it. But it is the part of infinite Goodness to chufe the very beft; from thence it proceeds therefore,

that

NOTES.

If it be asked, why God, as he is of infinite power and wifdom, did not order things in fuch a mannr that the good of the whole fhould, in all cafes and at all times, confpire with that of each particular or if thefe evils neceffarily arife from the mutual intercourfe of parts of a different and contrary kind, why did he ordain fuch an intercourfe? Could he not have created all things in fuch a state of perfection, that they should find their happiness in themfelves without the help of any thing external? At least he Should have made thofe things, which he himself had the framing of, in fuch a manner as to have no intercourfe with any Being but Himself. For they might have had enough to exercise their faculties upon in the contemplation and love of the divine nature which would have been fufficient for their happinefs, without any commerce with, or dependence upon other creatures; efpecially fuch as would incommode them. Why therefore did God choofd fuch a system, as made room for other imperfect, miferable Beings?

We anfwer, that granting fuch creatures as thofe above-mentioned to be poffible, God has actually created as many of that kind as the fyftem would admit; infomuch, that if there had been more, it would have been more inconvenient. Nor is it of any confequence, whether we fuppofe this fyftem to be finite or infi nite. If finite, it is plain that a certain number may fill it so that there will be no room for more. If infinite, infinite creatures of the fame kind will equally fill an infinite fyftem, as a finite number will fill a finite one; for there is the fame proportion. In this, then, as well as the former fyftem, there will be no place for more. But yet, when this fyftem, or order of creatures, is filled up, there would be room left for the other less perfect orders, whole natures and faculties might have a mutual relation to each other, and whofe happiness might require their mutual help and affiftance. It is certain, that many and various orders and degrees of this kind were poffible; neither would they, if created, be any impediment to the more perfect order, which is already completed, and the number of which could not be increafed, without damage to the fyftem; neither would the addition of these inferior orders and degrees, leffen the number of the prior and more perfect ones.

What therefore was to be done? Let us now fuppofe God deli berating with himfelf, whether he should create any of the inferior order. If he does, it is manifeft, that he will introduce unneceffary imperfections into his works. Nay, fince fome of thefe may have natures and powers contrary to each other, it will be poffible for clashing and oppofition to arife among his creatures.

that the more imperfect Beings have existence; for it was agreeable to that not to omit the very

NOTES.

leaft

If he does not create them, he will appear unkind, in grudging and refusing them a benefit, which he was able to communicate, without detriment to the fyftem. For I fuppofe thefe inferior ones not to be fo very imperfect, but that their existence would be deemed a great and valuable bleffing.

Who does not fee what way the Divine Goodness would incline in this debate? For fince it was better that these should exist, than not, is it not agreeable to infinite Goodness to choose the beft? At least fuch a choice could be no injury to the greatest goodness.

Whatever fyftem God had chofen, all creatures in it could not have been equally perfect, and there could have been but a certain determinate multitude of the most perfect, and when that was completed, there would have been a ftation for creatures lefs perfect, and it would ftill have been an inftance of goodness to give them a Being, as well as others and therefore whatever fyftem had been chofen, it would have come to what we see, perhaps it would have been worfe. Since therefore whatever God had chofen, there must have been degrees of perfection, and one creature must have been more imperfect and infirm than another, ought we not to conclude, that our prefent fyftem is at least equal to any other that we could have expected?

Hence it appears why God created fuch Beings, as must neceffarily have an intercourfe with each other, and how agreeable it was to the Divine Goodnefs not to deny them exiftence. There could be no reafon to afk why he did not make them of a more perfect order, fince as many of that kind are made already as the fyftem could receive, of what kind foever that fyftem were fuppofed to be. Neither could the benefit of the whole be rendered abfolutely, in all cafes, and at all times, confiftent with that of particulars. For though this might perhaps be effected in the more perfect orders, yet it is plainly impoffible in the lefs perfect ones, fuch as have a connection with matter, that is neceffarily fubject to contrariety and diffolution; and efpecially thofe which have folid and hard bodies. Either, therefore, no fuch animals as these were to have been created, or thefe inconveniencies tolerated fuppofing always that their exiftence is a bleffing to them, notwithstanding thefe inconveniencies, and that more good than evil accrues to them from the possession of it.

:

From hence it will appear how fruitful a fource of evils this imperfection of creatures may be, and that from this head there flows a poffibility of evil among the works of God, notwithAtanding infinite power and goodness. How every particular evil may be reduced to this origin, fhall be fhewn (God willing) in the fequel.

In the interim who can doubt whether this fource of all evils be itlelf to be called an evil? Evil is by many defined a privation of

good.

leaft good that could be produced. Finite goodness might poffibly have been exhausted in creating the greater beings, but infinite extends to all. The infinite power and goodness of God then were the caufe, why imperfect beings had existence,

NOTES.

good. In this it agrees with defect or imperfection, and a man is called evil, or an action evil, which brings us into inconveniences, or is prejudicial to the author, or any other perfon. With how much more reafon then may imperfection be called an evil, fince it is the origin of all the evils we endure, or which arise in the mundane fyftem.

But inanimate things, you fay, are capable of neither good nor evil, and therefore it does not fignify in what condition they be placed, fenfible things only can be miferable. I answer, it is true inanimate creatures are not capable of fome kind of evils, viz. pain, grief, or undue elections; but are there no other evils which they may be fubject to? Who would not think himfelf ill dealt with, if he fhould be reduced to the state of an inanimate crea ture? He would feel no inconveniences, fay you. I grant it, but this very not feeling is dreaded by us as one of the greatest of all evils. This deprivation of fenfe therefore, is far from being defi rable, and confequently far from being good. To be deprived of fenfe is what we call an evil of lofs, though it be not a fenfible

one.

If any one fhould take away a man's feeling by a blow or any other way, nay if he did not restore it to him when he had this in his power, would he not be mischievous and injurious to him, though the fufferer be not at all fenfible of the injury? Now who can affirm that God could not have endowed every thing with fenfe, at least have joined a fenfitive foul to every particle of matter? May we not complain therefore that he has not done it? Is it not equally difadvantageous for inanimate things never to have had fenfe, as for animated beings to be deprived of it?

And yet fome are fo perverfe that they will not have this imperfection called an evil, though it really be as great an one as the other.

However, we must obferve that inanimate things are not made for themselves, but for the ufe cf fuch as are endowed with fenfe and reafon, they have therefore a relative good or evil, both in regard to God, and to thofe creatures for whofe ufe they were defigned, and as far as they answer the end they were made for, we efteem them good, fuch as do otherwife are evil of which good or evil there is no other ground but their perfection or imper fection.

The origin of evil is the fame therefore in both fenfitive and in animate beings, viz. the abfence of perfection.

existence, together with the more perfect. It is plain therefore, that the fyftem of the world may be the work of a Deity, though it has this fault. Nay, that it was created is evident, for this very reafon, because it is imperfect; for if it were felf-exiftent, it would be abfolutely perfeƐt (24.)

NOTES.

CHAP.

(24.) The chief argument of the foregoing chapter is beautifully illuftrated by Mr. Addifon in the Spectator, No. 519. As frequent ufe will be made of this obfervation concerning the feale of beings, I hope the reader will excufe my tranfcribing fo much of the abovementioned paper as is necessary to explain it.

Infinite goodness is of fo communicative a nature, that it feems to delight in the conferring of exiftence upon every degree of perceptive being. As this is a fpeculation which I have often purfued with great pleasure to myfelf, I fhall inlarge farther upon it, by confidering that part of the scale of beings which comes within our knowledge. There are fome living creatures which are raised just above dead matter. To mention only the fpecies of fhell-fish, which are formed in fashion of a Cone, that grow to the furface of feveral rocks, and immediately die upon their being fevered from the place where they grow. There are many other creatures but one remove from thefe, which have no other fenses befides that of feeling and taste. Others have still an additional one of hearing, others of fmell, and others of fight, It is wonderful to obferve, by what a gradual progrefs the world of life advances through a prodigious variety of fpecies, before a creature is formed that is complete in all its fenfes; and even among thefe is fuch a different degree of perfection, in the fenfe which one animal enjoys beyond what appears in another, that though the fenfe in different animals be diftinguifhed by the fame common denomination, it feems almoft of a different nature. If after this we look into the feveral inward perfections, cunning and fagacity, or what we generally call inftinct*, we find them rifing after the fame manner imperceptibly one above another, and receiving additional improvements according to the fpecies in which they are implanted. This progrefs in nature is so very gradual, that the most perfect of an inferior fpecies comes very near to the most imperfect of that which is immediately above it. The exuberant and overflowing goodness of the fupreme Being, whofs mercy extends to all his works, is plainly feen, as I have before hinted from his having made fo little matter, at least what falls within our knowledge, that does not fwarm with life: nor

To which we may add, will and liberty,

See Bayle's Dict. p. 2609, 2610.

is his goodness less feen in the diversity than in the multitude of living creatures. Had he only made one fpecies of animals, f none of the reft would have enjoyed the happiness of existence, he has therefore specified in his creation every degree of life, every capacity of being. The whole chafm in nature, from a plant to a man, is filled up with diverse kinds of creatures, rifing one over another, by fuch a gentle and easy ascent, that the little tranfitions and deviations from one fpecies to another, are almost infenfible. This intermediate fpace is fo well husbanded and managed, that there is fcarce a degree of perfection which does not appear in fome one part of the world of life. Is the goodnefs or wisdom of the divine Being more manifefted in this his proceeding? There is a confequence, befides those I have already mentioned, which feem very naturally deducible from the foregoing confiderations. If the fcale of being rifes by fuch a regu ⚫lar progrefs, fo high as man, we may, by a parity of reason, fuppofe that it ftill proceeds gradually through thofe beings which are of a fuperior nature to him; fince there is an infinitely greater fpace and room for different degrees of perfection between the fupreme being and man, than between man and the most defpica ble infect. This confequence of fo great a variety of beings which are fuperior to us, from that variety which is inferior to us, is made by Mr. Locke, in a paffage which I fhall here fet down, after having premifed, that notwithstanding there is fuch infinite room between man and his Maker for the creative power to exert itfelf in, it is impoffible that it should ever be filled up, fince there will be ftill an infinite gap or diftance between the highest created being and the power which produced him.'

The fine paffage there cited from Mr. Locke, occurs in the 3d book of his Effay, chap. 6. §. 12,

See alfo notes, F. and 26.

From the foregoing obfervation, that there is no manner of chafm or void, no link deficient in this great chain of beings, and the reafon of it, it will appear extremely probable alfo, that every diftinct order, every clafs or fpecies of them, is as full as the nature of it would admit, and God faw proper. There are (as our Author fays) perhaps, fo many in each clafs as could exift toge ther without fome inconvenience or uneasiness to each other. This is easily conceivable in mankind, and may be in fuperior beings, though, for want of an exact knowledge of their feveral natures and orders, we cannot apprehend the manner of it, or conceive how they affect one another; only this we are fure of, that neither the fpecies, nor the individuals in each fpecies, can poffibly be infinite; and that nothing but an impossibility in the nature of the thing, or fome greater inconvenience, can reftrain the exercife of the power of God, or hinder him from producing ftill more and more beings capable of felicity. When we begin to enquire into the number of thefe and the degrees of their perfection, we foon lofe ourselves, and can only refer all to the divine wisdom and goodness: From our previous notices of which attributes, we have the highest reafon to conclude that every thing is as perfect as poffible in its own kind, and that every fyftem is in itself full nd complete.