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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA.

ALL existence of which the mind of man can form any conception, may be divided into two classes, viz. Matter and Mind. These are distinguished from each other by their qualities.

Matter is that which has the qualities of figure, divisibility, extension, inertia, and attraction.

Mind is that which thinks, feels, and wills.

The science which treats of the various phenomena of Matter, is called Natural Philosophy.

The science which treats of the phenomena of Mind is called Mental Philosophy. That part of Mental Philosophy, which treats of the duties of man to his Creator, to himself, and to his fellow beings, is called Moral Philosophy.

In treating of the various phenomena of mind, all mental philosophers have recognized specific operations of mind, such as Memory, Abstraction, &c., and also a generic classification which includes several specific exercises.

The most general classification of mental phenomena is that which in the common language of life, divides the operations of mind into the three general classes, thoughts, feelings, and choice.

The same classification has generally been adopted by most writers on Mental Philosophy; who have varied from common language, and from each other, chiefly in the names employed, rather than in the principles of classification.

That class of mental phenomena which is called thoughts, i common language, by mental philosophers has been denominated, the Understanding, the Reason, the Reasoning Powers, the Intellect, and the Intellectual Powers.

That class of mental phenomena called in common language the Feelings, writers on Mental Philosophy denominate the Affections, the Susceptibilities, the Heart, and the Active Powers.

The power of choice is commonly called the Will, and by some writers it is placed as a separate faculty of mind, and by some it is classed among the Feelings or Affections.

In this work the names which will be employed in designating the generic classification will be, the Intellectual Powers, the Susceptibilities, and the Will.

There is still another general classification which has been recognized.

It is found that thoughts, feelings, and acts of choice, (or volitions,) arise in the mind in two ways, as produced by material objects acting on the senses, and as originating in the mind, without being caused by the senses.

Those ideas, that are obtained through the aid of the senses, are, by Locke and others, called ideas of sensation. By Brown and Payne, they are called external affections, because caused by external objects.

Those ideas, which originate without the intervention of the senses, are called ideas of reflection, by Locke; and by Brown internal states, because originating in the mind, without the intervention of the senses.

In this work the classification of Locke will be retained, viz. ideas of sensation, and ideas of reflection.

Intellectual Powers.

Under the general class of intellectual powers are arranged the following specific acts of mind.

1. Sensation. 2. Perception. 3. Conception. 4. Imagination. 5. Memory. 6. Association. 7. Attention. 8. Judg ment. 9. Abstraction. 10. Consciousness.

Sensation, is a state of mind produced by material objects acting on the senses.

Thus, when light, which is considered as one kind of matter, affects the eye, the sensation of sight is produced. When the perfume of a rose, which is another species of matter, affects the organ of smell, another kind of sensation is produced. When a bell or some musical instrument causes the air to vibrate on the drum of the ear, it causes the sensation of sound. When any sapid body is applied to the tongue, the sensation of taste is caused. When the hand, or any part of the body, comes in contact with another body, the sensation of touch is produced.

Thus it appears that the five senses are the organs of sensation, and that through their instrumentality material things operate upon the mind.

Perception, is a sensation attended by the belief of a cause; and it is this additional circumstance alone, which distinguishes perception from sensation.

If a person were asleep, and should suffer from the prick of a pin, or be disturbed by an unpleasant sound, these would be mere sensations, because the mind would not ascribe them to any cause. But if the person` should waken, these sensations would immediately become perceptions, because they would be attended by the belief of some cause.

Conception, is a state of mind similar to perception, and differs from it in being less vivid, and in not being produced through the medium of the senses.

When we look at a tree, we have a perception of this object. But the mind can also have an idea of this tree when removed from the sight, though the idea is not so vivid and distinct, nor have the senses any agency in producing it. The perfume of a rose also, occasions another sensation ; but when the rose is

removed so as not to affect the senses, we can still have a conception of its perfume. The conception differs from the perception only in being less vivid, and in not being caused by a material object acting on the senses.

Memory, is either a conception or a perception, which is attended with a feeling of its resemblance to a past state of mind. It is this feeling of resemblance that is the only circumstance which distinguishes memory from conception.

Thus we can conceive of a tree, without recognizing it as the particular idea of any tree we may have seen before; but if with this conception is a feeling of the resemblance of this idea to the one we always have when we see the tree that shadows the paternal roof, this conception becomes memory. If we conceive the form of a man, without recognizing the resemblance of this idea to the perceptions we have when we see any particular man, this is a simple act of conception; but if we recognize in this object of conception, the features of a dear friend, this act then becomes memory. Again, if we conceive of certain events and circumstances attending them, without recognizing this combination as ever having existed in past experience, they are mere conceptions that arise before the mind; but if we recognize in these conceptions, the events and circumstances of past experience, conception becomes memory.

Imagination, is the power which the mind possesses of arranging our conceptions in new combinations. We can conceive objects as united together, of which we never conceived before, as thus united.

Thus when we read the description of some picturesque scene in nature, the mind immediately groups together mountains, trees, brooks, cottages, and glens, forming a new combination of conceptions different from any scene we ever witnessed or conceived of before. All the objects thus combined are conceptions, the act of arranging them is an act of the imagination.

Judgment, is the power which the mind possesses, of noticing relations. A relation is an idea obtained by observing one thing in connection with another. Thus when we perceive one thing to be longer than another, one thing to be on another, or one thing to belong to another, in all these cases the mind notices relations, or exercises the faculty of judgment. Thus also, when we compare any action with the rule of duty in order to decide whether it is right or wrong, we exercise the same faculty. This act always is necessarily preceded by the comparison of one thing with another, in order to notice the relations.

Abstraction, is the power of noticing certain parts or qualities of any object, as distinct from other parts or qualities. Thus when we notice the length of a bridge without attending to the breadth or colour, or when we notice the heighth of a a man, without thinking of his character, we exercise the faculty of abstraction.

Attention, is the direction of the mind to any particular object or quality, from the interest which is felt in it, or in something connected with it. The degree of attention is always proportioned to the degree of interest felt in the object.

Association, is the power possessed by the mind of recalling ideas in the connections and relations in which they have existed in past experience. For example, when any two objects of sense, such as a house and a tree, have often been observed together, the idea of one will ordinarily be attended by that of the other. If two events have often been united together in regard to the time of their occurrence, such, for example, as thunder and lightning, the idea of one will usually be attended by the other.

Consciousness, is the knowledge which the mind has of its own states and operations.

Susceptibilities.

The feelings or susceptibilities of the mind may be divided into two general classes: viz. pleasurable and painful.

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