in another moment be forgotten. Neither the fame acquired by the author, nor the stability attributed to his system by his followers, should therefore induce us to rely on the desert of the one, or the permanency of the other.

When it is said, that the agency of the Divine Spirit in renewing the heart of man is irresistible, it is probably said, because this agency being an exertion of omnipotence, is concluded, of course, to be irresistible by human power. This seems not, however, to be said on solid grounds. That agency of the Holy Ghost, which St. Stephen informs us was re sisted by the Jews, and by their fathers, was an exertion of the same omnipotence, and was yet resisted by human power. I know of nothing in the regenerating agency of the same Spirit, except the fact, that it is never resisted, which proves it to be irresistible, any more than that which the Jews actually resisted. That the Spirit of God can do any thing with man, and constitute man any thing, which he pleases, cannot be questioned. But that he will exert a regenerating agency on the human mind which man has not a natural power to resist, or which man could not resist if he would, is far from being satisfactorily evident to me. Indeed, I am ready to question whether this very language does not lead the mind to views concerning this subject which are radically erroneous.

In the cxth Psalm, in which we have an account of Christ's being constituted a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedek,' we have in the third verse this remarkable promise made to Christ, Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power.' This promise respects the very subject now under consideration; and is, I suspect, a more accurate account of it than can be found in the language which I am opposing. In the day of Christ's power his people are willing. The influence which he exerts on them by his Spirit, is of such a nature that their wills, instead of attempting any resistance to it, coincide with it readily and cheerfully, without any force or constraint on his part, or any opposition on their own. That it is an unresisted agency, in all cases, is unquestionable: that it is irresistible in any, does not appear.

III. The necessity of this agency will, if I mistake not, be evident from the following considerations :—

1. It is declared in the Scriptures.

'No man,' saith our Saviour, can come unto me, except the Father who hath sent me draw him.' This declaration will I suppose be allowed by the warmest opposers of this doctrine to have a meaning. There are but two meanings which it can possibly have. One is, that it is physically impossible for any man to come to Christ, unless drawn by the Father: the other is, that it is morally impossible. The former of these will be denied by both parties; the latter must, therefore, be conceded. In other words, it must be acknowledged that mankind are so opposed to Christ in their inclinations, that they will never come to him, that is, believe on him, unless drawn by the Father, or (which is the same thing,) renewed by his Spirit. It will be remembered, that God is nowhere in the Scriptures exhibited as drawing mankind to Christ in any other manner than by the influence of the Holy Ghost.

Except a man be born of the Spirit,' says our Saviour, 'he cannot see the kingdom of God.' Here it is obvious, that to be born of the Spirit' is declared to be an event without which it is impossible for men to see the kingdom of God.' The necessity of the agency of the Spirit cannot be more strongly exhibited than in the declaration, that without it, it is impossible to see the kingdom of God.

'The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.' If the natural man cannot receive the things of the Spirit of God; if he cannot know them; if they are foolishness to him, so long as he continues in bis natural state; if they are spiritually discerned, and therefore incapable of being discerned without a spiritual taste and character; if, at the same time, the discernment and knowledge of spiritual things is indispensably necessary to our attainment of salvation; then the agency of the Spirit of God in our regeneration is absolutely necessary to us, in the same sense and degree in which our salvation is necessary. Our Saviour declares to Nicodemus, that that (only) which is born of the Spirit is spirit,' or spiritual; while 'that which is born of the flesh,' viz. all that is in man, and all that belongs to his natural character, is flesh;' that is, is of this very natural character which receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God.'

2. Reason teaches the same doctrine.

The question has been often asked, "Why, since a holy mind can become sinful, a sinful mind may not also become holy? No preternatural agency," it is observed, “is necessary to accomplish the former change; why is any such agency necessary to accomplish the latter? The extent of the change in both instances is exactly the same; the one being merely the converse of the other. It would seem then that the same physical powers which are sufficient for the accomplishment of the former, must be sufficient also for the accomplishment of the latter. But by most men it is acknowledged that the physical powers of the same being when holy, are exactly the same as when sinful; both the understanding and the will remaining, in the physical sense, unaltered. Where, then, lies the impossibility, or even the difficulty of the supposition, that man can regenerate himself; or, which is the same thing, turn of his own accord from sin to holiness?"

All these questions are in my view fairly asked, and all the principles suggested, true. Still the conclusion is unsound, and will not follow. This, however, I am bound to prove in a manner equally fair; and the more especially as a great multitude of serious and, I hope, good men have found, and still find, no little difficulty in their contemplations on this subject.

That a holy being should be capable of sinning, seems not, in the nature of the case, to be a supposition attended with any great difficulty, All beings, holy and sinful alike, relish and desire natural good, or happiness. This can be found in an endless multitude of objects. Of these some may be enjoyed lawfully, or consistently with the will of God; while others cannot. These however, so far as they are supposed capable of communicating happiness, are still naturally the objects of desire to holy beings, as truly as to sinful ones. All natural good when perceived is, by itself considered, desired of course by every percipient being. Now it is plain, that this good may, in a given case, appear so great to a holy being, may so engross his whole attention, may so far exclude from his mind other considerations, and among them those of his duty, as to induce him to seek the good in view at the expence of his duty. In this manner, I apprehend, the angels who fell violated their duty; and our first parents, theirs.

Nor do I see how holy beings, so long as they love natural good, and are placed in a world where it is variously and amply provided, can fail of being exposed to temptations from this source; nor, if these temptations be supposed to possess a given degree of power, or, which is the same thing, to contain a given degree of natural good, and to be set fully and exclusively before the mind, how such beings can fail, without peculiar divine assistance, of being exposed to fall.

In all this, however, there is nothing to countenance the supposition that a sinner will in the same manner turn from sin to holiness. A sinner has no relish for spiritual good; that is, for the enjoyment furnished by virtuous affections and virtuous conduct. To apply the words of Isaiah concerning Christ as regarded by the Jews, to this good as regarded by sinners, When they see it, there is no beauty in it, that they should desire it,' Isa. liii. 2. Whenever this good therefore becomes an object of the sinner's contemplation, as his mind is wholly destitute of any relish for it, he will never desire it for its own sake; and will never make any such efforts to gain it, as are absolutely necessary to accomplish the renovation of his heart. The relish for spiritual good is that state of mind out of which all virtuous volitions spring. No volition is ever excited but by good, and by good actually perceived and relished. As spiritual good is never thus perceived by a sinner, it will not excite a single volition in his mind towards the attainment of it; but will operate upon him as little as harmony upon the deaf, or beautiful colours upon the blind.

But the relish for spiritual good is the characteristical distinction of holy beings; their essential characteristic, without which they would cease to be holy. The want of it, on the contrary, is a primary characteristic of sinful beings. In this lies the real difficulty of regenerating ourselves, and not in the want of sufficient natural powers: and so long as this continues, an extraneous agency must be absolutely necessary for our regeneration.

IV. The objections to the agency of the Divine Spirit in this work shall now be briefly considered.

1. It is objected, that this doctrine infers partiality in the conduct of God.

That in the conduct of God in this case there are mysterious

and difficult things, which I cannot explain, I readily acknowledge. What the particular reasons are, by which God is influenced in this dispensation, he has not been pleased to reveal; and we, therefore, are wholly unable to determine. It is sufficient for us, that we know all his conduct, in this and every other case, to be directed by the best reasons.

But this case presents no more difficulty than a thousand others, in which we do not even think of starting this objection. We might as well complain of the common dispensations of God's providence, as of this. "Why," we might ask, "was one child born of Popish parents, and educated in all the ignorance and superstition of the Romish religion; and another born of Protestant parents, and educated under the light and blessings of the Reformed religion? Why is one man destined by his birth to be a savage; and another to be a member of civilized, enlightened, and religious society? Why is one man a native of Sennaar; and another of New England: One a beggar; another a prince : One deaf and dumb; another endowed with hearing, and speech? Why are there any beggars; any savages? Nay, why are there any men; and why are we not all angels?"

To apply the question to the very case in hand. Why, on the supposition that we regenerate ourselves, is one man furnished with those endowments both of understanding and will, and with those advantages, all of which united, terminate in his regeneration; and another, not?

It will be easily seen from these questions, that the objection of partiality lies with the same force against all inequalities of distribution in the divine government, as against this dispensation. Indeed, the only way to remove this objection must be to make all beings exactly alike, and to confer on them exactly the same distributions. In other words, God, in order to remove this objection, must make all his conduct a mere repetition of exactly the same actions towards every creature.

2. It is objected also, that this doctrine supposes man not to be a free agent in his regeneration.

To this objection I answer, that, if it be true, and be seen by us to be true, our knowledge of its truth must be derived either from some declaration of the Scriptures, or from the nature of the subject, philosophically investigated. From the