him endued with infinite wisdom, knowledge, and power. By his Omniscience he sees that some will desert; by his Omnipotence he could indeed hinder them from doing it: For he could chain them all to so many posts stuck in the ground around their colours: But his Infinite Wisdom does not permit him to do it; as it would be a piece of madness in him, to defeat by forcible means his design of trying the courage of his soldiers, in order to reward and punish them according to their gallant or cowardly behaviour in the field. And therefore, though he is persuaded that many will be shot, he puts his proclamation in force; because, upon the whole, it will best auswer his wise designs. However, as he does not desire, much less design, that any of his soldiers should be shot for desertion, he does what his wisdom permits him to do to prevent their going over to the enemy; and yet, for the above-mentioned reason, he does not absolutely hinder them from doing it. Now, in such a case, who does not see that the difference between "not absolutely hindering" and designing, is as discernible as the difference between reason and folly ;-or between Wisdom and Wickedness? By such dangerous insinuations as that which this illustration exposes, the simple are imperceptibly led to confound Christ and Belial; and to think, that there is little difference between the celestial Parent of good and the Manichean Parent of good and evil :-The Janus of the Fatalists, who wears two faces, an angel's face, and a devil's face; a mongrel, imaginary god this, whose fancied ways are, like his fancied nature, full of duplicity.

3. To the preceding illustration I beg leave to add the following argument: No unprejudiced person will, I hope, refuse his assent to the truth of this proposition: -A world, wherein there are rational free-agents, like angels and men ;-irrational free-agents, like dogs and horses; necessary agents, like plants and trees;-and dead matter, like stones and clods of earth :-Such a world, I say, is as much superior in perfection to a world, where there are only necessary agents; and

dead matter; as a place inhabited by learned men and curious beasts, contains more wonders than one which is only stocked with fine flowers and curious stones. If this be granted, it necessarily follows, that this world was very perfect, calculated to display His Infinite Power and manifold Wisdom.-Now, in the very nature of things, rational free-agents, being capable of knowing their Creator, owe to him gratitude and obedience, one another assistance and love; and therefore they are under a law,' which (as free-agents) they may keep or break, as they please.

and

"But could not God necessitate free-agents to keep the law they are under ?"

Yes, says Calvinism, for he is endned with Infinite Power: But scripture, good sense, and matter of fact, say, No: Because, although God is endued with Infinite Power, he is also endued with Infinite Wisdom. And it would be as absurd to create free-agents in order to necessitate them, as to do a thing in order to undo it. Besides (I repeat it) God's Distributive Justice could never be displayed, nor would free obedience be paid by rationals, and crowned by the rewarder and 'Judge of all the earth,' unless rationals were freewilling creatures, and therefore, the moment you absolutely necessitate them, you destroy them as free-agents, and you rob God of two of his most glorious titles, that of Rewarder, and that of Judge. Thus we account for the origin of evil in a scriptural and rational manner, without the help of Fatalism, Manicheism, or Calvinism. Mr. Toplady replies :

ARGUMENT XXX1. (P. 44, 45.)—" Oh, but-God himself is a free-agent, though his will is necessarily, unchangeably, and singly determined to good, and to good only. So are the elect angels. So are the glorified souls of saints departed, &c., and so might Adam have been, had God pleased to have so created him." This is the grand objection of President Edwards, which I have answered in the Scripture Scales, in Vol. iii. 308. I shall, however, make here a few

Toplady, with the confidence which suits his peculiar logic, concludes this part of his subject by the following triumphal exclamation :

what

ARGUMENT XXXIII. (Ibid.)" And if so, becomes of the objection to God's Decree of Preterition, [a soft word for Absolute Reprobation to remediless sin and eternal death] drawn from the article of Injustice?”

Why, it stands in full force, notwithstanding all the arguments which have yet been produced. Nay, the way to shew that an objection is unanswerable, is to answer it as Mr. Toplady has done; that is, by producing arguments which equally shock Reason and Conscience, and which are crowned with this new paradox : "Fallen angels, and fallen men are involuntary Beings.” So that the last subterfuge of moderate Calvinists is now given up. For when they try to vindicate God's Justice, with respect to the damnation of their imaginary reprobates, they say, that the poor creatures are damned as voluntary agents. But Mr. Toplady informs us, that they are damned as "involuntary beings,” that is, as excusable beings;-and might I not add, as sinless beings? For (evangelically speaking) is it possible that an "involuntary being" should be sinful? Why is the murderer's sword sinless? Why is the candle by which an incendiary fires your house, an innocent flame? Is it not because they are 'involuntary beings,' or mere tools used by other beings? A cart accidentally falls upon you, and you involuntarily fall upon a child, who is killed upon the spot. The father of the child wants you hanged as a murderer: But the judge pronounces you perfectly guiltless. Why? Truly because you were, in that case, an "involuntary being" as well as the cart. When

"

therefore Mr. Toplady asserts that we are involuntary beings," and insinuates that God is just in absolutely predestinating us to sin necessarily, and to be damned eternally, he proves absurdum per absurdius—injustum per injustius—crudele per crudelius. In a word, he gives a finishing stroke to God's Justice; and his pretended "Vindication" of that tremendous Attribute

proves, if I may use his own expression, a public, though, (I am persuaded,) an undesigned “defamation

of it.

1 SECTION V.

An Answer to the Arguments, by which Mr. Toplady endeavours to reconcile Calvinian Reprobation with divine MERCY.

If it is impossible to reconcile Calvinian Reprobation with divine JUSTICE, how much more with divine MERCY! This is however the difficult task which Mr. T. sets about next. Consider we his arguments :

ARGUMENT XXXIV. (p. 45.)—“As God's forbearing to create more worlds than he has, is no impeachment of his Omnipotence: So his forbearing to save as many as he might, is no impeachment of his Infinite Mercy."-The capital flaw of this argument consists in substituting still the phrase "not saving," for the phrase "absolutely reprobating to remediless sin and everlasting burnings." The difference between these phrases, which Mr. Toplady uses as equivalent, is prodigious. No body ever supposed that God is unmerciful because he does not take stones into heaven, or because he does not save every pebble from its opacity, by making it transparent and glorious as a diamond: For pebbles suffer nothing by being “passed by," and not saved into adamantine glory. But, if God made every pebble an organised, living body, capable of the keenest sensations; and if he appointed that most of these "involuntary [sensible] beings,” should be absolutely opaque, and should be cast into a lime-kiln, there to endure everlasting burnings, for not having the transparency, which he decreed they should never have; would it not be impossible to reconcile hisconduct to the lowest idea we can form even of Bonner's mercy?

Having thus pointed out the sandy foundation of Mr.

Toplady's argument, I shall expose its absurdity by a similar way of arguing. I am to prove that the King may, without impeachment of his mercy, put the greatest part of his soldiers in such trying circumstances as shall necessitate them to desert and to be shot for desertion. To do this, I learn logic of Mr. T. and say, "As the king's forbearing to create more lords than he has, is no impeachment of his unlimited Right of Peerage; so his forbearing to raise as many soldiers as he might, is no impeachment of his great Mercy." So far the argument is conclusive. But if by not raising soldiers I artfully mean absolutely appointing and necessitating them to desert and be shot, I vindicate the king's mercy, as logically as Mr. T. vindicates the Mercy of Manes's god.

ARGUMENT XXXV. (p.46.)" If therefore the decree of [Calvinian] Reprobation be exploded, on account of its imaginary incompatibility with Divine Mercy, we must, upon the same principle, charge, God with want of goodness in almost every part of his relative conduct." If this dark argument be brought to the light, it will read thus: "God is infinitely good in himself, though he limits the exercise of his goodness in not forming so many beings as he might, and in not making them all so glorious' as he could; and therefore he is infinitely merciful, though he absolutely appoints millions of unborn creatures to remediless sin and everlasting fire." But what has the Conclusion to do with the Premise? What would Mr. T. think of me, if I presented the public with the following sophism ? "No body can reasonably charge the king with want of Goodness, for not enriching and ennobling every body; and therefore, no body can reasonably charge him with want of Mercy, for decreeing, that so many of his newborn subjects shall necessarily be trained up in absolute rebellion, that he may legally throw them into a fiery furnace, for necessarily fulfilling his absolute decree concerning their rebellion. Nevertheless, this absurd argument contains just as much truth, and mercy, as that of Mr. Toplady.