every being is contingent except the first, who does not owe his existence to free-will,---as every other being may be or may not be, according to the free-will of the Creator. And as to events, there is not one which is not, in this respect, contingent; for, antecedently, it might not have been. Either the interposing will of God might have prevented it by a miracle, or the secondary agent might have been annihilated. If by a contingent event be meant, that which is not known until it takes place; then it follows, that what is foreknown is not contingent to him who does foreknow it, though it may be so to others.

14. Can any thing, in this respect, be contingent to God? Is he not infinite intelligence itself? Some indeed have strangely fancied, that though he might forcknow every event before it takes place, if he pleased; yet that he does not choose to know it. But is not his knowledge of all things, both in himself and out of himself, an infinite perfection? What can be more fanciful, than the notion of an infinite perfection being abridged, or limited by an act of choice? If so, any other perfection may be limited. And if limited in some degree, why not in a still further degree, until nothing of it be left! Absolute infinity limited by will! Yet,

it

may be said, that God can do all things, if he

pleased to exert his omnipotence; but he does not choose to exert it to the utmost. That he can do all things which do not involve a contradiction, is very true; but to suppose that he can limit an essential perfection of his nature, is surely the grossest contradiction. The idea of omnipotence is one thing, but the exertion of power is another. The former, like intelligence, is an infinite perfection of the divine nature, and therefore cannot be limited by will, any more than the divine existence. The idea of power exerted ad extra, stands related to a limited object; and as the idea of a limited object excludes infinity, the exertion of power cannot be infinite; for it implies a power to produce infinite effects,—that is, effects equal to the first cause, and as numerous as there are objects of power! Still, it may be said, that the attribute of knowledge is not limited, but its exercise. But is there any conceivable medium between knowledge and ignorance?-and a voluntary ignorance, if in this case it were possible, is of all others the worst.

§ 15. Knowledge is essential to wisdom, and to be voluntarily ignorant is a voluntary limitation of wisdom. Is it then conceivable that the all-wise God either would or could be voluntarily unwise? Besides, the right exercise of power implies knowledge; and if that exercise

be infinitely right, how can this consist with a voluntary ignorance? If the divine knowledge do not include all beings and events, his designs (if on the supposition he could have any) may be continually frustrated; and if it do not include all possibles, how could any design be infinitely wise, since it possibly might be wiser? In short, the fallacy lies in this false assumption,

that knowledge is an active principle; which is in fact to identify it with power. The moment we conceive a possible change in divine knowledge, were it indeed compatible, we must borrow the idea of power to effect it: that is, we must borrow one attribute in order to lessen another! In short, there is no end to the absurd consequences of a sentiment which now struggles for popularity as an instrument to oppose Calvinism. I must, however, do justice to the Bishop of Lincoln by observing, that this does not appear to be his avowed opinion; and an apology might be made to the reader for detaining him in making an exposure of it, were it not that it contributes to my design to expose false principles which are levelled against modern Calvinism.

16. We know from the most unequivocal testimonics of scripture, as well as from the nature of infinite perfections, that God does foreknow future events which are to us contingent,

otherwise how could the free determinations of men and devils be accurately foretold through the whole system of prophecy? Now the question returns, can there be any principle of certainty beside the divine decree? Must not the divine will be the ultimate source of all certainty? No. But before I assign my direct reason for this laconic answer, let me be allowed to ask another question. Is the divine will the ultimate source of a mathematical point? This is neither matter nor spirit, neither substance nor form. It has neither length, breadth, nor thickness; it has neither thought, consciousness, nor, in brief, any positive being: it is a mere relative nothing: it is negation of length, breadth, and thickness, as related to something that has these properties. Yet will any say, that it is not à source of certainty? Rather, what can be more certain than many mathematical conclusions drawn from this negative idea? Without the idea of a mathematical point, we can have no idea of a mathematical line; and consequently of a circle, a triangle, a square, or any other diagram: but by the admission of this non-entity as it stands related to dimensions, we have demonstrations of the highest certainty,

§ 17. This, however, is but a specimen of a negative principle inseparably related to every

portion of the created universe. Were I to say that a negative principle pervades every portion of created existence, some minds, led away by fancy rather than corrected by judgment, might connect with the positive term a positive idea. Language was first formed on the principles of sense and physical nature, where so much positive energy is discoverable; and the farther we remove from these appearances,. to abstraction of thought, for instance, and to negative ideas especially, it is scarcely possible to employ terms by which we are not liable to be misguided, if not attended with either. settled definitions, or frequent explanation of the meaning intended to be conveyed by them. Language, however, is of arbitrary appointment;—and it is a pitiable prejudice too often indulged, that thoughts must be governed by words, as if these were the unerring standard of accurate conception, or that the mind was made for language, and not language for the mind.

§ 18. If there be in every created being a negative principle, itself not created, and if such negative principle may be an adequate reason of certainty, then a divine decree of what is good, does not necessarily imply that any real evil in the universe (of which there is much) is decreed; nor does it follow that a divine decree