all I can say to it is, the eternal Author both of sensation and thought, alone knows how he im. parts it, and how he preserves it.

It was the current opinion of all antiquity, that nothing is in our understanding, which was not before in our senses. Descartes, in his Philosophical Romances, advanced that we had metaphysical ideas before we so much as knew our nurse's breasts. A college of divines condemned this dogma, not because it was an error, but a novelty: afterwards it adopted this very error, because it had been overthrown by Locke, an English philosopher; and an Englishman, to be sure, must be in the wrong. After such shifts of opinion, it has again proscribed that ancient truth, that the senses are the inlets to the understanding. It seems to have acted like governments loaded with debts, sometimes giving a currency to certain notes, and afterwards suppressing them. But this college's notes have quite lost their currency for some time past.

In spight of all the colleges of the world, philosophers will still see that our first knowledge we receive from our sensations; and that our memory is no more than a continued sensation: a man born without any of his five senses would, could he live, be totally void of any ideas. It is owing to the senses that we even have our metaphysical notions: for how should a circle or a triangle be measured, without having seen or felt a triangle? How can we form an idea, imperfect as it is, of infinitude, but by enlarging boundaries? and how can we throw down boundaries, without having seen or felt them?

An eminent philosopher (Traité des Sensations,

tions, tom. ii. p. 128) says, Sensation includes all our faculties.

What must be inferred from all this? That I leave to reflective readers (1).

SOUL.

(1) Mr. Voltaire does not tell us what inferences we are to draw from the foregoing doctrine of sensations; but we must confess, the whole article contains the substance of the Lucretian arguments against the immateriality of human souls, which is this; that, since the five senses are the only means we have of perception, and these depend upon the corporeal organs, the soul without the body is incapable of perception, and therefore is nothing. In answer to which we must observe, first, that though the senses or perceptions depend on the corporeal organs, as to their present exercise, yet in their nature they are really distinct powers, and cannot arise from any of the known properties or qualities of matter, as the learned Dr. Clarke hath fully demonstrated. Secondly, our five senses cannot be said to be the only possible ways of perception, by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing: these are purely arbitrary; and the same power that gave us these, may have given others to other beings: if they be purely arbitrary, the want of them does not imply a total want of perception; but the same soul which in the present state has the powers of reflection, reason, and judgment, which are faculties intirely different from sense, may as easily in another state have different ways of perception. To say that the senses are necessarily the only ways of perception, is a mere prejudice arising from custom; for supposing men had never known the use of sight, would not they have the same reason to conclude, there were but four possible ways of perception, and that sight is an impossible, imaginary power, as they now presume the faculties

SOUL (2)

It would be a fine thing to see one's soul. Know thyself, is an excellent precept, which God alone can practise. Who but he can know his essence?

We

of immaterial beings to be so? Men from their own mere negative ignorance, should never dispute against the possibility of things. See Dr. Clarke on the Be ing and Attributes of God.

(2) This article abounds with metaphysical questions concerning the immortality of the soul, which our author says can be only made known to us by faith. We apprehend he is much mistaken, and shall therefore give the reader the proofs of the immortality of the soul, or of a future state of rewards and punishments. This we have attempted the rather, as throughout his whole work he seems inclined to discredit this doctrine, the basis of all natural aš well as of revealed religion. With regard to the notions of schoolmen, mentioned by M. Voltaire, they are a matter of no consequence, as they do not affect the doctrine itself, but are only designed to amuse an idle curiosity.

I. In this present world the natural order of things is so perverted, that vice often flourishes in great prosperity, and virtue falls under the heaviest calami ties; whence we conclude, there must be a future state of rewards and punishments. For if there be a God, he is infinitely just and good; and it must needs be his will, that all rational creatures shall imitate his moral perfections; he cannot therefore but be pleased with such as obey his will, and displeased with those who disobey it; thence it follows, that in vindication of the honour of his government, he must signify his approbation or displeasure some time or other, by making

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We call soul, that which animates; and so contracted is our understanding, that we know little

making finally a suitable difference between those who obey him, and those who act otherwise; consequently there must be a state of rewards and punishments after this life, wherein all the present difficulties of providence fhall be cleared up by an exact administration of justice. To say, that virtue is sufficient to its own happiness, is talking idly with the Stoics; since in the present state of things, virtue is not itself the chief good, but only the means to obtain it; and he who dies for the sake of virtue, is not really more happy, abstracted from a regard to futurity, than he who dies for any fond opinion or humour.

II. Considering the nature and operations of the soul itself, none of the known qualities of matter can in any possible variation, division, or composition, produce sense and thought. The powers of the soul are the most remote from the known properties of matter. It is absurd to suppose the soul made up of innumerable consciousnesses, as matter of innumerable parts; therefore the seat of thought must be a simple substance, such as cannot be divided into pieces like matter; consequently, the soul is not liable to be dissolved along with the body; therefore it will naturally be immortal.

III. A third argument in favour of a future state, is drawn from men's natural desire of immortality. For it is not at all probable, that God should have given men appetites, which were never to be satisfied; desires, that had no objects to answer them; and unavoidable apprehensions of what was never to happen.

IV. A fourth argument is drawn from men's conscience, or judgment of their own conduct. Virtuous actions are attended with self-applause and expec

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tation

little more of it. Three-fourths of our species do not go that length, and little concern themselves about the thinking being; the other fourth is seeking, but nobody has found, nor ever will find.

Thou poor pedant seeft a vegetating plant, and thou sayeft Vegetation, or even Vegetative soul. Thou observest bodies have and give motion, and this with thee is strength. Thy hound's aptness in learning to hunt under thy inftruction, thou callest instinct, sensitive soul; and as thou hast combined ideas, that thou termest spirit. But

tation of rewards; crimes, on the other hand, are followed by remorse, and dread of punishment. Hence it is not therefore at all likely, that the Deity should have so framed the mind of man, as necessarily to pass upon itself a judgment, which shall never be verified; and stand perpetually convicted by a sentence, which shall never be confirmed.

V. A fifth and last argument is drawn from man's being by nature an accountable creature, and capable of being judged. Every moral action a person performs proceeds either from some good, or bad motive; is either conformable or contrary to right reason, and worthy of praise, or dispraise. Therefore it is highly reasonable to suppose, that since all the moral difference of our actions consists in the right use or abuse of those faculties, which we have received from a superior being, there will at some time or other be an inquiry made into the grounds of our several actions, whether they have been agreeable or disagreeable to the rule that was given us, and a suitable judg ment be passed upon them. See further concerning this subject, Dr. Clarke on the Being and Attributes of God, and Woolaston's Religion of Nature delineated.