the having hands free, which makes us accountable for not placing them properly.

Apply this plain observation to the case in hand, and you will see, (1.) That it is not barely the having a will, but the having free will, which constitutes us accountable, judicable, and punishable.—(2.) That, of consequence, Mr. Toplady's grand argument is as inconclusive as that of the counsellor.-(3.) That both argnments are as contrary to good sense, as the state of hands at liberty is contrary to the state of hands absolutely tied ;-as contrary to reason, as free will is contrary to a will absolutely bound.-And (4.) That, of consequence, the doctrine of the day of judgment is as incompatible with Calvinian Predestination, as sense with nonsense, and Christ with Belial.

However, if Mr. T. cannot carry his point by reason, he will do it by scripture; and therefore he raises such an argument as this :-We often read in the Bible, that there will be a day of judgment; we often meet also in the Bible with the words "must" and " necessity;" and therefore, according to the Bible, the doctrine of a day of judgment is consistent with the doctrine of the Absolute Necessity of human actions : Just as if, in a thousand cases, a decree of necessity, or a must, were not as different from absolute necessity, as the want of an apartment in the king's palace is different from the absolute want of a room in any house in the kingdom. The absurdity of this argument will be better understood by considering the passages which Mr. T. produces to prove, that when men do good or evil, God's absolute decree of Predestination necessitates them to do it.

ARG. XLVIII. (P. 60.)—“ It must needs be that offences come.-There must be heresies among you.Such things, [wars, &c.,] must needs be."—When Mr. T. builds Calvinian Necessity upon these scriptures, he is as much mistaken as if he fancied that Mr. Wesley and I were Fatalists, because we say, "Consider. "ing the course and wickedness of the world, it

"cannot but be Christendom will be distracted by "heresies, law-suits, wars, and murders: For so

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long as men will follow worldly maxims, rather than "evangelical precepts, such things must come to pass." -Again, would not the reader think that I trifled, if I attempted to prove Absolute Necessity from such scriptural expressions as these?, Seven days ye must eat unleavened bread.--New wine must be put into uew bottles He must needs go through Samaria.-I have bought a piece of ground, and I must needs go and see it.-How can I sin against God?—I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come. The multitude must needs come together [to mob Paul.] (Acts. xxi. 22.) — A bishop must be blameless.-Ye must needs be subject [to rulers] not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.'

Once more: Who does not see, that there is what the poverty of language obliges me to call, (1.) A necessity of duty: "I must pay my debts:-I must preach next Sunday."-(2.) A necessity of civility: "I must pay such a visit."-(3.) A necessity of circumstance; "In going from Jerusalem to Galilee, 'I must needs pass through Samaria,' because the high way lies directly through Samaria."—(4.) A necessity of convenience: "I am tired with writing, I must leave off."-(5.) A necessity of decency: "I must not go naked.” —(6.) A necessity of prudence: "I must look before I leap," &c. Now, all these sorts of Necessity, and an hundred more of the like stamp, do not amount to one single grain of Calvinian, absolute, insuperable necessity. However, a rigid predestinarian (such is the force of prejudice !) sees his imaginary Necessity in almost every must; just as a jealous man sees adultery, in almost every look which his virtuous wife casts upon the man whom he fancies to be his rival.

ABG. XLIX. (P. 61.)—“ Absolute Necessity, then, is perfectly consistent with willingness and freedom in good agency, no less than in bad. For it is a true maxim, Ubi voluntas, ibi Libertas"-That is, where

there is a will, there is liberty. This maxim, which has led many good men into Calvinism, I have already exposed; see Scales, vol. iii. p. 292. To what is there advanced, I add the following remark: As there may be liberty, where there is not a will, so there may be a willwhere there is not liberty. The first idle schoolboy whom you meet will convince you of it. I ask him, "When you are at school, and have a will, or (as you call it,) a mind to go and play, have you liberty, or freedom to do it ?" He answers, "No." Here is then a will without liberty. I ask him again, "When you are at school where you have freedom or liberty to ply your book, have you a will to do it?" He honestly answers "No" again. Here is then liberty without a will. How false therefore is this proposition, that "where there is a will there is liberty!" Did judicious Calvinists consider this, they would no more say, If all men were redeemed, they "would all come out of the dungeon of sin." For there may be a freedom to come out consequent upon redemption, where there is no will exercised." Oh, but God makes us willing in the day of his power." True: In the day of salvation he restores to us the faculty of choosing moral good with some degree of ease; and, from time to time, he peculiarly helps us to make acts of willingness. But to suppose that he absolutely wills for us, is as absurd as to say, that when, after a quinsy, his gracious providence restores us a degree of liberty to swallow, he necessitates us to eat and drink, or actually swallows for us.

ARG. L. (P. 61.)-In his refusal to dismiss the Israelites, &c. "he [Pharaoh] could will no otherwise than he did, Ex. vii. 3, 4."-Is not this a mistake? When Pharaoh considered, did he not alter his mind? Did he not say to Moses, 'Be gone, and bless me also?' If Omnipotence had absolutely hardened him, could he have complied at last? Do the unchangeable decrees change as the will of Pharaoh changed?

ARG. LI. (P. 61, 62.)—" So when Saul went home to Gibeah, it is said, 'There went with him a band of men, whose hearts God had touched.' In like manner God is said to have stirred up the spirit of Cyrus.— Then rose up, &c. the Levites, with all them whose spirit God had raised up.' Will any man зay, that these did not will freely, only because they willed necessarily ?"

1. I (for one) say, that while they willed necessarily (in the Calvinian sense of the word "necessary,”)— they could not will freely in the moral sense of the word free. Mr. T. is not morally free to will, so long as he is absolutely bound to will one thing; any more than a man is free to look to the left, who is absolutely bound to look to the right; let the object he looks at engage his heart and eye ever so pleasingly. God's Spirit prevents, accompanies, and follows us in every good thing: All our good works are "begun, continued, and ended in him;" but they are not necessary, in the Calvinian sense of the word. In moral cases, God does not absolutely necessitate us, though he may do it in prophetic and political cases. Thus, he necessitated Balaam, when he blessed Israel by the mouth of that covetous prophet; and thus he necessitated Balaam's ass, when the dumb animal reproved his rider's madBut then, whatever we do under such necessitating impulses, will not be rewarded as our own work, any more than Balaam's good prophecy, and his ass's good reproof, were rewarded as their own works.

ness.

2. From the above-mentioned passages, Mr. T. would make us believe, that, upon the whole, the touches of God's grace act necessarily like charms: But what says the stream of the scriptures ?-God touched the hearts' of all the Israelites, and stirred them up to faith: But the effect of that touch was so far from being absolutely forcible, that their hearts soon started aside like a broken bow; and, after having been saved in Egypt through faith, they perished in the wilderness through unbelief.'-' God gave king Saul a new heart;' and yet Saul cast away the heavenly gift.-' God gave Solomon

a wise and understanding heart;' and yet, Solomon, in his old age, made himself a foolish heart, darkened' by the love of Heathenish women.-God stirred up the heart of Peter to confess Christ, and to walk upon the sea; and yet, by and by, Peter sunk, cursed, swore, and denied his Lord.-Awful demonstrations these, that, where divine grace works most powerfully, when its first grand impulse is over, there is an end of the over-bearing power; and the soul, returning to its Free-agency, chooses without necessity the good which constitutes her rewardable; or the evil, which constitutes her punishable. Of this Mr. Toplady himself produces a remarkable instance, (2 Cor. viii. 16, 17,) Thanks be to God,' says the apostle, who put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for you ;of his own accord he went unto you.'

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If a gentleman, who delights to be in houses of illfame, more than in the house of God, sees, in a circle of ladies, one whom he suspects of being immodest, he singles her out as one that may suit his purpose: And to her he makes his bold addresses. I am sorry to observe that this is exactly the case with Calvinism unmasked. We find, in the scriptures, a few places where God's suffering some men to do a lesser evil, in order to prevent, or to punish, a greater evil, is expressed in a strong, figurative manner, which seems to ascribe sin to Him, just as, in other places, Jealousy, Repentance, Wrath, and Fury, together with Hands, Feet, Ears, and a Nose, are figuratively attributed to him. Now as Popish Idolatry screens herself behind these metaphors, so Calvinian Antinomianism perpetually singles out those metaphorical expressions, which seem to make God the author of sin. Accordingly,

ARG. LII. (P. 61, &c.)—Mr. T. produces these words of Joseph,It was not you that sent me hither, but God;'-these words of David, The Lord said to him [Shimei] Curse David ;'-these words of the sacred historian, God had appointed to defeat the good counsel of Ahitophel, to the intent that the Lord might