I SERMON Ι. Moral Agency explain'd, and in what Rev. xv. 4. Who Shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy Name? for thou only art Holy. F all our inquiries concerning the su- SERM. preme Being, none are more impor- I. tant than those which relate to his moral Character; for that is the immediate foundation of our duty to him, and our hopes from him. An intelligent Agent, pofsessed of an eternal immutable existence, almighty Power, and infinite Knowledge, might be an object of speculation which would naturally end in distrust and horror: But perfect rectitude, equity, and goodness, are confidered as practical principles, which so determine his views, and direct the meafures of his conduct towards other beings, as to be the object of affections, which we know are in the human mind, and of the utmost VOL. II. A con SERM.consequence to its happiness; the objects of reverence, esteem, love, trust and a defire of I. imitation. This shews of how great moment, and how worthy of our attention the fubject is, which we are now entering upon, namely, the confideration of God's moral attributes. In this discourse I will endeavour, first, to shew what clear and rational evidence we have of his moral agency in general. 2dly, In what sense, and with what limitations, it is attributed to him. 3dly, To what useful purposes it may be applied for the forming our tempers, and governing our practices. First, to shew what clear and rational evidence we have of God's moral agency in general. Our idea of moral agency arises from an attention to what passes in our own minds. We find in ourselves confcious perception with a felf-determining power, and affections to certain objects variously exerting themselves; all which in some degree, and within a limited sphere, seem to be common with us to other animals. But there is in the mind of man, which the brutal nature appears to be incapable of, a power of reflecting upon affections, its own, or those of other agents, together with the actions proceeding from them, which are neceffarily approved or disapproved, in other words, judged to be good I. good or evil, and become objects of a distinctSERM. affection, that, like others, is a spring of action, influencing and directing our practice. It is this that makes us moral agents, which is the most important part of our conftitution. It implies not only intelligence, free agency, and direct affections to other beings, but affections arifing from our reflecting upon characters, affections, and actions morally diftinguished, that is, appearing good or evil to our minds, according to a certain invariable standard planted in them. Our highest enjoyment arises from self-approbation, or a confciousness of intire moral affection, and a course of morally good action, so far as human nature can attain to it. And our most intense affection to other beings, accompanied with the greatest, the pureft, the most rational pleasure we know, terminates on the same characters in them, manifested by their works. Now, if the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; if from the powers and capacities of the creatures we justly infer his existence and perfections; particularly, if the conscious intelligence and active powers of some beings formed by him, be a proof of his own felf-original intelligence and A 2 SERM.and activity, may we not in like manner I. from the moral powers he has given to mankind and other rational creatures infer his moral agency ? especially since this character necessarily appears to our minds the most excellent and amiable, and of all others the most important to a rational happiness. Is it possible for any man who believes God to be the father, the designing cause of spirits, of their intelligence, liberty, and all their other rational faculties and enjoyments, to doubt whether he himself is poffefsed of intelligence, liberty, and rational enjoyment? Whether fince he has indued them with a power of self-reflection, particularly, of reviewing their own affections and actions, and judging concerning their rectitude, his own actions and the principles from which they proceed, be not the object of his own understanding and attention? Whether having annexed the highest enjoyment to their self-approbation upon this review, and made their principal happiness to depend upon it, he possesses the like, or a more exalted enjoyment in the approbation of his own actions and principles of action? And this being the sum of what we mean by moral-agency, can we doubt whether God be a moral agent? Another Another way of apprehending this subject, SERM. will lead us to the same conclufion. It has I. been proved, * and must here be supposed, that God is the designing cause, the preferver and governor of the world, and all things in it; and from the relations and correspondencies of things which he has made, and continues to uphold, we difcern his particular ends. Now this implies a Character or a Will, a permanent principle determining him to act after one particular manner, rather than another. But it has been also proved + that morality is an eminent part of the human constitution; that is, the mind of man is so framed, as when it attains to the full exercise of its rational powers, to be necessarily sensible of moral obligations, and to have all the determination to fatisfy them, which is consistent with the nature of such a being, and the nature of virtue itself, i. e. with free-agency in an imperfect state: That morality is of the greatest moment to the perfection and happiness of every individual, and the whole collective body of mankind: And therefore it must be attributed to our intelligent Creator as the true cause of it, thereby intending those very ends, the perfection and happiness of our nature, which it is naturally apt to A 3 * Vol. I, † Vol. I, Serm. 3, serve, |