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Blackw 11-28-30 23050

1406 K543 1781

PREFACE.

A

N enquiry into the caufe and origin of evil, has always been efteemed one of the nobleft and most important fubjects in natural theology. It leads us into feveral fublime fpeculations, concerning the Divine Attributes, and the original of things.-It endeavours to difcover the true intent of the Deity in creating any thing, and purfues that intent thro' the various works of his creation ;-contemplates the Divine œconomy-examines the various plans of Providence in the protection and government of the universe, and takes in the whole compass of nature. Neither is its usefulness inferior to its extent. Nor is it of less moment to every rational being, when he comes to the full use of his reafon, and is 'difpofed to employ it to fome better purpose, than that of living on merely at random in this tranfitory world. He will find the knowledge of it to be in fome degree neceffary, under all the doubts and difficulties that may attend the fub

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ject, if he propofes to act upon any serious and fettled views here, or to entertain any well grounded hopes of futurity. When I begin to enquire how I came into this world at firft, and was doomed to my present ftation, I am told that an abfolutely perfect Being produced me out of nothing, and placed me here to communicate fome part of his happiness and perfection to me.—This end is not obtained;-the contrary full often appears to be fact:-I find myself surrounded with perplexity and confufion, 'want and mifery,-by whose fault I know not, nor find how to better my condition; what comfortable notion of the Divine Attributes can this afford me?-what proper ideas of religion, under fuch circumstances?—what folid expectation of any future ftate? For if God's great aim in producing me be neither his glory, which my prefent fituation feems to be far from advancing; nor my own good; with which the fame feems to be equally inconfiftent; how know I in what mar.ner I am to conduct myfelf? - how muft I endeavour to please him?-or why should I endeavour it at all? For if I must be miferable in this world, as from my prefent view of things appears to be the cafe; what fecurity is there, that I fhall not be fo in another too, (if there fhould be one) fince if it were the original intention of my Almighty Creator, I might, for aught I fee, have been made capable of happiness in them both? Such reflections as thefe, muft needs difturb a perfon that has any real concern for his Maker's honour, or his own ultimate happiness ;-that defires to make fome returns of a fuitable homage to the Supreme Lord of all, and anfwer the true end of his own creation ;-in fhort, that happens to think at all upon thefe matters, and to think for himself:-an attempt therefore to rid the

mind of these perplexities, cannot furely be unacceptable. But both the usefulness and antiquity of that celebrated controverfy, concerning evil, as well as the notorious abfurdity of the Manichean method of accounting for it, have been fo frequently and fully fet forth, that there is no need of enlarging upon them, fince all that ever feemed neceffary to a complete conqueft over those wild Hereticks, and their extravagant Hypothefis, was only fome tolerable folution of the difficulties which drove them into it; and this our Author has accomplished, as I hope to make appear in the fequel. There are two general ways of reasoning, termed arguments, a priori and a pofteriori, or according to what is usually stiled the synthetic and analytic method; the one lays down fome previous, felf evident principles; and in the next place, defcends to the feveral confequences that may be deduced from them; the other begins with a view of the phænomena themselves, traces them up to their original, and by developing the properties of these phænomena, arrives at the knowledge of their caufe. The former of these methods, where it can be had, is evidently preferable, fince the latter muft depend upon a large induction of particulars, any one of which failing, invalidates the whole argument; a proof therefore that the prefent fubject is capable of the former method, must be very defireable; and this our Author feems to have exhibited without any ill-grounded, or precarious hypothefis whatsoever. He first of all enquires into the nature and perfections of the Deity, and the fole defign which he can be fuppofed to have in the creation;-fettles the true notion of a creature, and examines whether any fuch could be perfect; and if not, whether all of them fhould have

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been made equally imperfect, or feveral placed in various claffes and degrees of imperfection: having proved the latter of thefe opinions to be moft reasonable, he proceeds to the loweft clafs of beings, viz. material ones enquires into the effential properties of matter, and the neceffary laws of its motion, and thereby directs us how to account for their effects, when difpofed into various mafes, and animated bodies. He fhews the unavoidableness of contrary motions, for the fame reason that it had any motion at all, and confequently of attrition, fermentation, corruption, diffolution, and all the pains, or natural evils, that attend them.

In the next place, from the nature of a felf moving principle, and the manner of its operation, he deduces all the irregularities incident to volition. He ftates at large the true and only confiftent notion of free will, and demonftrates the neceffity for it in every rational creature, in order to its fupreme happinefs; then accounts for the visible abufes of it, and the moral evils which arife from thence :-examines all the conceivable ways of preventing them, and upon the whole makes it apparent that none of these could have been originally guarded againft, or might afterwards be removed, without introducing greater; and confequently, that the permiffion of fuch evils, and the prefervation of fuch frail beings, in their prefent forlorn eftate, is an inftance of wifdom, and goodness.

Now these are not mere arguments, ad ignorantiam ; this is not accepting the perfon of the Almighty, (a) fervice which he himself difclaims) by profeffing our belief, that such and such things are the work of an infinitely wife and gracious Governor of the Univerfe, where no marks of either wifdom or beneficence appear;

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