beach, when the French general, Martin, feizing a favourable opportunity, attacked them with the bayonet. An attack was at the fame time made, by the adjutantcommandant, Sacklem, on the fide of the city. The English, after an obftinate engagement, were forced to retreat, and make, as well as they could, to their veffels. The English frigates, taking advantage of the moment, when the detachment from Porto-Ferrajo became mafters of the French battery, had entered the harbour; they were now under the neceffity of retiring. One of them being ditmafted, was towed off by a number of gun-boats.

Meanwhile an attack was allo made by a party of the English, covered with three flips, on Marciana, which was equally unfuccefsful. Marciana was garrifoned

[F 4]

prin

principally by Polish troops. The English were obliged to retreat with confiderable lofs. On that day, above 800 English were killed, drowned, in endeavouring, through rocks and precipices, to regain their bons, or wounded, and 200, including feveral officers, were made prifoners. In this attempt to relieve Porto-Ferrajo, and reduce the whole ifland of Elba, though unfuccefsful, there was no deficiency of either courage or conduct. What could be done, was performed by admiral Warren, and our brave foldiers and failors; and they were feconded by the gallant garrifon, with the greatest judgement as well as alacrity.

The difafters of the 14th of September were, in fome measure, compenfared to the defenders of PortoFerrajo, by a more profperous effort in November when, previous to the confirmation of peace between France and England, they made a fally, as ufual, under the command · of Mr. Grant, and, after a bloody engagement, not only took the outer intrenchments of the French camp, but the poft of Madonna della Grazia. Of the island of Elba, eight miles long, and two broad, part belonged to the grand duke of Tufcany, and part to the king of the two Sicilies. The Tufcan part was ceded by the treaty of Luneville: for what belonged to Naples, his Sicilian majefty received Piombino, a principality of Tufcany. On the other fide of Italy, the Turks were apprehenfive of a defcent on the Morea, or the coafts of Albania, by the French from Ancona, and other ports; and the French in Ancona, on the other hand, were apprehenfive of an attack by the combined fquadrons of the English and

Turks. Three Turkish fhips of the line were fent to cruife in the Adriatic feas; detachments were also sent occafionally into thofe parts from the fleet under lord Keith, to fcour the Adriatic of pirates, and to watch the movements of the French onthe fide of Italy. All the ports in the Adriatic, containing French troops, were declared to be in a ftate of blockade; it was alfo proclaimed, that all vessels bound, to thofe ports would be taken. Land forces, too, were ftationed on the Turkish coafts on the Adriatic.Great precautions of defence, on the other fide, were used by the French: among others, a chain was thrown acrofs the mouth of the harbour of Ancona. This was the head-quarters of the French in Italy; but parties were stationed in other places of the ecclefiaftical fiates, particularly in cantonments on the river Nera, which falls into', and opens a communication with, the courfe of the Tibur.

In the courfe of this fummer great infurrections prevailed for fome time in both Naples and Sardinia, the natural confequence of the dimi nifhed authority of government. A number of families of distinction retied from Naples to Rome: others went to Palermo. The malecontents were headed by a chief named Manmone, who advanced to the fron tiers of the Roman territories, and appeared refolute to try his firength againft any troops that might be fent against him. In Sardinia, a fellow of the name of Menmia, who could neither read nor write, was at the head of a great body of infurgents, conferred pretended honours and dignities on fuch of his followers as appeared most active and enterprifing, levied money on the coun

trys

try, and fet a price on the heads of thofe who were against him. The fpicit of infurrection in thofe quarters was not broken, until the pacification between France and England recognised and confirmed an established order of affairs in Italy.

It is aftonishing, and might well appear incredible, if it were not placed beyond all doubt by expeHence, that priefts, women, and other domeftics, in palaces, called courtiers, fhould have been able fo often, through their influence with kings, to thwart the measures, and diminish the refpect due to the higheft degree of honour and military courage, fkill, and fuccefs. The fapreme rulers of states do not give way to the influence and infinuations of thofe around their perfons, under the idea, that, in doing this, they hazard either the fecurity or the honour of their crowns: but they are artfully led to believe, that both these are equally fafe in the bands of certain favourites; and the ufual jealoufy that difpofes fovereign princes, rather to check and pull down, than to honour and exalt fuch tranfcendent merit, as feems,

in fome meafure, to eclipfe the fplendour of the throne, opens a way to the intrigues of the courtiers. Cer tain. it is, that neither the virtue, nor military fuccefs and glory of prince Charles, the Hedor, as the baron Thugut was the Pitt, of Auftria, and whole plan it was to call back the French from Germany andItaly, by penetrating into the heart of France, were able to fcreen him, from a miliguant and too fucceflful influence and oppofition at court.

The great object of the empress was, to fave Naples through an amicable compromife: many of the beft officers were neglected, and, in fome inftances, even difmiffed from the army, because they were attached to the archduke Charles. The council of war, at the feat of government, whose measures had uniformly, and with very little exception, been followed by defeat and difafter, was generally detefted and ridiculed by the army. On the whole, the nerves of the Auftrian army were relaxed; the fentiments and wishes of the officers were dif cordant; and almoft the only point on which there was a general una

nimity

nimity in all ranks, was a defire that the war might be brought to a fpeedy conclufion. Such being the ftate of the Auftrian army, and the Auftrian people, the audacity of Moreau in advancing into the very heart of the Auftrian dominions, inflead of being charged with folly, may be thought to have been a conduct as well judged as it was daring.

By the treaty of Luneville, the feelings of the houfe of Auftria were, no doubt, feverely wounded. Deprived of the rich and noble inheritance of their Burgundian anceftors, and almost excluded from their Jong-loved Italy, they were ifolated, in a great measure, from those points of contact, where they had fo long and to often meafured their ftrength with other powers, and on which they alerted their power, influence, and right to interfere, and be regarded with the highest degree of confideration in the great affairs of the fineft part of Europe. Yet the wifeft politicians were of opinion, that, in the compactnefs of empire, acquired by the acceflion of fo much territory on the fide of the Adriatic, in exchange for wider domains, but thefe disjointed, the Auftrian family had gained, in fiability and real ftrength, an ample compenfation for what they had loft in extent of dominion. This opinion coincides with that of a great politician and profound fcholar, who flourished in the end of the 17th, and beginning of the laft century: the celebrated Fletcher of Saltoun. If his reafening be juft, it ought to be a confolation, not only to the friends of the houfe of Auftria, but to all Europe, whofe in tereft it is, that a government fhould be effabled in the vicinity of France, fitted to make a stand against its capricious fallies, and thereby to

contribute to the general quiet and fecurity of nations. The paffage from Fletcher, to which we allude, may be quoted without much impropriety in this ftage of the hiftory of the Netherlands and the Auftrian dominions and authority in Italy." The violation of the ancient privileges of the Netherlands, by attempting to introduce an ablolute form of government, and the inquifition, was an extremely foolish meafure, which, together with the cruelty of the duke of Alva, rendered the inhabitants of them moft obftinate enemies; but the troops of Spain were at that time fo excellent, that they would have eafily furmounted this difficulty, notwithstanding the very ftrong fituation of fome of thefe provinces, and though the king had done nothing to redress their grie vances, had it not been that Flanders lay at fuch a distance from Spain, that, as armies could not be tranfported thither without the greateft difficulty and expenfe, fo that not only they, but frequently the advices by which they were to act, came not in time to answer the fudden emergencies that are always falling out in the courfe of a war, which the English and French, as being in the neighbourhood of thefe -people, were able to foment with the utmoft eafe and expedition; and fo blinded was this prince, that, as if Flanders had become the feat of his empire, he would needs from thence, and that, too, before the Flemings were reduced, make war upon France and England, as his fucceflors have fince done againft the Palatinate. So grofs an error not only occafioned a lofs of feveņ of thele provinces, and ruined his great defigns in France and England, but reduced him to the greatest

ftraits in all his other affairs: which the French, in these latter times,being aware of, have never failed to direct the chief weight of their wars againft thefe provinces, which lie fo near their capital, and to employ the bulk of their forces, on that fide, to their own great advantage, and the perpetual lofs of the Spaniards: nor at this day have they any other view in leaving a remnant of thefe provinces to the crown of Spain, bat to keep their arms weak and unable to operate elsewhere, and fo to increase the glory of the arms of France. Thus the French having been defeated by the Germans, in the battles of Treves and Altenheim, we faw their monarch, early in the fucceeding fpring, march in to Fianders, there to regain his loft reputation. And, at prefent, to render this province more expenfive and pernicious to Spain, after having ftript her of the more vaJuable part of the country, they leave her in poffeffion of a number of large fortified towns, that require great garrifons to keep them. But

though the French fhould conquer all the reft of Flanders, they will have the like advantages in the ftate of Milan, where France can make war with much more eafe than Spain; the paffage for fuccours, both by land and fea, being nearer from Provence and Daupany than from that kingdom. And to France, finding her account fo greatly in it, will never fail to

carry on her wars in these disjointed ftates, till Spain herfelf, when utterly exhaufted by their ruin, and incapable of making a defence, be attacked in the laft place. It was a moft fagacious faying of a happy genius, that, by the addition of Flanders, and the Spanish ftates of Italy, the weight of Spain and the Indies became lighter. In ur age, thefe itates have almoft totally deftroyed this weight. And it had been for the intereft of Spain, that Charles V. had alienated the provinces of Flanders, by either annexing them to the empire, or making a prefert of them to any power who had been able to defend them agamit the French; that Philip, inftead of retaining, by a moft confuming war, the dominion of a part of thefe provinces, had granted them all their liberty; or that the prefent king had vielded the remnant of them to France, rather than still have retained them, to the greater advantage of the latter. So little do men fee in their own affairs; and fo great and innumerab'e miferies do nations fuffer, merely from the want of folid reflection."* It would feem that the ambitious policy of the French monarchs, refpecting the provinces of Flanders and Milan, was very different from that of Buonaparte. Which of the oppofite fyftems was the most judicious and folid, it remains for time to determine.

CHAP.