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These things shew, that the influence of means is no just objections against the efficacy of grace. They shew, therefore, that, though the use of the same means may excite the holy affections included in divine love, and other affections of an inferior sort; this does not hinder a vast disparity, not only in these affections themselves, but also in the manner of their production. The external means may be the same. Mens' inward meditations may be on the same moving subjects. But there is a difference between what is wholly the natural production of means themselves, and what is the effect of divine grace operating by them. There is a difference between the natural and intrinsic efficacy of means, operating suitably to the previous dispositions of mens' hearts; and the efficacy of means, when divine operation rectifies the inward dispositions of the heart, and gives to means and endeavours, that good success which inherent depravity or infirmity would otherwise hinder.

When people imagine that the use of means, or activity and diligence in the use of them, clashes with the reality of divine operation, they so far go into one of the most unreasonable branches, of what the body of Christians reckon the enthusiastical scheme of religion, namely, that if God act on mens' minds, men themselves must cease to act; or that they must forbear the use of means, till they find some previous impulse exciting them to it.

They who do not own the doctrine of grace, must own, that if divine grace were needful and real, it would not hinder, but excite, activity and diligence in all good endeavours; and that it is suitable to the divine perfections, that if divine grace were bestowed, it should be bestowed in such a manner as to encourage diligence.

It is a main source of error in general, that men frequently confound things, between which there are the most substantial difference, because of some resemblances of less consequence. It is thus, that some people strengthen their prepossessions against all piety, because of the resemblances of it, that are found

in hypocrites. It is evidently a delusion and self-deceit of the same kind, when men despise all devout affections in general, these included in divine love not excepted, because of some kind of resemblance between all the affections of human nature in general. The view that was taken before of the difference between true holiness, and false appearances of it, shews that that difference is the most important and the most essential difference in the world. The name and general notion of affections, are applicable to the best and to the worst things, the heart of man is capable of. The best and the worst dispositions or emotions of the heart, are called affections, as the most useful truths, and the most hurtful practical errors in the judgment, are called principles. Some general properties may be af firmed of all sorts of principles, as well as of all sorts of affections. The natural means of producing or confirming principles, are real or seeming arguments; as the natural means of exciting affections are suitable motives, which are indeed arguments, relating not not merely to the reality, but to the goodness of certain objects, or the contrary. Notwithstanding such general resemblances, as it is absurd to annihilate the difference between truth and falsehood, in mens' principles, it is no less absurd to annihilate the differences formerly considered, in mens' affections. It cannot be justly objected against this illustration, that the same evidence produces the same principles. The strongest evidences of the most useful truths, are ofttimes considered, with some attention, without begetting persuasion. Sometimes men may consider such evidences, and then do their utmost to refute them.Sometimes these evidences procure assent to some good conclusions, while the most important conclusions, deducible from them, are not admitted. There is a resemblance between the various success of the evidences of the truth, and of the motives to holiness. Sometimes such motives are heard and considered with some attention, and at the same time, with strong aversion and disgust. Sometimes they excite these inferior good affections, which were formerly described, while the main design of them is not complied with..

The reasonings which have been insisted on, concerning the influence of means, or of natural causes, on all sorts of devout affections, serve equally to vindicate the two important points, formerly mentioned, concerning the holy affections included in divine love: namely, the great importance of these attainments considered in themselves, and the reasonableness of ascribing them to divine grace. But there are various things which make it needful to consider this influence of natural causes, on mens' devout affections, somewhat more particularly. It is a theory, in which there has been a good deal of philosophizing against serious piety, or affectionate devotion. But when duly considered, it is of manifold use for better purposes. It is of use for vindicating piety, and for unfolding the delusions of self-deceit, in false pretences to it. It is owned, on all hands, that there are various causes and helps in the nature of things, which are subservient to devout affections, especially to divine love. It is of importance to consider, whether this be a just objection against such affections, or an argument for them and whether or not, the philosophy that subtilizes so much against devout affections, without any due restriction, reflects dishonour, not crely on the corruption of nature, but on nature itself. On the other hand, it is owned by all parties, that men may impose on themselves and others, by devout fervours, which either come short of holiness, or are even of an opposite nature and tendency. A right view of the natural causes, which have an influence on strong fervours of affection, is of manifest use, for due caution against so hurtful delusion

Before we enter on the more particular consideration of the natural causes in view, it may not be improper to observe a remarkable inconsistency, in the reasonings of many people, against devout affections, as the mere product of such causes. Many people, who object against such attainments, as the effects of operations that are merely natural, are against all ́operation that is supernatural. It might be expected that such people would never make it an objection, against

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the goodness or excellency of any effect, that it is a mere natural efficacy that produces it. According to them, this must be the case, as to all the noblest attainments, in the minds or hearts of the best of men, It is very unreasonable in any people to maintain, that nothing can be of importance, that proceeds merely But that from the natural efficacy of second causes.

principle is chiefly unreasonable, in people who acknowledge no other efficacy on mens' hearts, but that alone. If such efficacy is no objection against other valuable attainments, and if they are not to be the less esteemed, because they are the effects of mere natural causes or natural powers; it is manifest partiality to make such a manner of production an objection against all devout affections: especially, against the noblest affection of the soul, fixed on the noblest object.

These things are so obvious, that though people sometimes argue, not only against the divine origin, but even against the importance of any strong devout affections, on pretence that they may be accounted for from natural causes; yet, it seems reasonable to understand such objections with some restriction. The meaning of them seems to be this, that devout affections are of little or no importance, not merely because they are the effects of natural causes, but because they are the effects of such causes, even in the hearts of wicked men and that these must be inconsiderable attainments, which may be produced in mens' hearts, without any changing of their hearts to the better. When the objections in view are understood in this meaning, a sufficient answer to them is contained in the description formerly given, of the vast disparity between different sorts of devout affections. That description proves, that to argue from some particular sorts of devout affections, to all sorts of them in general, without exception, is contrary to the most evident and incontested rules of just reasoning.

In considering the particular natural causes, which have a tendency to excite devout affections, that which deserves to be chiefly inquired into, is strong attention to proper motives. The native tendency of strong at

tention, affords various arguments in favour of vigorous affections towards objects, of the greatest excellency in themselves, and of the greatest importance to us. There is probably no controversy, whether serious and steady attention to such things, or the contrary, thoughtlessness and inconsiderateness about them, be most subservient to true wisdom. The same things, which are the chief motives to devout affections, are the chief motives to all good actions. If attentive consideration of these things be a natural cause, which has a tendency to lively devout affections; the usefulness of the cause, is a good argument for the usefulness of the effect. This way of reasoning is evidently founded on a general principle, on which the most satisfying arguments are founded in other cases; namely, that if the natural causes which have a direct tendency to produce any effect are good and useful, the effect itself must be so likewise. This shews, that instead of its being a just objection against devout affections, that they are naturally excited by attentive consideration, it would rather be a more plausible objection against them, if they were excited ordinarily any other way.

It was observed before, that mens' natural power of exciting several common good affections, does not disprove their need of divine grace, to produce and excite divine love. But though mens' power of attentive consideration, in order to excite some good affections, does not take away their need of that superior power; yet, the use of such serious consideration, with application to God for his blessing, is of such importance, and of so good tendency, that it is necessary to vindicate it from objections, founded on the bad use of it, and artificial imitations of it. The interest of true piety requires the vindication, not only of divine love, but also of earnest desires, and other devout affections, that quicken mens' endeavours after it. And whatever be said of mens' power, of exciting some such affections, by strong attention, it is certain that the use of that power, is a thing to which too many have a strong backwardness, that does not need to be fortified by arguments.

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