have no interest in them at all. A disinterested man may take the deepest interest in any subject; and the deeper the interest, the more disinterested he may be. The uninterested man can have no interest in that subject, either selfish or benevolent. To be absolutely disinterested is to be absolutely free from selfishness. To be absolutely uninterested is to be absolutely without any interest or concern in any thing. A perfectly disinterested man would experience a supreme delight in the perfect happiness of the universe. A perfectly uninterested man, if we can suppose such an one to exist, would feel no concern in any happiness whatever. The reason why these terms have been supposed to denote the same thing may have been, that the word interested is frequently opposed to each of them. This word originally denotes the concern which we feel in any thing; but has long been figuratively and very commonly used to denote a selfish concern ; probably, because the interest which the human heart feels in most things is so generally a selfish interest.

It is not my design to contend that there is not a real and great pleasure found in the exercises of virtue; nor that the virtuous man does not always experience this pleasure in such exercises, and that in exact proportion to his virtue; nor that this is not a proper motive to engage him to these exercises.

The true nature of virtue is well described in this definition: the love of doing good; or the love of promoting happiness. In all the good therefore which is done by ourselves or others, and of course in all that is enjoyed by ourselves or others, whenever it is not inconsistent with some greater good, virtue delights of course. In its own proper nature it aims at such good, and for such it labours, whoever is to be the recipient. Its true excellence lies in this; that it is the voluntary and only source of happiness in the universe. In aiming at our own happiness there is no necessary selfishness. Selfishness consists in a preference of ourselves to others, and to all others; to the universe, and to God. This is sin, and all that in the Scripture is meant by sin. In every individual sin this will invariably be found to be the essential and guilty character. Thus sensuality is the desire of self-gratification, at the expense of any and all other happiness. Thus ambition. is the desire of aggrandizing, and avarice the desire of enrich

ing ourselves, in preference to the interests of all others. From this spirit arises all our opposition to God, and all our injustice to his creatures. He who has seriously and entirely preferred God to himself, or the good of the universe to his own private, separate good, has in the complete sense become virtuous.

God wills our happiness. It is therefore right, it is virtuous in us to seek and promote it, both here and hereafter. In this conduct there is no selfishness. We do indeed commonly pursue it, in preference to that of all others. Such a pursuit of it is sinful; and the spirit with which we pursue it is by turns every sinful passion and appetite, and the source of every evil purpose and effort, towards God and our fellow creatures. Our pride, impiety, rebellion, and ingratitude, our self-dependence, our impatience, and murmuring under the government of God, are all only different forms of this disposition. The parsimony, fraud, and oppression of the miser ; the envy, intrigues, conquests, and butcheries of ambitiori; the rapacity, injustice, and cruelties of despotism; the sloth, lewdness, gluttony, and drunkenness of the sensualist; the haughtiness, wrath, revenge, and murders of the duellist-are nothing but selfishness, appearing in its true nature and genuine operations.

REMARK.

In these observations we have another specimen of the havoc which philosophy has made of divine subjects, and of the great interests of man.

Few writers have been more admired and applauded than Lord Shaftesbury; and among all his writings none have been more applauded than the work in which the doctrine opposed by me is taught. Yet in this work we are informed, that to have any regard either to future rewards or punishments, is mean and mercenary; and of course, instead of being virtuous, or consisting with virtue, is only criminal. It must therefore be odious in the sight of God, and the proper object of his wrath and punishment. Accordingly, this writer informs as directly, that "all reference either to future re

wards or punishments lessens and destroys virtue, and diminishes the obligations to be virtuous." The anger of God against a sinner is a dreadful punishment. The approbation of God, and his consequent love, are glorious rewards. But to regard this anger, to be afraid of it, to seek to avoid it, is (according to Lord Shaftesbury) mean and mercenary, odious and wicked. The contrary conduct must, of course, bear the contrary character. It must be honourable and generous, spirited, amiable, and virtuous, to disregard the divine anger, to have no fear of God before our eyes, and willingly to become the objects of infinite indignation. Equally mean and mercenary, and therefore equally hateful and guilty, is it in the eyes of this writer to prize the approbation of God, to desire an interest in his love, or to seek the attainment of either. Of course, to disregard both must, according to this scheme, be virtuous, honourable, and deserving of commendation. The real nature of all conduct God cannot but know intuitively; and, without injustice, cannot fail to regard it according to its real nature, and treat the subjects of it as they actually merit. Hence, as he cannot but discern the meanness and mercenariness, the odiousness and guilt, of those who dread his anger, and seek to avoid it, who prize his approbation, and love and labour to obtain them, he is bound, he cannot fail, to punish them for this criminal conduct. As he equally discerns the virtue of those who disregard his anger, approbation, and love, he cannot fail to reward them.

If God is angry with any of his intelligent creatures, it is undoubtedly with those who have broken his law. That hẻ has given a law to mankind, Lord Shaftesbury himself acknowledges; nor does he deny that mankind have in some instances broken this law. Indeed, it could not be denied with common decency. In this law, whatever it be, his pleasure is expressed and enjoined, as the rule of duty to rational bèings. This rule is in his view, and therefore in fact, a wise, just, and good rule for the direction of their conduct. Conformity to it is conformity to what is wise, just, and good; or, in other words, is virtue, or excellence of character: while disobedience to it is opposition to what is wise, just, and good; or, in other words, sinfulness and turpitude of character.

Every law, and this as truly as any other, annexes a reward to obedience, and a punishment to disobedience, otherwise it could not be a law. But to regard either this reward or this punishment is, according to Lord Shaftesbury, to be mean and mercenary, and so far, therefore, ceasing to be virtuous. If this reward and punishment are to have no influence on mankind, they are nugatory; and God has merely trifled with his creatures in annexing them to his law. If they are to have influence on mankind, the influence is merely such as to destroy, or at least lessen, both virtue and the obligations to it. God, who sees this to be true, if it be truth, has therefore, in annexing them to his law, and in endeavouring to influence mankind by them, attempted to destroy or lessen virtue, and to diminish their obligations to be virtuous.

Further: As without rewards and penalties no law can exist, it is evident that God cannot make a law in which he must not of course, either merely trifle with his creatures, or destroy or lessen virtue, and diminish their obligations to be virtuous.

The reward promised to obedience in this and every other law is happiness; and the punishment threatened to disobe dience is suffering, or misery. To desire the happiness of every rational being, and our happiness as truly as that of others, is the genuine dictate of virtue, and the indispensable duty of all such beings. It is the duty then of every other rational being to desire our happiness; and for this plain reason, it is in itself desirable. According to Lord Shaftesbury, then, we cannot, without being mean and mercenary, desire that which all other rational beings are bound to desire, and which is in itself desirable.

To be virtuous is the same thing as to be meritorious or to deserve a reward; And is the only real desert in the universe. The reward which virtue deserves is such treatment as is a proper retribution to virtuous conduct; such a kind and measure of happiness as it becomes the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the lawgiver to communicate, as a proper expression of his approbation of that conduct. To be influenced by a regard to this happiness, although the very thing which his virtue has deserved, and which God has pronounced to be its proper reward, is according to this scheme to become mean

and mercenary, and underserving of the reward itself. The reward is holden out by God to encourage his creatures to be virtuous. In doing this, according to Lord Shaftesbury, he discourages virtue, and lessens their obligations to be vir

tuous.

There are two kinds of original good; enjoyment, and deliverance from suffering; or, as the case may be, from the danger of suffering. These two are the only possible objects of desire to percipient beings, and to intelligent beings as truly as any others. When virtue itself is desired, it is desired only for the enjoyment which it furnishes. Were there no such objects in the universe, there would be no such thing as desire; and consequently no such thing as volition, or action. Percipient beings, and among them intelligent beings, would be as absolutely inactive as so many lumps of matter. But, according to Lord Shaftesbury, to regard future enjoyment or misery, and, for the very same reasons, to regard them when present, is to be mean and mercenary, and to cease from being virtuous. He who regards them therefore cannot be virtuous; he who does not must of course be a block.

In the mean time, not to regard enjoyment and suffering, when present to our view, is physically impossible. In order to be virtuous then we must, in every instance, accomplish a physical impossibility.

Finally: A moral government is entirely founded on motives. All motives are included in the two kinds of good mentioned above. In every moral government these motives are presented to the subjects of it by the law on which it is founded, in the forms of reward and punishment, both necessarily future, to obedience or disobedience. On the influence which these motives have upon the moral character and conduct of subjects, all moral government rests; nor can any such government exist for a moment without them. But to be nduenced by them is in every subject of such government, weurting to this scheme, mean and mercenary. God therefore, in establishing a moral government over intelligent creaures, as directly endeavoured by his authority to render Tear neau and mercenary; and, so far as this influence exhis revented them from being virtuous!