have the devil in reserve: it was the devil, they say, that did it all. But, my dear sir, the devil leaves the subject as unsatisfactory as he finds it: he gives not a single clue to extricate us from the labyrinth, nor throws a gleam of light on it. On the contrary, he appears to me, whenever he is introduced, to act strictly in conformity with his character of prince of darkness, and only involves us in more impenetrable obscurity. As, however, a very important part is assigned to him in the drama of Providence-in the denoûement of which we are all so deeply interested-and as so much use is made of him (in my humble opinion to very little purpose) in explaining the present subject, it is much to be regretted that our knowledge of his nature and history bears such a small proportion to the prodigious influence he is said to have on the eternal destiny of man.

All that divines tell us of him is, that he was not originally a mischievous and damned being as he now is, but, on the contrary, that he was highly in favor with God; but that he forfeited that favor by his wickedness.

So far there is a similarity in the history of this interesting character to that of man that might lead both to feelings of recipro cal sympathy: they are both creatures of the same God, they were both once in favor with him, and both are now children of his wrath. The different causes, however, that have led to the present deplorable situation of each, prevents any sympathy between them. The devil is the unprovoked and wilful cause of man's wretchedness; man has not in any way been instrumental to his.

Of the primary cause of the devil's wickedness, we are wholly ignorant. Whether

he was originally created of nature superior to ours, or was promoted, as we expect to be, to that superior station from which he is said to have fallen-whether he was the protoplast, or the descendant thereof, of a race of homogeneous beings-or whether he was a creature sui generis, without parentage, offspring, or sex-are subjects on which there are no materials for satisfying human curiosity. Nor, indeed, are we able to answer a question much more interesting than any of the preceding. Man sinned, as divines say, by the instigation of the devil: but by whose instigation did the devil sin? If the superior nature of which he was created by God was not impressed with an irresistible tendency to wickedness, and if there existed no previous devil to tempt him thereto, what caused him to be guilty of it? I say caused him; for there can be no effect without a cause; and we

cannot conceive the wickedness of which he has been guilty, to be other than either the necessary production of some quality inherent in the nature of which he was formed, or the result of some external temptation too strong for his piety.

But the agency of the devil, in any way in which divines choose to represent it, gives no elucidation whatever of the present subject. Why is the devil allowed, by Omnipotent Goodness, to amuse himself in seducing millions of human creatures to sin and misery? Divines answer; to try their virtue, and thereby ascertain their worthiness of eternal happiness: and a notion more unworthy than this of the Divine nature never was entertained by the human mind. It goes to assert, that God, being ignorant of the true nature of his creatures, requires some experimental test of it.

Again; they say, without temptation there could be no virtue. To this I answer, that, without it, there would certainly be innocence. Besides, it is by no means clear to me that a man may not be virtuous, in discharging all the various moral duties of social life, without having been ever assailed by temptation to violate them. But this at least will be granted to me, that virtue is produced by that degree only of temptation which is resisted and overcome: so that the question still remains (admitting that some degree of temptation is necessary for the production of virtue), Why is such a degree of it permitted, as is productive, not of virtue, but of vice and wretchedness?