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CHAP. IV.

ON IDENTITY IN GENERAL.

SECTION I.

On the Evidences of Identity.

In what personal identity consists, is an important question, which has been frequently agitated and variously discussed; and on this account it may appear presumptuous rather than prudent in me, to attempt an investigation of a subject on which She learned world has been so much and so long divided. But, since it is a point which is inseparably connected with the resurrection of the body on the grave; I am under a necessity of examinbriefly its evidences and nature, in order to fix e criterion that may serve to solve some of those Buities with which the subject of the resurrecpears to be perplexed.

as an opinion which has obtained the sanction suffrage that "personal identity consists stess." Whether this opinion be true or e not upon me presumptuously to detera certain I am, that my habits of reflection ed in my mind a different conviction, conclude that this consciousness, many, has been thought to constitute more than an evidence which we have

of it. For, as consciousness implies a substance in which it inheres; so, this consciousness rather presupposes than constitutes that identity which is attributed to it.

It is certain, I think beyond all doubt, that our consciousness of any given fact can never constitute that fact; nay, the fact itself must stand or fall independently of our consciousness of it; and must in the order of nature, have had an existence previously to any consciousness which we could possibly possess of it. Existence, therefore, and our consciousness of it are two distinct ideas.

In addition to the above observation, I think it will appear equally evident, that, though some particular action might have been performed by me, of which at present I have no recollection, while I am destitute of all consciousness, I am at the same time totally deprived of all evidence of the fact itself; and consequently, my consciousness which in this case must be absent, can never constitute the identity either of the action, or of any person or thinking substance, by which that action was performed. If, therefore, personal identity consists in consciousness, it will be extremely difficult for us to ascertain, as in the case before us, whether identity can remain after all consciousness of it is totally done away.

There can, I think, be no doubt, that our consciousness of any given fact will be admitted by ourselves as decisive evidence of that fact; while this consciousness remains; and this evidence will suffi ciently prove to us the existence of the fact itself.

But then, this consciousness of the fact being only a simple action of the mind, must be brought into contact with the fact, to the certainty of which it becomes evidence. And as this consciousness is founded upon the fact which it necessarily presupposes, and to which it owes its existence; it can never constitute either the fact which it proves, or the identity of that being by whom the fact was performed. Nay, this particular act of consciousness, instead of constituting personal identity, will not immediately prove its existence. It will indeed sufficiently prove the fact in question; and hence we may rest assured, that if there be an action there must be an actor; but the personal identity of the actor can neither consist in the action, nor be constituted by that consciousness which assures us of both, nor by any subsequent consciousness which we may hereafter possess.

Our present consciousness of any given action, which we have performed, is to ùs an invincible evidence of the existence of that action; and the subsequent consciousness which we may have hereafter, of our present consciousness, will be to us a sufficient evidence of our consciousness of the given action. Our present consciousness of any given action is a simple act of the mind, operating upon the past connection which subsisted between the action itself and our former consciousness of it; as well as between the former consciousness and action, and our present consciousness of both. In the former case, our consciousness became an evidence

of the action itself, while in the latter our consciousness becomes evidence of the former, and is an act of the mind operating upon its past operations. But, although our former consciousness of any given fact or action, and our present perception of that past consciousness must be admitted as indisputable evidence on the points in question; yet personal identity cannot possibly consist in either. And therefore it will follow that personal identity may remain uninjured and entire, though all evidence of its existence were done away. And, since our consciousness of our own identity depends upon identity itself for its existence; we cannot avoid obtaining an assurance, that where identity is not, there a consciousness of it cannot possibly be.

But, though there can be no consciousness of our own identity where identity is not; it will not follow, that where our own identity is, there must be an invariable consciousness of it. And the reason is evident: The identity of our persons being independent, can have no necessary reliance upon our consciousness of it; whereas our consciousness of our own identity, being in itself necessarily dependent must expire, the instant we conceive that identity, on which it is founded, to be done away. Hence then it is evident, that our own personal identity may remain, though our consciousness of it should even be lost; while on the contrary our consciousness of it will infallibly prove its existence; and, from its dependent nature, demonstrate that our identity never can be lost while our consciousness of it remains in existence. And hence also it follows,

that our own personal identity, and our own consciousness of it, are two distinct ideas; and that the former never can be constituted by the latter. Consciousness therefore never can constitute identity, though it is the only infallible evidence which we seem to have of it.

Whether consciousness be any thing more than an action of the mind, is not for me at present to inquire; but of this we are certain, that identity must, in its own nature, be immutable, intransferable, and exempted from all changes; and consequently our consciousness of it must, by being founded upon it, be equally permanent (if its report be true) however fluctuating and unstable it may be in its own nature. In fact we can have no conception of consciousness, when detached from an object; and therefore we can have no decisive mark, by which to determine upon its nature. But, admitting it to be in itself nothing more than an action of the mind; nothing perhaps can be a greater mark of folly than to conceive that our personal identity can consist in that which is fleeting, transitory and unstable.

As consciousness must either be an action, which results from some substance, or the peculiar modification of some substance itself; it must in the order of nature presuppose the existence of that substance from which it results, or of which it is a modification; because no peculiar modification can be coeval with the thing modified. And if, in the order of nature, the substance must have existed previously to those actions which result from it, and to those modifications which it may afterwards assume;