I. SERM. ferve. If it be fo, it must then, I think, be allowed a juft confequence, that it is the will of God, man fhould practise virtue and abftain from vice, or that he approves the one, and difapproves the other. Is it poffible to conceive that he should not be pleased with his intelligent creatures acting agreeably to his own defigns, voluntarily fulfilling the law of their nature; and displeased with their wilfully rebelling against it? Since he has made them capable of difcerning the end of his conftitution, and of acting freely either in purfuance of it, or in oppofition to it, to suppose that he is indifferent to the choice and to their course of action, is abfurdly to fuppofe that he is indifferent to the intention of his own works; indeed, to fuppofe fuch confufion and inconsistency in his counsels, as cannot be reconciled to any notions of wisdom. Inanimate things are altogether paffive in fulfilling his purposes; that is, they are moved and difpofed of merely by his fovereign irrefiftible Will. As they can never be the objects of his diflike, all the complacency he can be supposed to have in them, is properly no more than felf-enjoyment, which arifes from the exercife and manifeftation of his own attributes, and which in proportion to the degree of its perfections, muft belong to every intelligent nature in a natural and SER M. happy state. But free agents are the proper obI. jects of his approbation or disapprobation, according as they do or do not actively comply with his will made known to them, and with that eternal invariable reason by which his whole adminiftration is conducted. I believe it is scarcely in our power when we think seriously, to imagine that the most perfectly wife Being is not pleased with his creatures choofing to conform themselves to the wifdom of his counfels, and displeased with such as obftinately set themselves in oppofition to his will, though we ought never to impute to him any thing like that paffion, which in our weak minds accompanies refentment or averfion. But it may be faid, that by the fame reasoning, our natural actions, such as eating and fleeping, are agreeable to the will of God; because they are the means he has appointed us to ufe for preferving our lives. Be it fo. As natural governor of mankind, it is his will we should use the neceffary means for the preservation of our lives; as governor of moral agents, it is his will they should conduct themselves with a regard to moral deficiencies*. Therefore as the governor of fuch agents, (which relation is to us most important and comprehenfive, and in it our highest A 4 * Mr, A. here means, moral rectitude, as well as Deficiency. I. SER M.highest interest is immediately concerned,) his character is moral, or in that refpect he is a moral agent. Perhaps the clearest notion we can form of God's moral attributes is by refolving them into Benevolence, which in conjunction with infinite wisdom, will fully ac-. count for them all. As no principle of action can appear to our minds more amiable, more worthy of an abfolutely perfect Being, there is none more juftly attributed to the Deity, if we judge by the appearances of defign and final caufes in the conftitution of things, and the government of the world. Now if it be allowed that the Creator of the universe intended the most abfolute good in the whole of his works, and particularly in the creation and government of rational beings, it will evidently follow that his administration must be moral, or it must be fo conducted as in the whole to encourage virtue, which tends to promote the most universal happiness, and discountenances vice, which is naturally productive of mifery. In other words, the fupreme Being is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works. But in whatsoever manner we endeavour to investigate a subject which is too high for our comprehenfion, and to range our thoughts concerning the order, connection, and dependence of the divine moral I. moral perfections, it is plain, that to the pur-SER M. poses of a practical application, they are to be confidered as difpofitions or principles, (I do not say the fame as in us, but something analogous to them and which we conceive in that manner,) determining him to act according to moral differences, and with a regard to them. As inferior agents are called just, and good, and true, because their temper and their conduct are agreeable to the rules of righteousness, goodness, and veracity; the fame characters are ascribed to the fupreme Being, and on the fame account, tho' in a more exalted sense, and without any degree of im perfection. Our difpofition even of the virtuous kind have their weakneffes. They rife and fall according to the measure of our knowledge, and the diverfity of lights in which the objects appear. They are fometimes cooled by the influence of other affections and paffions in our nature; and fometimes attended with perturbation; from which and all other infirmities the abfolutely perfect divine nature is wholly free. But a constant, uniform, and invariable rectitude, or a regard to right and moral goodness, and opposition to evil or moral turpitude, is what we attribute to God, and have as clear and diftinct ideas of it as of any perfections which belong to him, I SERM. I have faid that God's moral attributes are I. difpofitions or principles analogous to what we call difpofitions in our felves, determining him to act according to moral differences, that ence |