THE

INTRODUCTION.

L

EST any perfon fhould haftily mifapprehend the nature, or importance, of the questions difcuffed in this treatise, or the manner in which I have decided for myself with respect to them, I fhall here state the feveral fubjects of inquiry as concisely, and with as much diftinctness, as I can, and also inform the reader what my opinions concerning them really are.

It has generally been supposed that there are two diftinct kinds of fubftance in human nature, and they have been distinguished by the terms matter and Spirit, or mind. The former of thefe has been faid to be poffeffed of the property of extenfion viz. of length, breadth, and thickness, and also of folidity or impenetrability, and confequently of a vis inertia ; but it is faid to be naturally deftitute of all other powers whatever. The latter has of late been defined to be a substance intirely deftitute of all extenfon, or relation to space, fo as to have no property in common with matter; and therefore to be properly immaterial, but to be poffeffed of the powers of perception, intelligence, and Self-motion. Matter

Matter is that kind of fubftance of which our bodies are compofed, whereas the principle of perception and thought belonging to us is faid to refide in a spirit, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the body; while higher orders of intelligent beings, and especially the Divine Being, are faid to be purely immaterial.

It is maintained in this treatife, that neither matter nor fpirit (meaning by the latter the fubject of fenfe and thought) correfpond to the definitions above mentioned. For that matter is not that inert fubftance that it has been fuppofed to be; that powers of attraction or repulfion are neceffary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to be impenetrable to other parts. I therefore, define it to be a fubftance poffeffed of the property of extenfion, and of powers of attraction or repulfion. And fince it has never yet been afferted that the powers of fenfation and thought are incompatible with thefe (folidity, or impenetrability, and confequently avis inertia, only, having been thought to be repugnant to them) I therefore maintain that we have no reason to fuppofe that there are in man two fubftances fo diftinct from each other, as have been represented.

It is, likewise maintained in this treatise that the notion of two fubftances that have no common property, and yet are capable of intimate connection and mutual action is both abfurd and modern; a fubftance without extenfion or relation to place being unknown both in the fcriptures, and to all antiquity; the human mind

for

for example, having till lately been thought to have a proper prefence in the body, and a proper motion together with it; and the Divine Mind having always been reprefented as being, truly and properly, omniprefent.

It is maintained, however, in the SEQUEL of this treatise, that such a distinction as the ancient philofophers did make between matter and Spirit, though it was by no means fuch a diftinction as was defined above (which does not admit of their having any common property) but a diftinction which made the Supreme Mind the author of all good, and matter the fource of all evil, that all inferior intelligences are emanations from the Supreme Mind, or made out of its fubftance, and that matter was reduced to its present form not by the Supreme Mind itself, but by another intelligence, a peculiar emanation from it, has been the real fource of the greateft corruptions of true religion in all ages, many of which remain to the very day; that this fyftem of philosphy and the true fyftem of revelation have always been diametrically oppofite, and hoftile to each other; and that the latter can never be firmly established but upon the ruins of the former. t To promote this firm eftablishment of the fyftem of pure Revelation, in oppofition to that of a vain and abfurd philofophy, here fhewn to be fo, is the true object of this work; in the perufal of which I beg the candour and patient attention of the judicious and philofophical reader.

1

ERRAT A

Preface, page xi, line 14, for upon, read of.

p. xxxi, Cudworth fhould be among the Folios.

Page 3, line 2, from the bottom, for a ball,

read the ball.

for have to,

for its

for a most,

for properties,
for Heb.

for mean,
for requires,

2, from the bottom, for Galis,

7, from the top,

read to have.
read bis.

read moft.

read property.

read Hab. (for Habakkuk

read meant.

read implies.

read it was.

read without.
read Gale's.

read John.
read pre-existed
read refloration.
read by Mr.

268,

2,

from the top,

for was,

read were.

for ing,

read making.

for impoffible,

read poffibles

for have,

read have obferved.

N. B. This whole quotation fhould have been inferted at the end of the