ǎ motive. The energy or pleasure with which the mind obeys a motive, is always as the strength of the motive if unresisted; or, if resisted, as the quantity of force by which it exceeds the contrary motive. For instance: a passion or appetite prompts me to a particular act: the commission of this act, I am told, will be visited with future punishment: if fear of this punishment acts on me with greater force than that by which my appetite impels me, I will not commit the act; if the motive originating from my passion of fear is not so strong as that proceeding from the other passion, I gratify the latter; the pleasure, however, with which I gratify it is so much less exactly by the quantity of force with which my fear acts on me, than if my preponderating motive was unresisted. Hence I do in one country frequently and with pleasure an act which in another I do seldom and E cautiously, and in another never, according to their different laws. The specific difference between a rational man and idiots and brutes is, that the latter obey their motives without a consideration of conse quence, or with a much less accurate one than the former; or, in other words, the motives of idiots and brutes are more instantaneous, and have less reference to the future, than those which actuate the rational man. The advocates of free will maintain that the power of choosing between two contrary motives constitutes free will: to this I answer, that the will is as irresistibly determined by the preponderating motive, as it is by one unresisted motive. If the mind is impelled by one motive of 99 degrees of force, and by another of 100, the mind is not free to choose between the two; but is as irresistibly determined by the latter as it would be by a motive whose force was one degree, and unresisted by any contrary motive whatever. No man can believe that the human mind has such a faculty as free will, who considers that his will follows his motive, not his motive his will; and that he cannot create a motive for himself; and that, if he could create one, he could not do so without having some previous motive for selecting the one he would choose to create.-I said, that our motives are perfectly independent of us. It is evident that the motives which first actuate us are so:an infant sucks, cries, and ceases to do either, without being conscious of its motive for doing any of the three. And, as I have already said, it will continue to obey without hesitation every impulse, however faint, transitory, and variable, until from some cause, no matter what, it learns that obedience to certain impulses will be followed by painful con séquences; from which consideration an opposite impulse arises: the contrary im pulses will then be weighed in the balance of the judgment, when one will kick the beam. Which will do so, depends not on the nature of the motives themselves, but of the particular mind on which they actof two rays of light, which, if either, will be reflected, and which transmitted, depends on the medium on which they fall. Motives are said to be good or bad, as they impel the mind to acts useful or pernicious to individual or social happiness. In some cases a motive may be bad that impels to a good action, and vice versa; but in such cases the acts are only exceptions to the general tendency of the motive. What is called a man's disposition, is a propensity or aptitude in his mind to be actuated by one class of motives rather than by another: hence a disposition (which the French call naturel) is said to be good or bad. When a man has by acts manifested his disposition clearly enough to allow its being classed according to its qualities, he has then a character. This character is formed by causes, whether physical or moral, quite independent of any man. Hence men, under the influence of nearly similar causes, will have a certain si, milarity of character *. * Mr. Hume maintains, that national character iş formed solely by moral causes: he says, "As to physical causes, I am inclined to doubt altogether of their operation in this particular *." Presuming to differ on this interesting subject from this most able writer, I would undertake to demonstrate, did my subject require it, that, strictly and philosophically speaking, national as well as individual character is formed by physical causes alone; or, in other words, that all the moral habits of mankind flow from their physical appetites and propensities, variously modified by physical causes, All laws divine and human, by which man is governed and his character materially formed, are founded on his Essay 21.-Of National Character, |