That he end. to bring it into being. Cogitation alfo, will and consciousness, or faculties equivalent to thefe, are neceffary to a free caufe, and on that account to be attributed to the first caufe, being (as fhall be fhewn below) perfectly free; which caufe, fince it is infinite (as we have proved) in its effence and power, it muft be fo likewife in intelligence, viz. omnipotent and omnifcient. VIII. Sixthly, Since this principle (which we afts for an call God) is the caufe of all things, and infinite in knowledge as well as power, it follows that he acts, not by blind impulfe, but for an end; and has ordered his works by fuch wifdom, as to be confiftent with themfelves, and not deftructive of each other. That the end of creation ercife the power, and to, cate the goodness of the Deity. IX. Seventhly, Since God is perfect in himfelf, fince all things fubfift by his providence, was to ex- and ftand in need of him, but he of none; and fince he can neither be profited nor incommoded by his works, nor affected by communi- their good or evil; it follows that he made these things for no advantage of his own, and that he neither receives nor expects any benefit from them. For by creating things without himself, he muft neceffarily have fought either their benefit or his own; but what benefit can God feek for himfelf, who poffeffes all good? That certainly which was wanting to him, and neceffarily must be wanting to a being even abfolutely perfect, till he has created fomething; I mean the exercife of his attributes without, the commucating of his power and goodness that therefore only muft he be fupposed to have fought in the creation and difpofal of his works. (12. Not that externals can add any NOTES. thing (12.) Some have objected here, that according to this no thing to God, for they have no manner of proportion to his power or nature; but he has in himself the adequate exercise of his power, namely in the contemplation and love. of himfelf. Externals therefore can neither encrease or diminish the exercife of his powers, which before was infinite. God is indifferent therefore as to thefe, nor does his exercise without pleafe him, otherwife than as he has chofen to exercife himself thus; as will be shewn be H 3 NOTES. tion, there must have been a time before the exiftence of any created Beings, when God was neither infinitely happy, nor abfolutely good *. But the one part of this objection evidently arifes from a mistake of our author's notion, who has often told us, that he does not fuppofe any thing external to the Deity, to add the leaft to his own happiness, or effential perfections; (and indeed to think otherwise, would be worse than to imagine the fountain fed by its own ftreams; or the fun enlightened by its own rays) but only to manifeft them to us his creatures, and encrease our happiness and perfection, by our knowledge and imitation of them The other part cannot be of force against Creation in any particular time, because it will hold equally against it in all times; against the very poffibility of creation in general: fince with God there is no prior and pofterior, no difference of time applicable to his existence, as we have endeavoured to prove in R. c. Befides, is it not abfurd to talk of time, before the beginning of things, which (as we have shewn in the fame place) can only be conceived as co-exiflent with, or rather confequential to the being of these things? 'Tis in vain therefore to ask, why were not beings created fooner? Since no part of time can ever be affigned when fome were not created, and every period of time has equal relation to eternity. As to the fecond fenfe of the question (fays Cudworth) why the world though it could not poffibly be from eternity, yet was no fooner, but fo lately made? We fay that this is an abfurd queftion, both because time was made together with the world, and there was no fooner or later before time and alfo, because whatfoever had a beginning, muft of neceflity be once but a 'day old. Wherefore the world could not poffibly have been fo made by God in time, as not be once but five or fix thousand years old and no more, as now it is," p. 887. See the fame more at large in Fides's Theo. Spec. B. 3. Part 1. Chap. 2. and in Bentley's Boyle' Lect. p. 232, 235, 5th edit. or Jenkin's Reasonableness of Chriftianity, Vol. 2. C. 9. or Sir M. Hale's Prim. Orginat. of Mankind, S. 1. C. 6. Where you have all the abfurd queries of that kind folidly and acutely answered. See Bp. Pearfon on the Creed, 2d ed. p. 62, 63. When the faid to be below*. And hence it manifeftly follows that the world is as well as it could be made by infinite power and goodness. For fince the exercise of the divine power, and the communication of his goodness, are the ends for which the world was framed, there is no doubt but God has attained thefe ends. X. I know 'tis commonly faid, that the world is world was made for the glory of God: But created for this is after the manner of men. For defire of God's glo glory, is attributed to God in the fame manry, 'tis af. ter the ner as anger, love, revenge, eyes and hands (A). manner of When therefore the fcripture teaches us, that the world was created for the glory of God, men. . 'tis to be understood that the divine attributes, namely power, goodness and wisdom, fhine forth as clearly in his works, as if he had po other intent in making them befide the often NOTES. *See chap. 5. § 1. fubf. 4. (A) We see many things are ascribed to God in Scripture by way of accommodation; as hands and feet, heart, anger, revenge, and repentance. And fince we understand all thefe to be spoken of him by way of condefcenfion to our ca. pacity, why thould we not underfland the defire of glory to he af ribed to him in the fame way? efpecially fince we mult conceive God to be obliged by his goodness to fet a great value on his glory, and to require the promoting of it from us as a principal duty. For the good and advantage of all reasonable creatures depends on the obedience that is paid to God's law; and there cannot be a more effectual means to promote that obedience than a due fenfe of the great and glorious attributes of God; of his wildom, power, justice, and goodness. The more lively these are reprefented to intelligent beings, the more willing and careful they will be to obey God, and the more afraid to offend him; and therefore it is agreeable to the goodness of God to exact our endeavours to beget this apprehenfion in us and all other thinking beings. Not for any advantage this glory brings to God; but because the reputation of the Lawgiver and Governor of the world is a means neceffary to advance the good of his creatures, and therefore it is our duty and interest in the highest degree to promote that glory and therefore God may be faid to do all things for his glory, because if that were the end of all that he has done, he could not be more concerned for it, nor would it be more our duty to pro mote it. : oftenation of thefe attributes; nor could they have answered that end more fitly if they had been defigned for glory: but strictly fpeaking, the power of God is infinite, and when he acts for the good of his creatures according to that infinite power, he is infinitely good. Infinite knows no bounds, nor has the goodness of God any other bounds befide his wisdom and power, which are alfo infinite. And in reality this makes moft for the glory of God, viz. to have created a world with the greatest goodness. (13.) world as corre- made the God well as it great could be XI. By good I here understand that which is That God convenient and commodious, that which is fpondent to the appetite of every creature. therefore created the world with as convenience and fitnefs, with as great gruity to the appetites of things, as could be effected by infinite power, wifiom, and good- goodness nefs. If then any thing inconvenient or in- and wil NOTES. con (13) The reafon why God made the world (fays the learned author fo often cited above) was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness; that there might be other beings alfo happy befide himself, and enjoy themfelves. And afterwards, God did not make the world merely to oftentate bis kill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and fplendor of the fun is the glory of it *. We have a fine paragraph or two to the fame purpose in Wallafton's delin. of Rel of Nat. p. 115.-110. The fame notion is well itated in Scot's Chriftian Life; Vol. 2. chap. 6. p. 434 435. and made by the high dom. commodious be now or was from the beginning in it, that certainly could not be hinder NOTES. ed and happiness? It is true indeed, he defigns to glorify himfelf in our happiness; but how? not to render himself more glorious by it than he is in himself, for it is impoffible; but to difplay, and few forth his own effential glory to all that are capable of admiring and imitating him, that thereby he might invite them to transcribe that goodness of his into their nature, of which his glory is the shine and luftre, and thereby to glorify themselves; and what can more effectually difplay the glory of a being who is infinitely wife and powerful, and good, than to contrigue and effect the happiness of his rational creatures, who, of all others, have the molt ample 'capacity of happiness ? And again." But doth not the fcripture tell us, that he doth all things for his own glory, and that he obtains this end, as well by punishing, as by rewarding his creatures? Very true, but then it is to be confidered that the glory he aims at, confifts not in receiving any good from us, but in doing and communicating all good to us. For infinite goodness. can no otherwife be glorified, than by its own overflowings and free communications, and it can no otherwise be glori fied in the punishment of its creatures, but only as it doth Igood by it for fhould it punish without good reason, it would reproach and vilify itself: but if it doth it for good reafon, it must be because it is good either for itself or others: for itself it cannot be; for how can an infinitely happy being reap any good from another's mifery? And therefore it 'must be for the good of others, either to reduce those who are punished, or to warn others by their example from running away from their duty and happiness. So that to do good is the end of God's punishment: and because it is fo, he is glorified by it: and confidering that he is so infinitely happy, that he can no ways ferve himself by our miseries, it ' is impoffible he should have any other end in concerning himfelf about us, but only the great, god like one of doing us good, and making us happy.' See alfo difc. 14 in the fame vol. p. 302. To the fame purpose is Smith's excellent diicourse of the exiftence and nature of God, chap. 4. and 7.† And d'Oyly's firit differtation, p. 122. and Rymer's general reprefentation of Rev. Rel. p. 260,——267. and p. 511. Bp. Ruf's re. mains ift difc. and Bp. Burnet's expofition of the articles, p. 27. 4th edit. and our author's fermon on divine predeftination, &c. $33. For a fufficient aniwer to the objection drawn from Prov. 16. 4. fee Tillotson's 2d vol. of fermons, fol. p. 681. But there is lefs occation for referring to a variety of authors on thefe fubjects, fince they have received fuch a clear and ample explanation from the writings of the late Mr. Tucker. Light of Nature purfued. * Vol. 2. p. 204. fol. + See felect difcourses, p. 136. and 147, and 393. |