Page images
PDF
EPUB

proper

to their natural ftate, they become hurtful SER M. and uneafy instead of pleafant, there are no VI. bounds to our best affections (affections to rational and moral excellence, which is the divine excellence) nor to the most agreeable fenfations wherewith they are accompanied. Reverence, esteem, love, defire, delight, can never be raised, even in our imagination, to fuch a height, but that they are capable of increase; and the reason is, because the object of them is infinite and incomprehenfible, Why should we then stain the glory of our nature? Why should we abuse our noble powers to unworthy purposes, and prostitute them to mean enjoyments? Let us follow the directions of the law of our nature, and attend those lower affairs which the condition of the prefent life requires, (as it is the will of God we should,) but not make them our principal bufinefs and our highest enjoyment. Let our chief care be to know God, and our chief delight to converse with him in the manner we are now capable of, that we may be fitted for that happy state in which we shall see him as he is, more directly and immediately than we do at prefent, yet not fo as to comprehend him; but our knowledge shall be always increasing, and with it our happiness, for no finite mind can understand the Almighty to perfection.

SER

SERMON VII.

The Divine Perfections incomprehenfible.

SERM.
VII.

Job xi. 7.

Canft thou by fearching find out God? canft thou find out the Almighty unto Perfection?

I

N the foregoing difcourfe, from these words I endeavoured to fhew, that the

nature and perfections of God are, and neceffarily must be, to us incomprehenfible. I design at this time to confider them in a different sense, but which they will as well bear, namely, as importing the unfearchableness of the divine counfels and administration of providence. This seems indeed to be directly the defign of the text. For the occafion of it being a warm debate between Job and his friends upon the subject of his extraordinary afflictions, and he having in the preceding chapter uttered fome very paffionate complaints, Zophar, much to the purpose, puts him in mind of the depth of God's judg

ments,

ments, that is, providential dispensations, and SER M. that the reasons of them lie out of the reach VII. of human understanding. Upon a like occafion, I mean, an event of providence very difficult to be explained, and which was extremely shocking to fome who were immediately affected by it, that is, the rejection of the Jews from their national and religious privileges as God's peculiar people, and the calling of the Gentiles, the apostle Paul falls into this exclamation, * O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! how unfearchable are his judgments, and bis ways paft finding out!

I will endeavour in this discourse to fix the true meaning of the doctrine, and to fhew in what sense, and for what reasons, the counfels of God, and the administration of his providence are infcrutable by us; and then I will confider what influence it ought to have our minds, in directing our fentiments, and governing our difpofitions and behaviour.

upon

Firft, To fix the true meaning of this doctrine, and fhew in what fenfe, and for what reafons, the counfels of God, and the administration of his providence are infcrutable by us. Here is an effential difference between atheism and religious principles; and upon this one point the debate chiefly turns,-whe

*Rom. xi. 33.

ther

SERM.ther there be any fuch thing as a wife scheme VII. of providence? Whether the world be go

verned by an intelligent and good being, or by blind chance, or fatal undefigning neceffity; rather, if there be no fuch thing in it as order and government at all? It is acknowledged on both fides, that particular events are to us unaccountable: The sceptic fays fo, and triumphs in it, as the ground of his arguments and the strength of his caufe; the religious confeffes it. But the question is, whether this acknowledged unaccountableness proceeds from the want of wisdom in the difpofer of all things, or from the abundance of it? Whether there be no counfel and no wife difpofition in the affairs of the world, or, if because of the weakness of our understandings, and the very nature and reason of things, that wife difpofition only lies beyond our reach, and cannot in many inftances be difcerned by us?

My present intention is not to enter into this debate; the great principle of religion referred to, being, I think, established with fufficient evidence in the preceding discourses. For the providence of God fignifies the exercife of his perfections in the preservation and government of the world. If then he is every where present, every where active and intelligent,

ligent, and all his creatures, their beings, SER M. powers, and operations neceffarily depend up

on him, hence arifes the idea of his fupreme univerfal dominion, our conceptions of which must be formed according to the notion we have of his character. Now if it be proved that he is perfectly wife, righteous, and good, it follows, that his whole administration is agreeable to these attributes, whatever variety there is in it arifing from the difference of the beings over which it is exercised, and the different ends they are capable of serving. Inanimate things are governed by irresistible will; fenfitive creatures by instincts planted in them; and moral agents by rational motives fit to influence their self-determining powers.. Still however, from the perfect intelligence of the Deity, and his moral character, we cannot avoid inferring, that there is an uniformity in his whole conduct; for wifdom, equity, and goodness, are always confiftent, and invariably pursue one end. And indeed the appearances plainly lead us to conclude unity of defign; and that as the world in its original compofition, (as various as it is,) confifting of numberlefs parts and numberlefs kinds of beings, is a regular system, fo it is ftill under the direction of one counsel, which continually inspects every part of it, and cares for the whole.

It

VII.

« PreviousContinue »