LETTER V. THE following is the learned Dr. S. Clarke's solution of this important question : "And now, having, as I hope, sufficiently proved both the possibility and the real existence of liberty, I shall, from what has been said on this head, draw only this one inference-that hereby we are enabled to answer that ancient and great question, Πόθεν το κακον ; What is the cause and origin of evil? for liberty implying a natural power of doing evil as well as good; and the imperfect nature of finite beings making it possible for them to abuse this their liberty to an actual commission of evil; and it being necessary to the order and beauty of the whole, and for displaying the infinite wisdom of the Creator, that there should be different and various degrees of creatures, whereof, consequently, some must be less perfect than others: hence there necessarily arises a possibility of evil, notwithstanding that the Creator is infinitely good. In short, thus all that we call evil is either an evil of imperfection—as the want of certain faculties and excellencies which other creatures have-or natural evil, as pain, death, and the like; or moral evil, as all kinds of vice. The first of these is not properly an evil; for every power, faculty, or perfection, which any creature enjoys, be ing the free gift of God, which he was no more obliged to bestow than he was to confer being or existence itself; 'tis plain the want of any certain faculty or perfection, in any kind of creature, which never belonged to their nature, is no more an evil to them than their never having been created or brought into being at all could properly have been called an evil. The second kind of evil, which we call natural evil, is either a necessary consequence of the former-as death to a creature on whose nature immortality was never conferred; and then 'tis no more properly an evil than the former or else 'tis counterpoised in the whole with as great or greater good, as the afflictions and sufferings of good men: and then, also, it is not properly an evil; or else, lastly, 'tis a punishment; and, then 'tis a necessary consequence of the third and last sort of evil, viz. moral evil. And this arises wholly from the abuse of liberty which God gave to his creatures for other purposes, and which 'twas reasonable and fit to give them for the perfection and order of the whole creation: only they, contrary to God's intention and command, have abused what was necessary for the whole, to the corruption and depravation of themselves. And thus all sort of evils have entered into the world, without any diminution to the infinite goodness of the Creator and Governor thereof *." If I do not mistake, you will not concur with the learned doctor in thinking that he has been more successful than his predecessors in answering this "ancient and great question." Having already expressed my opinion of the insufficiency of any hypothesis founded on what appears to me an impious absurdity; namely, that God's intentions have been frustrated; I will here only observe, with due deference to the learned doctor, that, if the notions of God's designs being defeated does not suppose "any diminution * Clarke on the Attributes, p. 99 (tenth edition). to his infinite goodness," it is utterly incompatible with any idea of his infinite wisdom and power. The great father of poetry, with more becoming notions of God's omnipotence than are entertained by modern theologians who are always vindicating his goodness at the expense of his wisdom-instead of allowing himself for a moment to entertain the opinion that the purposes of omniscience could be frustrated, expressly declared his conviction, that, however contrary to human wishes the events of the world may occur, in all cases, and in every instance, διος ετελείετο βέλη. I confess myself as little satisfied with the doctor's notion of what constitutes evil, as I am with his explanation of the cause of it. His assertion, that evil of defect is not properly an evil, cannot be admitted without limits much narrower than those |