thing to be our duty, which we fee thus vifibly to contribute to his intention.

For there cannot be a more binding law than the will of our Creator; and there is no plainer way of knowing his will, than when we have once arrived at the knowledge of his defign, to observe what are the methods, the neceffary and only methods of effecting it..

To this way of reasoning nothing material, I think, can be objected. And yet attempts have been made, to fhew that there is no fuch natural difference of things, no fuch natural fitness or unfitness of acting in one way rather than in another, towards perfons in certain circumstances and relations to us.

It has been faid indeed, very boldly faid, and without any proof, by one who had no goodwill towards natural religion as well as revealed, that no man could do any injury to another, except to him only with whom he had entered into a compact and bargain to the contrary. But how comes it to pass then, that the not ftanding to a compact and bargain is unreafonable and unlawful? If there be no moral difference of things antecedent to fuch a compact a Hobb's de Cive. cap. 3. fect. 4.

and

and bargain, then it cannot be more injurious, to hurt a man contrary to a bargain made, than when no bargain is made at all with him. And the maintainer of this irreligious notion is not only guilty of uttering this abfurdity, that the doing a damage to a man is not an injury, and yet that the not performing an agreement is one : but he likewise allows that there is a moral and eternal difference in compacts and bargains, which ties men down to the performance of them and, if fo, why is there not the fame in injuries, which should prevent men from doing them to their fellow-creatures?

An unhappy proof, that, when men strive, right or wrong, to leave the common road of thinking, they very often depart very widely from common fenfe too.

We may confider again, that all, even wicked men, did ever acknowledge that there are fome obligations upon them to do one thing preferably to another, or to do this action and forbear the doing of that. Even the author, whom I just now mentioned, who plainly undertook to overthrow all natural religion, was forced to acknowledge its authority in one inftance, that of performing a bargain.

And

And whatever mens writings fpeak, their actions ever did and ever will acknowledge in general, that we lie under obligations to perform all that we know to be the will of God. For fetting afide all fear of punishment from human laws, fetting aside all fear of the lofs of reputation among thofe we live with, there is no man, but must confefs, that he had much rather attain his ends, without murdering his neighbour or without defrauding him of his due. And why this? because all men are fenfible, that murder and injuftice are unreafonable and unfit to be practised. It is not the want of knowing what is our duty, and what is not; but the firength of temptations, for the fake of avoiding fome evil, or attaining fome pleafure, profit, or hohour, that makes men act against the reason of things and the relation which they bear to one another. Thefe are the great fources, whence those streams of wickedness are derived, which fpread themselves over the world, and take away much of the force of that first and most ancient guard of human happinefs, natural religion.

We

We have, befides this, the acknowledgment of every man, that the reafon of things is the rule of our duty, in the fevere reflections, which we are all apt to make upon the faults of others.

However fond we are of excufing ourselves, yet we are commonly fure to express true notions, and declare a right abhorrence of injuftice in our neighbours. All their faults of this kind we make no fcruple to confider as tranfgreffions of a natural law, and we cenfure them accordingly. Here then is a plainer proof, that we judge aright of the nature of other men's actions than that we do fo of our own because that felf-love, which biaffes us in our own cafe, has no room in the survey which we make of our neighbour's. This I urge therefore as a proof, that, where our intereft of all kinds is out of the question, we naturally form a judgment in favour of the obligations of morality.

The fourth and laft confideration which I have to offer in regard to this enquiry before us, is, that which St. Paul has mentioned in the verse following the text, men's confciences bear them witness, that the law of nature is VOL. I. written

F

written in their hearts, and their thoughts accufe or elfe excuse them.

Let men reafon and dispute, write and publifh what they pleafe, against an eternal, moral rule of behaviour, their confcience, which is God's deputed judge within them, will cenfure and reprove them, when they act viciously or impiously, and will praise and commend them, for the practice of piety and virtue.

If there were nothing naturally known to be the will of God, if we could not gather any thing to be our duty by the help of reason, why should our confcience concern itself in any of our actions? Let the wife man of this world account for it, if he can : why is his conscience fo bufy to accufe or excufe him, if it has no law to try him by? let him impute its activity to the impreffions of custom and example, to the prejudices of education or the like: can he get rid of it? did ever any serious and fober man get rid of its notices? we have all the reafon in the world to believe, that, however confcience became implanted within us, no one could ever eradicate it: and this feems a plain proof, that. God placed it there as his vicegerent and our remembrancer. This feems

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a plain