an infinite variety; that is, he must be SER M. every where prefent.

But farther, it is evident, that being every where prefent is the highest degree of perfection; because if it is a perfection to exist at all, and a greater to exift through longer periods of time, it must also be a perfection to exift in larger portions of space, and fo on, till we arrive at the notion of a boundless being that is every where. Therefore, if God is not every where prefent, he cannot be infinitely perfect, but must only be a finite being, confined within certain limits, and his powers determined, which feems contrary to the natural notion of a first and necessary cause; and then we might also imagine another being more perfect and of fuperior attributes, which is a plain abfurdity; for is it not abfurd to imagine, the poffibility of a being more perfect than the cause of all things?

It is true, it is difficult for us, from our weak and narrow notions, to imagine, how this can be an attribute of the Divine nature; but we see that it must be fo, because it is impoffible for his power to act where he is not, and because without this he could not be allpowerful

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VII.

BERM. powerful and infinitely perfect. How VII. ever, we may conceive of it faintly in this

manner. As we fee that inferior creatures, of less perfect powers than ourselves, have a less sphere of activity, in which they act and exert their powers at a less distance, and can attend to fewer things than we; fo we may imagine, that there may be other beings more perfect than us, which ufe their powers at a greater distance, and attend to more things in greater variety. And by enlarging our imagination, we may still conceive, that there may be incomparably more perfect beings than thefe, that can use their faculties at greater diftances, and upon a greater variety of things, and fo on; till by thus afcending in our thoughts, we may conceive a being infinitely perfect, whofe powers are exerted every where, upon an infinite variety of things, through the immenfity of space. And this is God, who by the neceffity of his nature exifts every where, and fills all things; or, as the fcripture expreffeth it, in whom we live, move, and have our being.

I might alfo mention, that fome have endeavoured to illuftrate the notion of God's

VII.

God's being every where prefent with his SER M works, by the comparison of a foul that animates a body. Not that they fuppofed God to be the foul of the world, for that is too grofs; but only, that as the foul gives life and motion to the body, and is fenfible of whatever happens to it, fo God acts upon his works, and perceives all occurrences among them. I come now to the

II. Thing I propofed; to mention some general confequences of this doctrine of God's being every where prefent." And

1. We fee plainly from hence, the unity of the Divine nature, and the abfurdity of Polytheifm. For if there could be more Gods than one, then each of these must be infinite, and every where prefent, or else each of them muft exift within certain limits, and be confined to particular regions of the universe. Now in the first case, if there could be a plurality of infinite beings, then each of them must exist together in every part of space, and operate together in the various productions of nature; fo that to every effect, there would be more than one in

SERM. finite cause to produce it: and befides VII. this, their natures must be so blended to

gether, that there must be confufion; for how is it poffible, without confufion, to imagine different beings of the fame kind, each of them having immenfity, and filling all things. And we can no more conceive, how more beings than one, of the fame kind, can have immensity, or be every where prefent, than that more bodies than one, can be in the one and the fame place. But if in the other case, we could fuppofe each of them to be confined within certain limits and regions of the univerfe, and their powers reftrained to fome particular things, which was the notion of the heathens; then these must be imperfect beings, of limited powers, feparated from, and independent of one another, and each of them incapable of doing a variety of things; and then there could be no infinitely perfect, fupreme, and neceffary cause of all things; and consequently, there could be no proper object of fupreme worship and adoration, because each of thefe, might occafionally, be unable to affift their votaries. So that God's being every where prefent, fhews plainly the unity of the

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Deity; which is the foundation of all true S ER M. and rational religion.

2. From hence it is evident, that God must be also infinite in knowledge. For if he is every where prefent, if he exists in every part or portion of space, all things, and their properties, and circumftances must be known unto him, and he must see them distinctly, in whatever way they may be involved together. Nothing can be hidden from him or kept fecret; all things must be within the reach of his view. And therefore, all the actions of all moral agents, however dispersed through the universe, must be perfectly known unto him; he must know their down-fitting and up-rifing, and understand their thoughts afar off. The inmost and essential parts of their nature must be known unto him, and be continually before him. They cannot diffemble with him, nor conceal their most inward motions from him.

3. If God is every where prefent, we may see also, that his providence must extend to all, even the minutest things. For if he exists in every part of infinite fpace, what alteration, what movement can there be of any the leaft particle of

matter,

VII.