If he knows himself to be a Christian, then he knows it to be contrary to the will of God that he should be finally condemned, or that he should suffer the miseries of perdition. To be willing in this case to suffer these miseries, is to be willing to suffer that which is known by him to be contrary to the will of God. It is a consent to prevent Christ of one trophy of his cross, one glorious fruit of his sufferings, and to take a gem from his crown of glory.

If the professor believes himself to be a Christian, then, in being willing to suffer perdition, he is willing to suffer in direct contradiction to what he believes to be the will of God. His belief here ought to have exactly the same influence on his disposition and conduct as his knowledge in the former case. Wherever we have not, and, at the time when we are to act, cannot have, certainty, we are under absolute obligation to be governed by the highest probability. In this case, therefore, the duty of the professor is exactly the same as in the former.

When we remember that the sufferer becomes, of course, the eternal enemy of God and of all good, and that the professor, in thus consenting to suffer, consents in the same act to be the eternal enemy of God and of all good; and when this consent is yielded in direct contradiction to what he either knows or believes to be the will of God; it will, I think, be difficult to find a reason which will evince this conduct to be a part of the Christian's duty.

(3.) There is no precept in the Scriptures enjoining this conduct.

should, if it be Certainly it is It can hardly

It certainly must seem strange that a duty so extraordinary, and so fitted to perplex the minds of mere men, really a duty, be nowhere expressly enjoined. not likely to be easily embraced by any man. be supposed therefore, if it be really a part of the evangelical system, to be left to inference, philosophy, and supposition. No precept, so far as we are able to judge, needs more to be clear and express than that which should require of us this singular mental effort. But such a precept cannot be found. (4.) There is no example of such resignation recorded in the Scriptures.

There are two examples, which are alleged in support of the resignation in question. The first is in Exod. xxxii. 31,

32, And Moses returned unto the Lord, and said, Oh! this people have sinned a great sin, and have made them gods of gold. Yet now, if thou wilt, forgive their sin; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book, which thou hast written.' The part of this text, which is alleged in support of the doctrine here contended against, is contained in these expressions: Yet now, if thou wilt, forgive their sin: if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book, which thou hast written.' It is supposed that Moses prayed to God to make him miserable, on the condition specified, throughout eternity.

Concerning this subject, I observe, first, that the expression, Blot me out of thy book, which thou hast written,' is wholly figurative; and, like most other figurative language, is capable of being understood in various senses. To say the most then, it is ambiguous and uncertain. I need not say, that such a doctrine as this ought not to be founded on an ambiguous passage of Scripture, nor on any uncertainty whatever.

Secondly: It will be admitted, that Moses, although he prayed in a violent state of emotion, yet spoke in some accordance with common sense. But the interpretation given to his words by those who teach this doctrine makes him speak the most arrant nonsense. His words are, Yet now, if thou wilt, forgive their sins; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written.' Here, according to the abettors of this doctrine, Moses prays that God would forgive their sin, if he was willing; and, if he was unwilling, that he would blot him out of the book of life. They say, that the benevolence of Moses was so great, that he chose rather to suffer endless misery, in order to obtain the forgiveness of his countrymen, than to be endlessly happy, and see them condemned. But they do not attend to the words of Moses. He himself says no such thing. On the contrary, he prays, that God would blot him out of his book, if he will not forgive their sin' choosing not to be happy himself, unless they may be happy with him; and choosing to be endlessly miserable, rather than to be endlessly happy, unless they may be happy also. This, it must be acknowledged, if it be benevolence, is benevolence of a very extraordinary kind. Moses, according to this scheme, is desirous, if he cannot obtain all the good which he wishes, to have none; and, if his countrymen cannot be happy, to be miserable himself; to be endlessly miserable,

without the least expectation of doing, without a possibility of doing, any good whatever to them: in plain language, to be endlessly miserable for the sake of being endlessly miserable.

It is also resignation of an extraordinary kind. Instead of being resignation to the will of God, it is resignation directly opposed, and perfectly known by Moses himself to be directly opposed, to that will. Moses certainly knew that he was destined to endless life; and therefore certainly knew that this was the will of God. To this will, thus known, his prayer, interpreted according to this scheme, is directly contradictory. I hesitate not to say, that Moses never exercised resignation of this nature.

Thirdly: The real meaning of this prayer is, on the condition specified, God would take away his life.

After the rebellion of the Israelites at the foot of the Mount, in which they made and worshipped the golden calf, God directed Moses to let him alone, that he might consume them; and promised to make of Moses himself, a great nation.' Alluring as this promise was, Moses loved Israel too well to forsake them on this pressing occasion. He therefore besought God to forgive them, with great earnestness and anxiety; and prayed fervently also, that, if he would not forgive them, he would take away his own life; probably, that he might not witness the melancholy sight of the ruin of a people for whom he had done and suffered so much, and in whose interests his heart was so entirely bound up. The book, here called the book which God had written,' is a figurative allusion to a register, in which were recorded the names of living persons; and, in the present case, is considered as a register written by God, in which were enrolled the names of all living men. To blot out the name is equivalent to taking away the life of the person, thus registered. That this was what was intended by Moses, must, I think, be unanswerably evident from the observations which have been already made.

A similar prayer of the same illustrious man is recorded in Numb. xi. 14, 15, 'I am not able to bear all this people alone, because it is too heavy for me. And, if thou deal thus with me, kill me, I pray thee, out of hand, if I have found favour in thy sight; and let me not see my wretchedness.' The

only difference between the two cases seems to be, that in the former case, Moses prayed that he might not live to see the ruin of his people; and in the latter, requested to be released from life, because he was unable to bear the burden of superintending, and providing for them.

6

The other passage is Rom. ix. 1-3, I say the truth in Christ, I lie not; my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost; that I have great heaviness, and continual sorrow in my heart. For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ, for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.' Here it is supposed, that St. Paul declares himself desirous, or at least capable of being desirous, to suffer final perdition for the sake of rescuing his brethren, the Israelites, from their ruinous condition. But I apprehend the apostle says no such thing. For,

In the first place, the declaration in the Greek is not, I could wish,' but I wished:' not nuxon, in the optative mode, but nuxouny, in the indicative. The apostle therefore here declares a fact which had taken place; not the state of his mind at the time present; nor a fact which might take place at that, or any future time. I do not deny, that the indicative is sometimes used for the optative, or, as it ought to be here understood, in the potential, sense; to denote what could be done, instead of what has been done. But no case of this kind is to be presumed; nor is such a meaning to be admitted, unless the general construction of a passage renders the admission necessary.

say

'I

Secondly: The admission of it here ruins the meaning of the passage altogether. It is introduced in this manner; I the truth in Christ, I lie not; my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost.' Now what is the assertion, to gain credit to which these three declarations, two of them attended with all the solemnity of an oath, were made? It is found in the following verse. 'I have great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart.' Can it be imagined, that St. Paul would think it necessary or proper to preface this assertion in so solemn a manner ? Was it a matter even of surprise, that a person, afflicted and persecuted as he was, should be the subject of such sorrow? Could the apostle need the aid of a triple declaration, and a double oath, to make this assertion believed? And, if these were not necessary, can he be sup

posed to have used them for such a purpose; or for any purpose whatever?

As this cannot have been the apostle's meaning in this passage; so, happily, that meaning is sufficiently obvious. St. Paul, it is well known, was considered by the Jews as their bitter enemy; as hating their temple, worship, and nation; and as conspiring with the Gentiles to subvert all those which they esteemed their best interests. This prejudice of theirs against him was an immense evil: for it not only obstructed powerfully, and often fatally, the success of his evangelical labours among the Gentiles; but, in almost all instances, prevented the Jews from receiving the Gospel. This evil the apostle felt in its full force, as he teaches us on many occasions, by endeavouring earnestly to clear himself of the imputation. The present is one of those instances; and the meaning of the passage is rendered perfectly clear, and highly important, when it is considered in this manner; and the propriety of the solemn preface with which it commences fully evinced. The words, rendered, For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ,' ought to be included, as they plainly were intended to be, in a parenthesis. The passage, truly translated in this manner, will run thus. I say the truth in Christ, I lie not; my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost; that I have great heaviness, and continual sorrow in my heart, (for I also wished myself separated from Christ) for my brethren, my kinsmen, according to the flesh.' That the apostle had really this sorrow and heaviness for his nation, he knew would be doubted by some, and disbelieved by others. He therefore naturally and properly appeals to God for the reality of his love to them, and for the truth of the declaration in which it is asserted. To show his sympathy with them in their ruined state, he reminds them, that he was once the subject of the same violent unbelief, and alienated from Christ; and that then he earnestly chose to be what he here calls anathema,' justly rendered in the margin, separated, from Christ,' just as they now chose it. A person, once in this condition, would naturally be believed to feel deeply the concerns of such as were now in the same condition, and would therefore allege this consideration with the utmost force and propriety.

It will, I am aware, be here said, that this interpretation