and limited understandings cannot account SER M. VII. for, nor make any certain judgment concerning the defign and the event of them. For he adds, He is in one mind, and who can turn him? And what his foul defireth, that he doth, for be performeth the thing that is appointed for me, and many fuch things are with him. He governs the world with fteddy counsel, and pursues his defigns independently on thofe things that would influence and alter feeble human refolution, fo that his measures are to us impenetrable, being conducted with infinitely fuperior wisdom, as well as irrefiftible power. The conclufion is, therefore am I troubled at his prefence; when I confider, I am afraid of him. My inmoft foul stands in awe of his tranfcendent greatnefs; and the unfathomable depth of his adminiftration, (which is not at a distance, but intimately present,) taking all my concerns within its care. The fame pious perfon having + elsewhere defcribed the utmost efforts of human skill and induftry, fhews how weak they are and defective, when compared with the infinitely more extenfive knowledge of God, who only knoweth the ways of wisdom, and the place of underftanding; from whence he infers, that to man the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wif dom, and to depart from evil is underfianding.

SER

*Job xxii. 13, 14. + Chap. xxiii.

SERM.
VIII.

SERMON VIII.

Religion diftinguifhed from Superftition, and fhewn to be true Wisdom.

Job xxviii. 28.

And unto Man he said, Behold the fear of the
Lord, that is Wifdom, and to depart from
Evil is understanding.

W

ISDOM is naturally agreeable to the human mind; and indeed cannot but be agreeable to an intelligent nature, because it is the best use of understanding, and the proper improvement of reason. What is it that makes confufion and diforder fo diftasteful, as in an irregular jumble of things and heaps of materials cafually thrown together? And on the contrary, regularity in any work or fyftem, and exact proportion and relation in the parts, and harmony in the whole, appear so beautiful? Certainly, it is because counsel and contrivance, that is, wisdom,

is

is apprehended in the latter, and the want of SER M. it in the other. But applying this to ourselves, VIII. and to the direction of our own affairs, we shall be yet more fenfible how much wisdom is neceffarily in our esteem, and of how great importance to our happiness. For, as we are inwardly conscious of an intelligent principle, our fatisfaction in the part we act, always depends upon our knowing that we are governed by it. Events which have no dependence on our own choice or intention may affect us very sensibly, whether they be fuppofed to come by chance, or neceffity, or by the will of another agent; They may, I fay, affect us, but in a manner very different from our own actions with the forefeen neceffary confequences of them, which are directly the objects of the mind's approbation or disapprobation, and give us pleasure upon the review of them, only so far as we appear to our felves to have acted wifely.

Nay fo true are mankind univerfally to this rule of conduct, however they may be mistaken in the application of it, that in all their divided opinions and pursuits, most directly contradictory to each other, every one flatters himself, that he has reafon on his fide. The religious man, the philofopher, the politician, the œconomist, and even the fordid mifer, and

the

SERM. the luxurious, fuch, at leaft, of these several VIII. fects as are the most fixed in their oppofite courfes, and thoroughly governed by their denominating principle, (and in them the cafe is fairly stated,) imagine that their choice is, all circumstances confidered, the best, and their behaviour the wifeft. The men of pleasure and gayety who seem profeffedly to defpife wisdom, (it is only, what they fancy to be the outward appearances and affectation of it that is the object of their ridicule,) they think that good fenfe and reafon is with them, which is but another name for wisdom, that the end of their perfecutions is fomething real, a fenfible pleasure, (and there is no arguing against experience) and that the fuperior enjoyments which others talk of are but vifionary. The more grave and fober man, who is wholly devoted to his worldly intereft, which he decently and skilfully pursues, imagines he knows the world well, (which he reckons a point of great wisdom,) and the designs he carries on are well concerted, folid and fubstantial, leaving spiritual and intellectual pleafures, fo called, which he despises in his heart to the religionists and virtuofi, as well as the madness of licentious and expenfive mirth to the prodigal. I obferve this only to fhew that there must be fome appearance of wif

dom

dom in our conduct to justify it to ourselves; SER M. and that we neceffarily have fuch a regard to VIII. reason, that we cannot knowingly and deliberately act against its dictates with any contentment in our own minds. So that lufts and paffions, let them be ever fo ftrong, in order to their having a settled dominion in the heart, must filence understanding, or rather bring it over to their fide. For fuppofing a man's choice, and the course he follows, to be never fo foolish in itself, and in the judgment of others, he cannot be easy in it without, at least, a conceit of wisdom to countenance it, which is apparent in the case of the fluggard, (one of the lowest and most contemptible of all characters,) who, as Solomon obferves, * is wifer in his own conceit than feven men that can render a reason.

Since it is fo, this is one principal point which all our deliberations ought to aim at: and the question, by the decifion whereof, we should be determined in our defigns and courfes of action is, whether they be wife or not, that is, becoming rational agents in our circumstances? And then it evidently follows, that we ought to examine; there being no other way by which we can come to a rational judgment. Let it not be objected that examination is difficult, and we are in danger of mistaking. Difficulty should never be objected

*Prov. xxvi. 16.