but with the force peculiar to himself. Literally, he declares that love does not seek her own interest at all; but is so absorbed in her care for the common good, as to be wholly negligent of their personal concerns. This, however, I do not suppose to have been the meaning of the apostle. But he plainly intends, that this spirit is wholly destitute of any selfish character. Less than this it will I think be impossible to consider as meant by him in this passage.

With these three passages the whole volume of the Scriptures accords; and that these clearly determine the love required in the Gospel to be the love of happiness—proportioned to the importance of the object loved-and disinterested in its nature, the points relative to this subject which are chiefly disputed, cannot I think be denied without violence.

To this decisive voice of Revelation, reason adds its own unqualified testimony; as I shall endeavour to show in the following observations :

1. The benevolence, which I have described is the only equitable spirit towards God and our fellow creatures.

That the interests of God are inestimably more valuable than our own, will not be questioned by any man. This being allowed, it can no more be questioned that they deserve incomparably more regard than our own. Nor can it any more be doubted that the interests of our neighbour are, at a fair average, equally valuable with our own. The fact, that they are ours, certainly adds nothing to their value. For what then, it may be asked, can they be more valuable than those of our neighbour? God unquestionably regards them alike; and it will not be denied that he regards them equitably, and in the very manner in which we ought to regard them.

A public or common good therefore is more valuable and ought to be more highly regarded than the good of an individual, for this plain reason, that it involves the good of many individuals. This has ever been the only doctrine of common seuse. In free countries particularly, when men have had the power as well as the right to act according to their own judgment, a majority of votes has always constituted a law; obviously because a majority of interests ought ever to be preferred to those of a minority, and still more to those of an individual. On the same principle, laws which consult the general good

are ever pronounced to be right, although they may operate against the good of individuals. On the same principle only are individuals required to devote their labour, their property, and at times their lives, for the promotion or security of the general welfare. Selfishness on the contrary, which always prefers private good to public, would, if permitted to operate, produce an entire subversion of public good. All the views, affections, and operations of selfishness are unjust; the interests of an individual being invariably estimated more highly by this disposition, and loved more intensely, than their comparative value can ever warrant. It can never be a just estimation which prefers the private good of one to the good of many, the interests of each of whom are just as valuable as those of that one; or which prefers the interests of man to those of God. If this estimation is right, and the regard, which accompanies it, then God ought to give up his own kingdom, purposes, and pleasure, for the sake of the least of his intelligent creatures; and the good of the universe ought to be sacrificed to the good of one.

2. It is reasonable to suppose, that God would create, and that he has created intelligent creatures with this just disposition.

That there should nowhere exist in the intelligent kingdom a disposition regarding things according to their value, is a supposition too absurd in itself and too dishonourable to the Creator, to be made by a sober man. Such a disposition it is plain must be more estimable and lovely to the eye of the divine mind than any other which is supposable. If then God made his works with a design to take pleasure in them, or to be glorified by them, he could not fail to give existence to such a disposition, unless it was because he was unable. But this will not be pretended. Such a disposition therefore certainly exists.

3. If there be no such disposition, there can be no pure or lasting happiness.

(1.) There is no original cause of happiness, but the action of minds. Minds are the only active beings in the universe. Matter, if eternal, must have been eternally quiescent. But minds never act to the production of that which they do not love. If then they did not love happiness, they could not act to the production of it. Of course, if God had not been be

nevolent, that is, if he had not loved happiness; he never could have produced it; nor created those beings who were to be made happy.

(2.) Without the same disposition intelligent creatures could never produce happiness for each other. Under the divine government, happiness, in an endless variety of forms, is produced by intelligent creatures for each other. The degree in which their benevolent offices accomplish good for each other is to a finite eye literally immense. But it is clearly evident that if they were not benevolent, no part of this good would ever exist.

Should it be said, that creatures who are not benevolent do in fact produce happiness for each other in the present world; as is unanswerably manifest in the proper influence of natural affection, and various other attributes of the human mind: I answer, first, that all this happiness, like all other, is ultimately derived from the benevolence of God, and would have had no existence had he not possessed this disposition. Secondly, the happiness thus produced is far from being pure or lasting. Thirdly, natural affection is not an original and necessary attribute of a rational being, but has its origin and continuance in circumstances which may be termed accidental; and accordingly has no existence where those circumstances are not found. Fourthly, natural affection is an attribute of a benevolent as well as of a selfish being, and is therefore no part of selfishness. Fifthly, the Scriptures teach us, that even this good is not derived from the proper tendency of our selfish nature, but from a particular restraining influence of God on its proper operations, which either prevents their existence, or lessens their malignant efficacy. That the world is so comfortable as it actually is, is I apprehend the result of a mere act of mercy on the part of God, rather than of the genuine tendency of the human character. Finally, should all be allowed to this source which is claimed for it, the happiness which it yields is so mixed and so transient, as to form an exception to the doctrine which I am defending too unimportant to deserve any serious attention.

(3.) There is no other disposition which is happy. The happiness inherent in a disposition is the enjoyment eitner experienced in the exercises of the disposition; or springing from the consciousness of its excellence; or resulting from a

knowledge of the desirable nature of its consequences. Some of the exercises of selfishness are pleasant in themselves, and some in a knowledge of their consequences. Thus pride is in a degree always pleasing to the proud man; pleasing, I mean, in its very nature. The same thing may be said also

of the sensual appetites, whenever they are gratified. Some of them also are pleasant in the knowledge of their consequences; particularly those, which respect fame, power, and property. But the pleasure furnished by all of them is in itself poor, transient, and mixed with no small pain and mortification. The pleasure furnished by our sensual appetites is also a part, not of a selfish, but of a merely animal nature; and, so far as it is temperately enjoyed, belongs equally to a benevolent as to a selfish being. Selfishness can here claim nothing as being peculiar to itself, except inordinate indulgence; and this is regularly a diminution of the enjoyment, and an accumulation of pain and sorrow. In the mean time, none of the affections of selfishness yield happiness from a consciousness of their nature and operations. They cannot be seen to be excellent, because they are all obviously evil, and odious. They cannot be seen to be honourable, because they are all base and contemptible. Of course the mind cannot approve of these affections, nor of itself while indulging them; but must condemn both them and itself for cherishing them, as being vile and despicable.

A great part of the happiness enjoyed by intelligent beings arises from the knowledge that they are esteemed and loved by other intelligent beings. This is an enjoyment, to which selfishness can make no claim, for no being can approve of selfishness. Whether it exists in himself or in others, it necessarily and always awakens contempt. The selfish man is therefore cut off by his very nature from this delightful enjoyment.

At the same time, this spirit produces of course evils immense in their number, and surpassing all finite estimation in their degree. Self-condemnation, the hatred and contempt of others, contentions, oppression, tyranny, war, and bloodshed; in a word, all the evils occasioned by man to himself or to his fellow-men are uniformly and universally the effects of this disposition. No clearer proof can be reasonably de

manded of its unhappy nature and miserable consequences than the unceasing bitter complaints with which this world everywhere resounds; almost all of which terminate in the deplorable nature of this disposition, or its malignant efficacy on the interests of man. It cannot be believed, it cannot with decency be said, that God has formed a universe of intelligent creatures, and withheld from them all that disposition which alone is productive of happiness, and left them wholly to that which is the source of misery alone. That God made the universe with an intention to make it happy, and upon the whole to make it supremely happy, will be denied by gross infidels only. But it is plain that this end would be impossible, unless he should give to intelligent creatures this disposition.

4. This is the only disposition, which can be approved, or loved, by God.

(1.) It is the only disposition which is like that of God. But all beings approve and love that in others, which they approve and love in themselves. God approves and loves himself for his benevolence. Of course, he cannot but approve and love the same disposition in his intelligent creatures; and, by unavoidable consequence, must equally hate that which is of an opposite nature.

(2.) It is the only disposition which can voluntarily become the means of his glory. It has been already seen that benevolence is the only fulfilment of the law. It was formerly shown and is abundantly evident, that this disposition, and no other, voluntarily coincides with him in promoting the great end of all his works; viz. the happiness of his immense kingdom. But it is plain that this voluntary coincidence of his intelligent creatures he must necessarily approve and love; and approbation and love being in every such case inseparable from an intelligent nature. All beings, and God as truly as any other, love of course a voluntary coincidence with their favourite designs, and necessarily approve of it also, whenever the designs themselves receive their approbation.

(3.) It is the only amiable disposition. There is nothing amiable beside the voluntary promotion of happiness, and those minds which voluntarily promote it. But benevolence is the only disposition, and the minds in which it exists are the