previous to any inftruction; and therefore his opinion is, that no account can be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we pretend to account for the pleasure or pain which arifes from fenfation; i. e. Why any particular motion produced in our bodies fhould be accompanied with pain rather than pleasure, and vice versa.

But this account feems ftill infufficient, rather cuting the knot than untying it; and if it is not a kin to the doctrine of innate ideas, yet I think it relishes too much of that of occult qualities. This ingenious author is certainly in the right in his obfervations upon the infufficiency of the common methods of accounting for both our e ection and approbation of moral actions, and rightly infers the neceffity of fuppofing a moral fenfe (i.e. a power or faculty whereby we may perceive any action to be an object of approbation, and the agent of love) and public affections, to account for the principal actions of human life. But then by calling thefe inftincts, I think he ftops too foon, imagining himself at the fountain-head, when he might have traced them much higher, even to the true principle of all our actions, our own happiness

And this will appear by fhewing that our approbation of morality, and all affections whatsoever, are finally refolved into reafon pointing out private happiness, and are converfant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the affociation of ideas, and may properly enough be called babits.

For if this be clearly made out, the neceffity of fuppofing a moral fenfe or public affections to be implanted in us, fince it arifeth only from the infufficiency of all other schemes to account for human actions, will immediately vanish. But whether it be made out or no, we may observe in general, that all arguments ad ignorantiam, or that proceed a remotione only (as this, by which the moral fenfe and public affections are established to be instincts, evidently does) are scarce ever perfectly

ectly fatisfactory, being for the most part fubject to this doubt, viz. Whether there is a full enumeration of all the parts; and liable alfo to this objection, viz. That though I cannot a count for phenomena otherwife, yet poffibly they may be otherwife accounted for. But before we can determine this point, it will be neceffary to fettle all the terms: We fhall in the first place therefore enquire what is meant by the Criterion of Virtue.

TH

SECT. I.

Concerning the Criterion of Virtue.

HE Criterion of any thing is a rule or measure by a conformity with which any thing is known to be of this or that fort, or of this or that degree. And in order to determine the criterion of any thing, we must first know the thing whofe criterion we are feeking after. For a measure prefuppofes the idea of the thing to be measured, otherwife it could not be known, whether it was fit to measure it or no, (fince what is the proper measure of one thing is not fo of another) Liquids, cloth, and flesh, have all different measures; gold and filver different touchftones. This is very intelligible, and the method of doing it generally clear, when either the quantity, or kind of any particular fubftance is thus afcertained.

But when we extend our enquiries after a Criterion. for abftract, mixed modes, which have no existence but in our minds, and are fo very different in different men; we are apt to be confounded, and fearch after a measure for we know not what. For unless we are first agreed concerning the thing to be measured, we shall in vain expect to agree in our criterion of it, or even to understand one another.

But it may be faid, if we are exactly agreed in any mixed mcde, what need of any criterion? or what can we want farthe.? Vhat we want farther, and what we

mean

mean by the criterion of it, is this; viz. to know whether any particular thing do belong to this mixed mode or no. And this is a very proper enquiry. For let a man learn the idea of Intemperance from you never fo clearly, and if you please let this be the idea, viz. the eating or drinking to that degree as to injure his understanding or health; and let him also be never so much convinced of the obligation to avoid it; yet it is a very pertinent question in him to ask you, How fhall I know when I am guilty of Intemperance?

And if we examine this thoroughly, we fhall find that every little difference in the definition of a mixed mode will require a different criterion. e. g. If murder is defined the wilful taking away the life of another, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how we fhall know when the life of another is taken away wilfully; i. e. when one who takes away the life of another does it with that malicious defign which is implied by wilfulness. But if murder be defined the guilty taking away the life of another, then to enquire after the criterion of murder, is to enquire how it fhall be known when guilt is contracted in the wilful taking away the life of another. So that the criterion of murder, according to one or other of these definitions, will be different. For wilfulness perhaps will be made the criterion of guilt; but wilfulness itself, if it want any, must have foine farther criterion; it being evident hat nothing can be the measure of itself.

If the criterion is contained in the idea itfelf, then it is merely nominal, e. g. If virtue is defined, the acting agreeably to the will of God: to fay the will of God is the criterion of virtue, is only to fay, what is agreeable to the will of God is called Virtue. But the real criterion, which is of fome ufe, is this, How fhall I know what the Will of God is in this refpect?

From hence it is evident, that the criterion of a mixed mode is neither the definition of it, nor contained in it. For, as has been fhewn, the general idea is neceffarily to be fixed; and if the particulars comprehended under it

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are fixed or known alfo, there remains nothing to be measured; becaufe we meafure only things unknown, The general idea then being fixed, the criterion which is to measure or determine inferiors, must be found out and proved to be a proper rule or meafure, by comparing it with the general idea only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to be applied. For the truth of the measure must be proved independently of the particulars to be measured, otherwife we shall prove in a circle.

To apply what has been faid in general to the cafe in hand. Great enquiry is made after the criterion of virtue; but it is to be feared that few know diftinctly what it is they are enquiring after; and therefore this must be clearly ftated. And in order to this, we must (as has been fhewn) first fix our idea of Virtue, and that exactly; and then our enquiry will be, how we all know this or that lefs general or particuler action to be comprehended under virtue. For unlefs our idea of virtue is fixed, we enquire after the criterion of we know not what. And this our idea of virtue, to give any fatisfaction, ought to be fo general, as to be conformable to that which all or moft men are fuppofed to have. And this general idea, I think, may be thus expreffed.

Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each other's happiness, to which conformity every one in all cafes is obliged: and every one that does fo conform, is or ought to be approved of, efteemed and loved for fo doing. What is here expreffed, I believe moft men put into their idea of Virtue.

For Virtue generally does imply fome relation to others: where felf is only concerned, a man is called prudent, (not virtuous) and an action which relates immediately to God, is filed religious.

I think alfo that all men, whatever they make Virtue to confift in, yet always make it to imply obl gation and approbation.

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The idea of Virtue being thus fixed, to enquire after the criterion of it, is to enquire what that rule of life is to which we are obliged to conform; or how that rule is to be found out which is to direct me in my behaviour towards others, which ought always to be pursued, and which, if purfued, will or ought to procure me approbation, esteem, and love.

But before I can anfwer this enquiry: I must first see what is meant by Obligation.

SBC T. II.

Concerning Obligation.

Bligation is the neceffity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy: i. e. when there is fuch a relation between an Agent and an action that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that action, then the agent is faid to be obliged to do or omit that action. So that obligation is evidently founded upon the prospect of happiness, and arifes from that neceffary influence which any action has upon prefent or future happiness or mifery. And no greater obligation can be fuppofed to be laid upon any free agent without an exprefs contradiction.

This Obligation may be confider'd four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced: First, that obligation which arifeth from perceiving the natural confequences of things, i. e the confequences, of things acting according to the fix'd laws of nature, may be call'd natural. Secondly, that ar fing from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favour of our fellow creatures, or the contrary, is ufually filed virtuous. Thirdly, that arifing from the authority of the civil magiftrate, civil. Fourthly, that from the authority of God, religious.

Now from the confideration of thefe four forts of obligation (which are the only ones) it is evident that a

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