THE RENEWAL OF THE JAPANESE
ALLIANCE

THE Anglo-Japanese Alliance is based on an agreement which consists of six articles, and the last article, which treats of the duration and the termination of that alliance, reads as follows:

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

As this agreement between Great Britain and Japan was signed on the 30th of January, 1902, it follows that on the 30th of January, 1906, or within less than a twelvemonth, either Power may notify the other that it wishes to terminate the alliance unless the RussoJapanese war should still continue.

Owing to our party system, the British Government, and more especially if it is a weak one, is, as a rule, so much engrossed in maintaining its position in Parliament that problems of foreign policy are apt to receive but scant attention on the part of the Cabinet, Parliament, and the Press, and that they are often settled offhand, without sufficient consideration. In this way it comes that, in the stress of the Parliamentary struggle for power between the two contending parties, matters of urgent imperial importance are likely to be negligently treated or to be made subservient to the party requirements of the moment. The British Empire is a peaceful and satiated business Empire, the prosperity of which is based on peace, the greatest interest of which is peace, the possessions of which are scattered all over the globe, and which has to live in harmony with many nations. It has no territorial ambitions, and has much to lose, but almost nothing to gain, from foreign complications and wars. Hence its

greatest interest is to avoid foreign complications, and it follows that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should neither be terminated nor be prolonged in a hurry and on the spur of the moment. On the contrary, the nation should, in good time and after mature reflection, make up its mind, weighing carefully the advantages of the AngloJapanese Alliance and the consequence to which the continuation or the abandonment of that alliance might lead.

Among the British public, among British politicians, and even among British statesmen, who are so much occupied with party questions that, as a rule, they cannot make a study of foreign policy, very curious notions obtain with regard to a nation's treaty obligations. Many look upon national agreements as they look upon civil agreements. They believe that such agreements are unconditionally and absolutely binding on a country, and they therefore fear that Great Britain may be ruined by faithfully fulfilling its engagements towards another Power, and that the nation may, through an alliance, eventually have to immolate itself for the sake of a rash and venturesome or ambitious ally. During the unfortunate Venezuela entanglement, for instance, when our co-operation with Germany led to serious and somewhat dangerous friction between this country and the United States, and when British public opinion loudly demanded that the Government should withdraw from that unpopular compact, a distinguished British statesman pleaded for the continuation of a policy which was as distasteful to the United States as it was to this country, and which was extremely dangerous at the same time. He wished AngloGerman co-operation to continue because he thought himself in honour bound to carry out to the letter the obligations which, without sufficient consideration, had been incurred by the Government on behalf of the nation, and he meant scrupulously to fulfil his contract, notwithstanding the risk of rupture, or even of war, with the United States. The statesman who acted in this manner was probably not aware that no agreement and no alliance whatsoever can compel a nation to commit political suicide for the sake of its ally. As this limitation to all national agreements is hardly known in this country, it is worth while to quote an authoritative opinion on this most important subject. Prince Bismarck, who may fairly be considered an unrivalled authority on this point, writes the following with regard to the necessarily limited and conditional validity of all treaties in his Memoirs, which constitute his political testament:

All contracts between great States cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by The Struggle for Existence.' No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two. The maxim, Ultra posse nemo

obligatur,' holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever; nor can a treaty guarantee the degree of zeal or the amount of force that will be devoted to the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who have made the treaty no longer reinforces the text at its earliest interpretation.

It may appear morally wrong if a State refuses, at a critical moment, to fulfil its solemn obligation, being unwilling to sacrifice its existence for the sake of its ally. However, those who uphold the principle Ultra posse nemo obligatur' point out with much force that the first duty of every State is the duty towards itself-selfpreservation. Therefore the governing individuals who have to make up their minds whether they should break their word to their ally or rain their nation by keeping their word will, at least in non-British countries, not hesitate for a moment in making their choice.

Of course, it might be asked, Of what value are alliances if they are only conditionally binding? Prince Bismarck may be made to supply the answer to this question also. He says epigrammatically : 'Alliances are the expression of common interests and purposes.' After all, alliances are concluded for a definite purpose, and are entered upon in consequence of certain political situations or events; therefore it logically follows that if the surrounding conditions under which an alliance has originally been concluded have materially changed, the alliance itself is affected by these changes. Treaties, like laws, lapse automatically when they no longer answer the requirements of the time, owing to changes which have taken place, and treaties, like laws, need not be formally repealed when they have become out of date. Hence all treaties are concluded under the presupposition, provided the material conditions are unchanged.' Prince Bismarck lays down the following on this point:

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The clause rebus sic stantibus' is tacitly understood in all treaties which involve performance. . . . I think, therefore, that to ensure the durability of a written treaty, it is indispensable that the variable element of political interests, and the perils involved therein, should not be left out of account. . . . Even in the last century (the eighteenth century) it was perilous to reckon on the constraining force of the text of a treaty of alliance when the conditions under which it had been concluded were changed; to-day it is hardly possible for the Government of a great Power to place its resources unreservedly at the disposal of a friendly State when the sentiment of the people disapproves it. No longer, therefore, does the text of a treaty afford the same security as in the days of the Cabinet Wars.

Prince Bismarck may not be considered a model of political morality, but diplomacy, like every other business, is carried on for profit, and not for the public manifestation of lofty principles on the part of those who are appointed to their high office, not in order to be able to pose as morally perfect men, but for the purpose of advancing the interests of their nation. Bismarck's political principles need,

therefore, not be approved of in the abstract, but they should always be borne in mind, for they are the principles by which the policy of most nations, and especially that of Germany, is guided. If we keep before us the fundamental principles with regard to treaty engagements which Bismarck deliberately enunciated, and if we remember that an agreement between nations which has been entered upon by one party in consequence of a misconception is, per se, not valid, it is clear that at the time of the Venezuela imbroglio the British Government might easily have got rid of its engagements towards Germany if official circles in this country had been acquainted with the views which in a similar position would certainly have been expressed by another nation.

From the foregoing it is perfectly clear that a nation, by signing a treaty of alliance, does not by any means altogether sign away its liberty of action; that it may not helplessly be plunged into endless and unexpected complications by its ally; that it need not follow its ally on any insane course upon which he wishes to embark; that, in spite of all solemn formulas, it is merely a limited partnership for business purposes.

Not sentiment, but self-interest, should be our guiding principle in foreign politics. If we listen to the greatest master of foreign policy of the pre-Bismarckian era, we shall meet with views which bear a curious resemblance to those expressed by the great German diplomat. At the commencement of the session of 1848, Lord Palmerston expressed his guiding principles in matters of foreign policy in the following words:

If I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the Interest of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.

If we wish to consider the question whether from the Palmerstonian point of view the Japanese Alliance is worth renewing, we should follow Palmerston's statesmanlike advice with regard to alliances in general. He said:

I hold with respect to alliances that England is a Power sufficiently strong to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government. It is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.

From the foregoing lines it is clear that Lord Palmerston would have condemned our Venezuela policy which, some time ago, tied this country hand and foot' as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of

another Government,' in a dangerous adventure, which offered no chance of profit, but vast possibilities of trouble and loss.

A purely, deliberately, and consistently selfish policy with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should therefore be pursued, although such a policy may appear sordid to that numerous class of Englishmen who, in the generosity of their hearts, are always so ready to devote the resources of the Empire to purely philanthropic purposes. These people, who still live in the early Victorian era, should remember that Bismarck's advent brought the era of political generosity, of magnanimity, and cosmopolitanism to a close, and they should always remember the following memorable words of Bismarck before formulating their political views:

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In the policy of sentiment there is no reciprocity of any kind. . . . Every Government takes solely its own interests as the standard of its actions, however much it may drape them with deductions of justice or of sentiment. . . .

I cannot consider it right, either in myself or in others, that sympathies or antipathies with regard to foreign Powers or persons should take precedence over my sense of duty in the foreign service of my country. Such an attitude contains the seed of disloyalty to the ruler or to the country which one serves. But if anyone tries to arrange the diplomatic relations and the maintenance of a good understanding between Governments in time of peace upon such personal and sentimental predilections, he ceases, after my opinion, to be a statesman, being solely actuated by his personal caprice. According to my view, not even the King has the right to subordinate the interests of the country to his own feelings of liking or disliking towards foreigners.

Fortified by the guiding principles of the two ablest and most successful statesmen of modern times, it remains to consider the business aspects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and to see whether the continuation of that alliance would be advantageous or disadvantageous to Great Britain from both the strategical and the economic point of view.

China has been opened to Europe by British enterprise, and at the cost of much British blood and treasure. British merchants, having been the pioneers, possess by far the largest share of the foreign trade of China, and Lord Charles Beresford, who was sent by Lord Salisbury to that country on a commercial mission, has been assured by the British merchants that they have no fear of fair competition, and that they will be able to maintain their position if equal opportunities are given to other nations. At the same time, these merchants bitterly complained of the unfair treatment which had been meted out to them by certain foreign Powers. Great Britain has no desire to acquire Chinese territory, and her interests in China are mainly, one might say exclusively, commercial. She wishes merely to preserve the old-established commercial position of her subjects, and an unobstructed outlet for British exports; and her policy in China is directed to that end.