the perverseness of their own wills. Now, if God invited all men to come to him, and then shut the door of mercy against any who were desirous of entering; his invitation would be a mockery, and unworthy of himself: but we insist on it, that he does not invite all men to come to him in a saving way: and that every individual person, who is, through his gracious influence on his heart, made willing to come to him, shall, sooner or later surely be saved by him, and that with an everlasting salvation. (2.) Man is not excusable for neglecting God's will of command. Pharaoh was faulty, and therefore justly punishable for not obeying God's revealed will, though God's secret will rendered that obedience impossible. Abraham would have committed sin, had he refused to sacrifice Isaac; and in looking to God's secret will, would have acted counter to his revealed one. So Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the reprobate Jews, were justly condemned for putting CHRIST to death, inasmuch as it was a most notorious breach of God's revealed will. "Thou shalt do no murder;" yet, in slaying the Messiah, they did no more than God's hand and his counsel, i. e. his secret, ordaining will, determined before should be done, Acts iv. 27, 28. and Judas is justly punished for perfidiously and wickedly betraying Christ, though his perfidy and wickedness were (but not with his design) subservient to the accomplishment of the decree and word of God. The brief of the matter is this; secret things belong to God, and those that are revealed belong to us therefore, when we meet with a plain precept, we should simply endeavour to obey it, without tarrying to inquire into God's hidden purpose. Venerable Bucer, after taking notice how God hardened Pharaoh's heart, and making some observations on the Apostle's simile of a potter and his clay; adds,* that "Though God has at least the same right over his creatures, and is at liberty to make them what he will, and direct them to the end that pleaseth himself, according to his sovereign and secret determination; yet it by no means follows, that they do not act freely and spontaneously, or that the evil they commit is to be charged on God." Pos. 5. God's hidden will is peremptory and absolute: and therefore cannot be hindered from taking effect. God's will is nothing else than God himself willing: consequently, it is omnipotent and unfrustrable. Hence we find it termed by Austin and the schoolmen, voluntas omnipotentissima, because, whatever God wills, cannot fail of being effected. This made Austin say, "Evil men do many things contrary to God's revealed will; but so great is his wisdom, and so inviolable his truth, that he directs all things into those channels which he foreknew." And again,‡"No free will of the creature can resist the will of God; for man cannot so will, or nill, as to obstruct the divine determination, or overcome the divine power." Once more§ "It cannot be questioned, but God does all things, and ever did according to his own purpose: the human will cannot resist him, so as to make him do more or less than it is his pleasure to do, quandoquidem etiam de ipsis hominum voluntatibus quod vult facit, since he does what he pleases even with the wills of men. Pos. 6. Whatever comes to pass, comes to pass by virtue of this absolute, omnipotent will of † De Civ. Dei. 1. 22, c. 1. * Bucer ad Rom. ix. Ibid. God, which is the primary and supreme cause of all things. Rev. ix. 11. "Thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are, and were created." Psalm cxv. 3. "Our God is in the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he pleased." Dan. iv. 35. "He doth according to his will, in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What dost thou ?" Psalm cxxxv. 6. "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and in earth, in the seas, and deep places.' Mat. x. 29. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father. To all which Austin subscribes when he says,* "Nothing is done but what the Almighty wills should be done, either efficiently or permissively." As does Luther, whose words are these, This therefore must stand; to wit the unsearchable will of God, without which nothing exists or acts." And again, c. 160. "God would not be such, if he was not almighty, and if any thing could be done without him." And elsewhere, c. 158. he quotes these words of Erasmus: "Supposing there was an earthly prince, who could do whatever he would, and none were able to resist him ; we might safely say of such an one, that he would certainly fulfil his own desire in like manner, the will of God, which is the first cause of all things, should seem to lay a kind of necessity upon our wills." This Luther approves of, and subjoins, "Thanks be to God for this orthodox passage in Erasmus's discourse! but, if this be true, what becomes of his doctrine of free will, which he at other times so strenuously contends for?" *Tom. 3. in Enchi. † De Serv. Arb. c. 143. Pos. 7. The will of God is so the cause of all things, as to be itself without cause; for nothing can be the cause of that, which is the cause of every thing. So that the divine will is the ne plus ultra of all our inquiries: when we ascend to that we can go no farther. Hence, we find every matter resolved ultimately into the mere sovereign pleasure of God, as the spring and occasion of whatsoever is done in heaven and earth. Mat. xi. 25. "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes : even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." Luke xii. 32. "It is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom." Mat. viii. 3. "I will, be thou clean." Mark iii. 13. "He went up into a mountain, and called unto him whom he would." Jam. i. 18. "Of his own will begat he us, with the word of truth." John i. 13. "Which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." Rom. ix. 15, 18. "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." And no wonder that the will of God should be the main spring that sets all inferior wheels in motion, and should likewise be the rule by which he goes in all his dealings with his creatures; since nothing out of God, i. e. exterior to himself, can possibly induce him to will or nill one thing rather than another. Deny this, and you at one stroke destroy his immutability and independency: since he can never be independent, who acts pro re nata, as emergency requires, and whose will is suspended on that of others not unchangeable, whose purposes vary and take all shapes, according as the persons or things vary, who are the objects of those purposes. The only reason, then, that can be assigned, why the Deity. does this, or omits that, is, because it is his own free pleasure. Luther,* in answer to that question, Whence it was, that Adam was permitted to fall, and corrupt his whole posterity, when God could have prevented his falling," &c. says, "God is a Being, whose will acknowledges no cause: neither is it for us to prescribe rules to his sovereign pleasure, or call him to account for what he does. He has neither superior nor equal; and his will is the rule of all things. He did not therefore will such and such things, because they were in themselves right, and he was bound to will them; but they are therefore equitable and right, because he wills them. The will of man indeed may be influenced and moved; but God's will never can. To assert the contrary is to undeify him." Bucer likewise observes, "God has no other motive for what he does, than ipsa voluntas, his own mere will; which will is so far from being unrighteous, that it is justice itself." Pos. 8. Since, as was lately observed, the determining will of God being omnipotent, cannot be obstructed or made void; it follows, that he never did, nor does he now, will that every individual of mankind should be saved. If this was his will, not one single soul could ever be lost: (for who hath resisted his will?) and he would surely afford all men those effectual means of salvation, without which it cannot be had. Now God could afford these means as easily to all mankind as to some only: but experience proves that he does not; and the reason is * De Serv. Arb. c. 153. † Ad Rom. ix. |