And the Secretary of the Treasury in his report to the same Congress, in 1832, mentions certain things which "have suggested an inquiry into the security of the Bank as the depositary of the public funds."

The subject of the safety of the deposits was thus an object of inquiry by the Secretary of the Treasury, and by Congress-and what was the result? The agent of the Treasury, after a full investigation, reported as follows:

"Thus far I consider my report as complying with that part of your letter directing the investigation 'so as to ascertain the security of the public money, and the solvency of the Bank,' neither of which in my opinion, admit of a doubt."

of Executive Departments But Congress made a dis-
tinction between them.
On the 2d of July, 1789, as
the Journals of Congress show, "An engrossed bill for
establishing an Executive Department, to be denomi-
nated the Treasury Department,' was read the third
time, and the blanks therein filled up.

The House of Representatives, after an investigation by the Committee of Ways and Means, resolved by a vote of more than two-thirds,

"That the Government deposits may, in the opinion of the House, be safely continued in the Bank of the United States."

"Resolved, That the said bill do pass, and the title be an Act to establish the Treasury Department." The same distinction pervades the whole organiza tion of the several Departments. The Secretary of the Navy, of State, and of War, are to execute the orders of the President-but the Secretary of the Treasury is not enjoined to execute the orders of the President. Not a single word is there of performing the or ders of the President. On the contrary, the act of Congress declares, that it shall be his duty to make report and give information to either Branch of the Legisla ture, in person or in writing, (as he may be required) respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to From these it is apparent that, in the opinion of the his office." And the act of May 10th, 1800, directs President, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Com-him to make his annual report, not to the President,but mittee of Finance, the question of removing the deposits was a question merely of their safety:

That the Government, through its proper channels, inquired into their safety:

And that through all these channels their safety was made manifest, and so declared by the highest authority.

But supposing this to be less evident than it is-supposing that causes other than the safety of the public funds would justify their removal from the Bank after it has paid a full equivalent for them, still one thing is manifest:

to Congress.

This independence of the Secretary of the Treasury if it be true in general-is more especially true in regard to the Bank. It was in fact the leading principle in organizing the Bank, that the President should be excluded from all control of it. The question which most divided the House of Representatives was whether there should be any Government Directors at all-and although this was finally adopted, yet its tendency to create an executive influence over the Bank was quali fied by two restrictions-first, that no more than three Directors should be appointed from any one State-and That the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secre- second, that the President of the Bank should not be, tary of the Treasury alone, has the power to remove as was originally designed by the Secretary of the Treathem--that officer being specially designated to per-sury, chosen from among the Government Directors. form that specific duty-and the President of the Unit- Accordingly, by the charter, the Secretary of the Treaed States being, by the clearest implication, forbidden sury is every thing-the President comparatively nothto interfere. ing. The Secretary has the exclusive supervision of all the relations of the Bank with the Government, Thus:

The whole structure of the Treasury shows, that the design of Congress was to make the Secretary as independent as possible of the President. The other Sec- By the 15th article of the 11th section, the Officer at retaries are merely executive officers; but the Secreta- the head of the Treasury Department of the United ry of the Treasury, the guardian of the public revenue, States, shall be furnished from time to time, as often as comes into immediate sympathy with the repre- he may require, not exceeding once a week, with statesentatives of the people who pay the revenue; and al- ments of the amount of the capital stock, &c. &c. though according to the general scheme of appoint- By the 15th section, "Whenever required by the Sec ment he is nominated by the President to the Senate,retary of the Treasury, the said Corporation shall give yet he is in fact the officer of Congress, not the officer the necessary facilities for transferring the public of the President. Thus: funds," &c. &c. By the act of Congress, of 1789, it was provided, that

"There shall be an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of War; and there shall be a principal officer therein to be called the Secretary for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on, or entrusted to him by the President of the

United States."

By the same act it was provided, that

There shall be an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, [afterwards changed by the act of September 15, 1789, to the Department of State] with the same provisions as to the principal officer."

By the act of 30th of April, 1798, it was declared,

that

There shall be an Executive Department, under the denomination of the Department of the Navy, the chief officer of which shall be called the Secretary of the Navy, whose duty it shall be to execute such or ders as he shall receive from the President of the Unit

ed States.

The bill introduced into the Congress of 1789, provided for the establishment of the three Departmentsthose of War, State and Treasury-under the name

By the 16th section, the deposits of the money of the United States shall be made in the Bank and its Branches, "unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct."

All these the Secretary may do-but from the begin ning of the charter to the end of it, there is not one sin gle power over the administration of the Bank assigned to the President, except in the last section, where it is declared that, "whenever any Committee of Congress shall find and report, or the President of the United States shall have reason to believe, that the charter has been violated, it may be lawful for Congress to direct, or the President to order, a scire facias to be sued out of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, calling upon the Corporation to show cause wherefore the charter hereby granted shall not be declared for feited." The whole function then delegated to the President is a power, concurrently with a Committee of Congress, to issue a scire facias, by which the Court is to try whether his belief that the Bank has violated its charter is well founded. Yet this slender authority is made the pretext for usurping the whole power of the Secretary, and for doing that which the Secretary alone was authorized to do, and which he the President was not merely not authorized to do, but substantially prohibited from doing.

For it is manifest that this removal of the deposits is been violated, bring the Bank before the court for trial. not made by the order of the Secretary of the Treasu- Now, in this manifesto, he distinctly declares that the ry. It is a perversion of language so to describe it. Bank has acted in direct violation of one of the most On the contrary, the reverse is openly avowed. The important provisions of the charter." If so, it was his Secretary of the Treasury refused to remove them, be- duty to issue the scire facias-to appeal to the Courts lieving, as his published letter declares, that the remo- and Juries. That was the only legitimate action which val was "unnecessary, unwise, vindictive, arbitrary, and belonged to him. But a judicial investigation of his unjust." He was then dismissed because he would charges is precisely what he dreaded. The more sumnot remove them, and another was appointed because mary and illegal invasion of the powers of others, seems he would remove them. Now this is a palpable violation to have more attraction than the legitimate exercise of of the charter. The Bank and Congress agree upon his own. And making himself accuser and judgecertain terms, which no one can change but a particu-disregarding the vote of Congress, the authority of the lar officer: who, although necessarily nominated to the Courts and Juries, and the exclusive power of the SeSenate by the President, was designated by the Bank cretary of the Treasury, he substitutes at once his own and Congress as the urpire between them. Both arbitrary will. Certainly since the foundation of this Congress and the Bank have a right to the free, and Government, nothing has ever been done which more honest, and impartial judgment of that Officer whoe- deeply wounds the spirit of our free institutions. It, in ver he may be the Bank, because the removal may in-fact, resolves itself into this-that whenever the laws jure its interests-the Congress, because the removal prescribe certain duties to an officer, acting under the may greatly incommode and distress their constituents. sanctions of his official oath and his private character, In this case, they are deprived of it by the unlawful in- refuses to violate that law, the President of the United terference of the President, who "assumes the respon- States may dismiss him and appoint another; and if he sibility," which, being interpreted, means, usurps the too should prove to be a "refractory subordinate," to power of the Secretary. To make this usurpation more continue his removals until he at last discovers in the evident, his own language contradicts the very power descending scale of degradation some irresponsible inwhich he asserts: dividual fit to be the tool of his designs. Unhappily, there are never wanting men who will think as their superiors wish them to think-men who regard more the compensation than the duties of their office-men to whom daily bread is sufficient consolation for daily

"The power of the Secretary, says he, over the de. posits, is unqualified."

"The President cannot refrain from pressing upon the Secretary of the Treasury his view of the considerations which impel to immediate action."

And yet these phrases have scarcely escaped him, when he ends by declaring that he "begs his cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own." "Its responsibility is assumed," &c.

Finally, it was announced in the Official Gazette, that "We know the fact, that if Mr. Van Buren and every personal friend of the President, had united in recommending that the deposits should not be removed, the President would have taken measures to remove them notwithstanding."

The Bank, then, has a right to complain: 1st. That after paying amply for the use of the deposits, they have been suddenly drawn from it.

2d. That this has been done without the slightest suspicion of their insecurity, the only ground on which the removal could be justifiable-and

3d. That it has been done, not by the officer to whose judgment it had agreed to submit, but by another officer who had not the slightest right to interfere.

But the wrong done to the pecuniary interests of the Bank, sinks into entire insignificance when compared with the deeper injury inflicted on the country by this usurpation of all the powers of the Government.

By the act of Congress, chartering the Bank, certain specified powers in regard to it are delegated to parti

cular officers.

By the 16th section, and by the 15th rule of the 11th section, the Secretary of the Treasury has a constant supervision of its affairs, and the power of placing the public revenue elsewhere, subject to an immediate and direct responsibility to Congress.

By the 22d section, Congress itself has the power of investigation, to ascertain if there be sufficient ground to justify an appeal to the courts of the United States. to try if it has violated its charter.

Finally, by the same section, whenever the President of the United States shall have "reason to believe that the charter has been violated," he may order a scire facias to be sued out of the Circuit Court of the District of Pennsylvania, calling on the said corporation to show cause wherefore the charter hereby granted shall not be declared forfeited.

This is the whole power of the President in relation to the Bank. He may, if he thinks the charter has

shame.

The present state of this question is a fearful illustration of the danger of it. At this moment, the whole revenue of this country, is at the disposal-the absolute, uncontrolled disposal-of the President of the United States. The laws declare that the public funds shall be placed in the Bank of the United States, unless the Secretary of the Treasury forbids it. The Secretary of the Treasury will not forbid it. The President dismisses him and appoints somebody who will. So the law declares that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, except on warrants for appropriations made by law. If the Treasurer refuses to draw his warrant

for any disbursement, the President may dismiss him sitate to gratify his patron. The text is in the official and appo nt some more flexible agent, who will not he Gazette, announcing the fate of the dismissed Secretary to all who follow him. "The Agent cannot conscientiously perform the service and refuses to co-operate, and desires to remain to thwart the President's measures. To put an end to this difficulty between the head and the hands of the Executive Department, the Constitution arms the Chief Magistrate with authority to remove the refractory subordinate.' The theory thus avowed, and the recent practice under it, convert the whole free institutions of this country into the mere all the restraints which the framers of the Government absolute will of a single individual. They break down hoped they had imposed on arbitrary power, and place the whole revenue of the United States in the hands of fitter for the East, than for any country claiming to be the President. The power, too, is asserted in a tone governed by laws.

The President declares that, "in his opinion, the near approach of the termination of the charter, and the public considerations heretofore mentioned, are of themselves amply sufficient to justify the removal of the deposits, without reference to the conduct of the Bank, or their safety in its keeping."

The only "public considerations heretofore mentioned," are his own re-election, and his belief that the charter would not be renewed. So that the President here avows that although the last Congress passed a bill rechartering this very Bank-although the same Congress, a few months ago, at his own invitation, declared that the public deposits might be safely continued in this Bank-although a new Congress, many of whose members are chosen by the people since his own election,

is about to meet in ninety days, and will continue in existence for two years-although at the end of those two years a new Congress, fresh from the people, will meet before the charter expires-yet, notwithstanding all this, he, the President declares, on his own responsibility, that the deposits shall be removed; no matter whether the conduct of the Bank has been good or bad, and no matter whether the deposits are safe or unsafe; and accordingly he dismisses the officer who refuses to remove them, and appoints another who will remove them.

1st. He first complains that the Bank applied to Congress for a decision in regard to its charter. He says "that there are strong reasons for believing that the motive of the Bank for asking for a re-charter at that session, was to make it a leading question in the election of a President of the United States the ensuing November, and all steps were deemed necessary to procure from the people a reversal of the President's decision;" and again-"the object avowed by many of the advocates of the Bank was to put the President to the test" and moreover, "it was to compel the Presi

At this moment the process of evading the law is indent to take his stand that the question was brought full practice.

By the Constitution of the United States, (Sec. 9,) "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of an appropriation made by law."

By the act of Sept. 1, 1789, establishing the Treasury Department, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to "grant all warrants for moneys to be issued from the Treasury in pursuance of appropriations by law;" and the same act further declares, that it shall be the duty of the Treasurer to receive and keep the moneys of the United States and to disburse the same, upon warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, countersigned by the Comptroller, recorded by the Register, and not otherwise."

But there has been a usage of transferring funds from one branch of the Bank of the U. S. to another, or one State Bank to another, when the public service res quired disbursements at remote places. This transfer draught, intended to require an actual transfer, has been converted into a mere check-a warrant in fact, though not in form and has been applied to the purpose of taking the funds out of the place to which they are assigned by law, and transferring them to the opposite side of the street. As it was never presumed that such a power would be thus abused, the transfer draft has fewer checks than the warrant for disbursement, the signature of the Comptroller, who is the law officer of the Treasury not being usual; and accordingly by a strange anomaly, although the Treasurer's warrant to pay one hundred dollars to an honest creditor of the Government must go through a great variety of forms, the transfer draught for a million has fewer formalities. By means of these transfer draughts, as will be seen by the annexed correspondence, large sums of money have been withdrawn from the Bank of the United States, and placed in State Banks in the same city, without the slightest reference to the public disbursements and no less than two millions three hundred thousand dollars of the public revenue have been plac. ed at the discretion of the officers of the State Banks by transfer draughts privately issued, and without the notice to the Bank of the United States, which the Treasury had promised to give, and had hitherto always given of similar demands on the Bank.

The Committee willingly leave to the Congress of the United States the assertion of their own constitutional power, and the vindication of the principles of our Government, against the most violent assault they have ever yet encountered; and will now confine themselves to the more limited purpose of showing that the reasons assigned for this measure are as unfounded as the object itself is illegal.

The main purpose in fact of this manifesto, appears to be to prove that the Bank was unfriendly to his own election, and he endeavors to trace this opposition to him and his measures.

1st. In the application to Congress for a renewal of the Charter.

2d. In the extension of the loans of the Bank in 1831 and 1832.

3d. In the claim for damages on the French Bill. 4th. In the circulation of documents vindicating the Bank from the imputations which had been cast upon it.

All these assertions it is proposed briefly to disprove.

forward at that particular time." Now the fact is that so far from prematurely hastening a discussion on the part of the Bank, it was he himself who brought this very question before Congress and rendered its discussion inevitable. Thus,

In his Message of December 8, 1829, he said,

"The Charter of the Bank of the United States expires in 1936, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy in a measure involving such important principles and such deep pe cuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the Legislature and the people." In his Message of December 11th, 1830, he says, "The importance of the principles involved in the inquiry whether it be proper to re-charter the Bank of the United States, requires that I should again call the attention of Congress to the subject."

In his Message of December 6, 1831, he says, "Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the Bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty in my former Messages frankly to disclose them, in order that the attention of the legislature and the people should be seasonably directed to that important subject, and that it might be considered and finally disposed of in a manner best calculated to promote the ends of the Constitution, and subserve the public interest. Having thus conscientiously discharged a constitutional question, 1 deem it proper on this occasion, without a more particular reference to the views of the subject then expressed, to leave it at present to the investigation of an enlightened people and their representatives.'

It was under these distinct and repeated invitations by the President himself, that the Bank felt itself oblig ed not to decline his call upon Congress, and accordingly the subject was brought before that body.

Both Houses of Congress passed the bill renewing the charter. This result was unexpected to him, and although he had declared in the Message just quoted, that he meant to "leave it at present to the investigation of an enlightened people and their representatives" -yet the moment the enlightened people and their representatives differed from him in opinion, he treated them just as he has recently done the conscience of the Secretary of the Treasury. He refused his signature to the bill on the 14th of July, 1832, declaring that "had the executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed." As however no such call was made he concluded that "as the charter had yet four years to run, and as a renewal now was not necessary to the successful prosecution of its business, it was to have been expected," &c. &c.

Here then the President begins in 1829, when the Bank had nearly seven years to run, by telling Congress that to avoid precipitancy he could not too soon present the subject of the re-charter to their considera tion. The next year, when the Bank had nearly six years to run, he repeated to Congress that the importance of the subject of the re-charter required that he should again call the attention of Congress to it. The next year when the Bank had five years to run, he re iterated to Congress that he thought the attention of

Congress should be seasonably directed to this import-possessing thus additional means of loaning, to the ant subject and then when Congress at his request proceeded to consider it and renewed the charter, he sent it back with a declaration, that as the charter had yet four years to run, there was no necessity for being in haste about it.

And now in the face of all these testimonials of his urging Congress, year after year, to decide the question, as they decided against him, he asserts that the Bank must have brought it before Congress to defeat his elec. tion.

His second proof is scarcely less extraordinary. He says that in order to carry the clection against him "although the charter was approaching its termination, and the Bank was aware that it was the intention of the Government to use the public deposit as fast as it accrued in the payment of the public debt, yet did it extend its loans from January 1831, to May 1832, from $12,402,304 24 to $70,428,070 72, being an increase of $28,025,766 48 in sixteen months. It is confidently believed that the leading object of this immense extension of its loans was to bring as large a portion of the people as possible under its power and influence." The errors here are as follows:

1st. That the fact in regard to the increase of the Loans is mis-stated-and that the motives of them are wholly perverted.

The truth is, that the loans at the periods mentioned

stood thus:

Loans to Individuals $33,575,403 43 $47,375,078 20
Loan to Government 8,674,681 06

Domestic Bills

10,456,653 90 23,052,972 52

$52,706,738 39 $70,428,050 72
52,706,738 39

$17,721,312 33

Baring, Brs. & Co. Cr. 2,387,331 19 Dr. 1,878,122,29

From this it is manifest that between those two periods the Bank had received from Government the reimburse$8,674,681 06

ment of

It had drawn for its foreign funds

And drawn on its foreign correspondents for an additional sum of

Making a total of

$2,387,331 19

1,878,122 29

Thus furnishing additional means of discounting to the amount of

Yet its actual loans-its actual discounts were increased only

amount of nearly thirteen millions, actually increased its loans to the amount of seventeen millions, making in fact a mere increase of its investiments not equal to five millions, of which increase the new Branch Bank of Natchez, established within that period, alone contributed nearly three millions.

There are several circumstances which make this mis statement peculiarly improper. He reproaches the Bank with this increase, although "the Bank was aware of the intention of the Government to use the public deposit as fast as it accrued, in the payment of the pub. lic debt." Now the fact is, that this public deposit was used as we have just seen, in paying off the public debt owned by the Bank itself-so that instead of increasing its loans in such a way as to interfere with the payment of the public debt to others, this very public debt was actually paid to the Bank itself, and furnished the very means of increasing the loans.

What makes it still worse is, that this very public debt was in fact paid to the Bank on the solicitation of the Treasury itself, before the Bank was bound to receive it. On the 29th-day of September, 1831, the Secretary wrote to the President of the Bank:

"The offer made by you this day, on behalf of the Bank of the United States, for the immediate re-imbursement at par of the following stocks received by that institution is accepted, viz:

91,188 92 of 43 per cents of 26th May, 1824. 3,260,475 99 of 44 per cents of 24th May, 1824.

$3,351,664 91

"The department fully appreciates the disposition which the Board of Directors have manifested by this arrangement, to co-operate in the accomplishment of its desire for the discharge of the public debt as early as the means of the Treasury will permit."

It has been thus seen, first, that the actual amount of increased investment was less by ten millions than is here asserted-second, that the public debt which the Bank is charged with not preparing to pay, was actually paid to the Bank itself, and not merely paid to the Bank, but paid before it was due, in order to accommodate the Government. In regard to this increase, too, the points of comparison are wholly fallacious. From the nature of the business of the country, the loans are necessarily larger in May than January, because the southern crop, with all its business, enlarges the Spring operations of the Bank—and no more just result can be had by comparing May and January, than 4,265,453 48 by comparing the thermometers of the two seasons. The true comparisons must be between January and January, or between May and May. Now the fact is, that the increase from May to May of the successive years is comparatively small. The loans at these successive periods were as follows:

$12,940,134 54
5,124,893 71

May,

66

66

1827 33,118,707 46 17,764,359 05 50,883,066 51 1828 37,353,717 92 17,474,111 43 54,827,829 35 1829 42,894,587 90 15,007,472 13/57,902,060 03 1830,43,206,694 12|10,892,530 90 54,099,225 02 1831 53,582,067 75 5,674,681 06/59,256,748 81; 66 1832 70,428,070 72 paid off. 1833 64,519,900 73 Nov.1833 57,210,604 38|

66

70,428,070 72 64,519,900 73 157,210,604 38!

The Domestic Bills of Exchange purchased for the transferring of the funds of the Government or of individuals, make a separate and independent business, dependant on the demand for the interior commerce of the country. But taking the increase of those bills into consideration, it will be seen that the increase of loans is $5,124,893 71 And the increase of Bills of Exchange 12,596,318 62 Making a total increase of $17,721,212 33 instead of 23 millions as asserted by the signer of the From which it appears that this enlargement was paper. That is to say, in the year 1831, there being a most active foreign and interior trade, requiring unu- gradual-that it occured when the wants of the counsual facilities for its operations, the Bank having re-try required the aid of this expansive power, so valuaceived from the Government the reimbursement of its ble in the Institution, and that the increase has subsid. loan to Government, amounting to more than eight when no longer required. millions; and having called in its funds in Europe, and employed its credit there to the amount of four millions,

Supposing all this, however, to have been exactly as it has been stated, that is, supposing this increase of

loans to have been twenty-eight millions, what does it prove? Why that the Bank enlarged its business to meet the commercial wants of the country, and when those wants were supplied, the business of the Bank of The next head of complaint is the postponement of a course subsided. But the President can ascribe this portion of the three per cents. by the Government in increase to no other cause than his own election. Ac-April, 1832; and of another portion by the Bank in Decordingly, he says that the Bank, in January, 1831, cember, 1832. Now, it is very remarkable that both began to prepare for his election, which was to take these subjects were fully examined-the first by the place nearly two years afterwards, by lending 28 mil-Committee of Investigation of 1832, and the second by lions. It is somewhat hostile to this theory, that this the Committee of Ways and Means of 1833-and both whole increase had reached its height in May, 1832. reports are in decided contradiction to the assertions Now, in December, 1831, the Secretary of the Trea- of the President. For instance, he complains of the sury, with the full approbation of the President, had first postponement, which he imputes to the Bank, spoken in the most favorable terms of the Bank, and whereas the Committee of Investigation themselves dehe did not sign his veto message against it until July, clare, "they are fully of opinion that the Bank neither 1832, up to which period, it was doubtful whether he sought for nor requested a postponement of the paywould veto it, and of course it was unknown whether ment by the Government." He complains of the sethe Bank would have the least reason to be opposed to cond postponement, yet the Committee of Ways and his election and these whole 28 millions might have Means report, that the nominal postponement had, in been uselessly lavished: so that the Bank increased its fact, closed the payment sooner than if no postponeloans while it had no interest in his election, and did ment had been made; and that "this question seems no not increase them when he supposes it had. Truly longer to present any important or practical object of this mode of "bringing as large a portion of the people inquiry, or to call for or admit of any action of Conunder its power and influence," seems singularly ill-gress upon it."