the Subtle; and other divine and irrefragable octors of the Latin church, who, if they failed to discover the matter of knowledge, have been unsurpassed in inventing the forms by which it is conveyed to the minds of men. And besides these, there was pointed out to me, Lord Bacon, Doctor Chalmers, Doctor Samuel Clark, Jacob Böhme, Leibnitz, Fenelon, Sir Isaac Newton, John Locke, Bishops Barrow, Butler and Berkeley, Doctor Thomas Brown, Doctor Arnold of Rugby; Dugald Stewart, and Doctor Beattie and Coleridge, and many more whose names I need not repeat; and last not least, certainly not in my eyes, sat the eminent Jonathan Edwards side by side with the genial and lovely Bishop Berkeley. Doctor Clark and Doctor Chalmers appeared to be on most intimate terms, and Coleridge sat dreaming, ever dreaming, during the session; every new phase of the discussion giving a new impulse to his reverie. I was pleased to see Newton and Leibnitz whispering together every now and then, as the discussions went on; as I guessed, comparing notes."

"Pray, tell us, what was the matter in hand ?" asked Mrs. Jay. "I am curious to know what they find to talk about this side of the grave; are not vou, Faustinus ?" she said, turning to Faustinus for a reply.

Angelical Doctour for three respects; first, for the ingeniousness wherewith he handled his questions; secondly, for that he wrote of the angels like an angel; the third, for that he was a Virgin; for that which an Angel is in heaven, a Virgin Is on earth."

"I left off with Plato," replied Faustinus. "I know nothing of modern methods of philosophy. Doubtless they have made important discoveries; and these philosophers of whom Mr. Laurens has been speaking, may have made as great advance upon Plato, as Plato upon Heraclitus and Pythagoras."

666

"Let me reply to you, my Faustinus," said Perpetua. Speculation has advanced not one step farther than when he left it. Plato stands confessedly at the head of the speculative genius of the world,' But I beg Mr. Laurens will answer Mrs. Jay's inquiry, and tell us what was the subject under consideration."

"You must pardon my inability to do justice to these great minds," replied Mr. Laurens; "and I will do what I may to comply with your request. The subject-matter was the Absolute, and our cognitions of the Absolute. The point made was the occult question, whether it was possible to bridge the abyss from the subjective to the objective-from the apparent to the real.* Lord Bacon was speaking when we took our seats. He remarked, that 'as navigation was imperfect before the use of the

*This seems to have been the aim of Plato. A writer in the London Quarterly, Article: "Institutes of Metaphysics," etc., says: "Plato's dialectic (which seems to answer to what we call self-examination) had clearly this one object: it was an attempt to bridge over the gulf between man and the ideal world. . . . Was there not an ideal world, the region of real being, whether or not in the mind of the Deity, in which the soul of the votary might be lost forever in the mystic contemplation of the True, the Beautiful and the Good? Was there not as surely some pathway by which the soul could ascend to this its native region, and by searching find out its truest heaven? Plato gave a long answer to this inquiry."

compass, so will many secrets of nature and art remain undiscovered without a more perfect knowledge of the understanding, its uses and ways of working.'* He was followed by Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas; but such was the strangeness of their terminology, so numerous their subdivisions, that I was unable to comprehend anything of their line of argument. Next, Locke spoke in his clear, simple style; and though the speeches that followed were brief, they were so entirely satisfactory to my mind, that it seemed to me the last speech settled the vexed question; but I soon grew diffident, and before they concluded, I listened without any attempt to form a judgment as to the dark oracles which were opened."

Mrs. Jay, turning to Peter, who sat quietly listening to all that was said, looking as if his mind had wandered leagues away from the subject on hand, said: "Well, Peter, I suppose you heard so much about the me and the not me, until you did not know whether you stood on your head or your heels ?"

"Precisely so, Mrs. Jay. Of course I made out so much as this, that all the knowledge of a world outside ourselves came to us through our senses, and I came to the wise conclusion that if our wise men of modern times will not believe their seven senses, there is then no hope for them." +

* "De Augmentis Scientiarum," translated by Shaw.

The able President of Rochester University, New York, M. B. Anderson,

"Seven senses !" exclaimed Calliste. "And has the

area of the senses been enlarged as well as the land on our globe since we last visited it ?”

"Did I

say seven senses ?" asked Peter demurely. "Yes, sir, you did; and I would like to have you tell me what these are."

"If I said seven senses, seven it shall be. Well then, madam, there is the sense of seeing, of feeling, of hearing, of smelling, of tasting," and he paused.

"Yes, Mr. Peter, I had all these myself; what

next?"

"Common sense! Did you have that ?" asked

Peter.

"And what is common sense ?" asked Calliste.

LL.D., in a brief review of "Lewes' History of Philosophy," thus speaks of the latest of all philosophical systems, known as "Comte's Positive Philosophy:" "It follows, from Mr. Lewes' own showing, the external world is only a matter of Inference, and this inference is not necessary, but contingent. He is placed, in reference to the external world, in a relation precisely similar to that which led Berkeley and Collier to deny that matter had any existence out of the perceiving mind." And further on, President Anderson says: "In view of the deductions which we have made from the principles which Mr. Lewes holds, in common with his master, Comte, one cannot but be amused at his extravagant claims for Positive Science. On his own showing, this boasted method is conversant only with shadows. So far from having anything to do with the real, the solid and the certain only, it stands before us a philosophy of matter, which cannot even certify us, by any legitimate method, of the real existence of the earth on which we tread; as a philosophy of the real, which is founded on a denial of all knowledge of reality at the very outset. It comes to us as a philosophy of law, while it denies the existence of all necessary convictions. It comes to us as a philosophy of effects, while it affirms the knowledge of causes to be impossible, and their pursuit absurd."

"Do you not know what common sense is? and did you never hear of this in your lifetime ?"

Calliste shook her head.

"How could you get on without it?" continued Peter. "Peter Schlemihl!" cried Mrs. Jay, "how can you be so rude? Common sense, dear Calliste, in the parlance of the present day, means the instinctive decision of the mind unperverted by passion or ignorance; or, in other words, sound practical judgment. Now then, Peter, please explain yourself."

"With all pleasure, so I do not weary my audience," said Peter. "Doctor Reid told us this morning that common sense was 'the mathematical affections of matter;* a part of human nature which,' he said, 'had never been explained.' In answer, Doctor Beattie rose and declared common sense was, 'that power of the mind which perceives truth or commands belief, not by progressive augmentation, but by an instantaneous and instinctive impulse;' and further, 'it is instinct and not reason.' § Doctor Stewart declared it to be 'the common reason of mankind.' This did not quite satisfy Doctor Reid, who would have it far above all this, for he said expressly, 'that common sense was the direct inspiration of God, leading us, where our reasoning facul ties leave us in the dark.' " ||

* Reid's Essays, vol. i. p. 95.

+ Beattie on Truth, part i. ch. i. p. 2.

† Inquiry, ch. vii. p. 480. sec. iii. p. 113. § Ibid. part ii. ch. i.

Reid, ch. vii. p. 482.