ner we have a controversy with those writers of the small boroughs, especially the burgage who insist upon representation, as a natural tenure, contributes, though undesignedly, to right: we consider it so far only as a right the same effect: for the appointment of the at all, as it conduces to public utility; that is, representatives we find commonly annexed to as it contributes to the establishment of good certain great inheritances. Elections purely laws, or as it secures to the people the just ad- popular are in this respect uncertain: in times ministration of these laws. These effects de- of tranquillity, the natural ascendancy of wealth pend upon the disposition and abilities of the will prevail; but when the minds of men are national counsellors. Wherefore, if men the inflamed by political dissensions, this influence most likely by their qualifications to know and often yields to more impetuous motives.-The to promote the public interest, be actually re-variety of tenures and qualifications, upon turned to parliament, it signifies little who return them. If the properest persons be elected, what matters it by whom they are elected? At least, no prudent statesman would subvert long-established or even settled rules of representation, without a prospect of procuring wiser or better representatives. This then be ing well observed, let us, before we seek to obtain any thing more, consider duly what we already have. We have a House of Commons composed of five hundred and fifty-eight members, in which number are found the most considerable landholders and merchants of the kingdom; the heads of the army, the navy, and the law; the occupiers of great offices in the state; together with many private individuals, eminent by their knowledge, eloquence, or activity. Now if the country be not safe in such hands, in whose may it confide its interests? If such a number of such men be liable to the influence of corrupt motives, what assembly of men will be secure from the same danger? Does any new scheme of representation promise to collect together more wisdom, or to produce firmer integrity? In this view of the subject, and attending not to ideas of order and proportion (of which many minds are much enamoured,) but to effects alone, we may discover just excuses for those parts of the present representation which appear to a hasty observer most exceptionable and absurd. It should be remembered, as a maxim extremely applicable to this subject, that no order or assembly of men whatever can long maintain their place and authority in a mixed government, of which the members do not individually possess a respectable share of personal importance. Now whatever may be the defects of the present arrangement, It infallibly secures a great weight of property to the House of Commons, by rendering many seats in that house accessible to men of large fortunes, and to such men alone. By which means those characters are engaged in the defence of the separate rights and interests of this branch of the legislature, that are best able to support its claims. The constitution of most

If this right be natural, no doubt it must be equal; and the right, we may add, of one sex, as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of representation that we have heard of, begins by excluding the votes of women; thus cutting off, at a single stroke, one half of the public from a right which is asserted to be inherent in all, a right too, as some represent it, not only universal, but unalienable, and indefeasible, and imprescriptible.

which the right of voting is founded, appears to me à recommendation of the mode which now subsists, as it tends to introduce into parliament a corresponding mixture of characters and professions. It has been long observed that conspicuous abilities are most frequently found with the representatives of small boroughs. And this is nothing more than what the laws of human conduct might teach us to expect: when such boroughs are set to sale, those men are likely to become purchasers, who are enabled by their talents to make the best of their bargain: when a seat is not sold, but given by the opulent proprietor of a burgage tenure, the patron finds his own interest consulted, by the reputation and abilities of the member whom he nominates. If certain of the nobility hold the appointment of some part of the House of Commons, it serves to maintain that alliance between the two branches of the legislature which no good citizen would wish to see dissevered: it helps to keep the government of the country in the House of Commons, in which it would not perhaps long continue to reside, if so powerful and wealthy a part of the nation as the peerage compose, were excluded from all share and interest in its constitution. If there be a few boroughs so circumstanced as to lie at the disposal of the crown, whilst the number of such is known and small, they may be tolerated with little danger. For where would be the impropriety or the inconveniency, if the king at once should nominate a limited number of his servants to seats in parliament; or, what is the same thing, if seats in parliament were annexed to the possession of certain of the most efficient and responsible offices in the state? The present representation, after all these deductions, and under the confusion in which it confessedly lies, is still in such a degree popular, or rather the representatives are so connected with the mass of the community by a society of interests and passions, that the will of the people, when it is determined, permanent, and general, almost always at length prevails.

Upon the whole, in the several plans which have been suggested, of an equal or a reformed representation, it will be difficult to discover any proposal that has a tendency to throw more of the business of the nation into the House of Commons, or to collect a set of men more fit to transact that business, or in general more interested in the national happiness

decision of a great majority of the nation; at it is permitted to impede or delay the course least, that, in general, is right for them, which of judicial proceedings, it becomes an absurd is agreeable to their fixed opinions and desires. sacrifice of equal justice to imaginary dignity. But when we observe what is urged as the There is nothing in the British constitution public opinion, to be, in truth, the opinion on-so remarkable, as the irregularity of the poly, or perhaps the feigned profession, of a few pular representation. The House of Commons crafty leaders; that the numbers who join in consists of five hundred and fifty-eight memthe cry, serve only to swell and multiply the bers, of whom two hundred are elected by sesound, without any accession of judgment, or ven thousand constituents; so that a majority exercise of understanding; and that often- of these seven thousand, without any reason times the wisest counsels have been thus over-able title to superior weight or influence in the borne by tumult and uproar;-we may con- state, may, under certain circumstances, deceive occasions to arise, in which the common- cide a question against the opinion of as many wealth may be saved by the reluctance of the millions. Or, to place the same object in annobility to adopt the caprices, or to yield to other point of view: If my estate be situated the vehemence, of the common people. In ex-in one county of the kingdom, I possess the pecting this advantage from an order of nobles, ten-thousandth part of a single representative; we do not suppose the nobility to be more unprejudiced than others; we only suppose that their prejudices will be different from, and may Occasionally counteract, those of others.

or of propriety, to justify the preference of one place to another. Or, thirdly, to describe the state of national representation as it exists in reality, it may be affirmed, I believe, with truth, that about one half of the House of Commons obtain their seats in that assembly by the election of the people, the other half by purchase, or by the nomination of single proprietors of great estates.

if in another, the thousandth; if in a particular district, I may be one in twenty who choose two representatives; if in a still more favoured spot, I may enjoy the right of appointing If the personal privileges of the peerage, two myself. If I have been born, or dwell, or which are usually so many injuries to the rest have served an apprenticeship, in one town, I of the community, be restrained, I see little am represented in the national assembly by inconveniency in the increase of its number; two deputies, in the choice of whom I exercise for it is only dividing the same quantity of an actual and sensible share of power; if acpower amongst more hands, which is rather cident has thrown my birth, or habitation, or favourable to public freedom than otherwise. service, into another town, I have no repreThe admission of a small number of eccle- sentative at all, nor more power or concern in siastics into the House of Lords, is but an the election of those who make the laws by equitable compensation to the clergy for the which I am governed, than if I was a subject exclusion of their order from the House of of the Grand Signior: and this partiality subCommons. They are a set of men consider-sists without any pretence whatever of merit able by their number and property, as well as by their influence, and the duties of their station; yet, whilst every other profession has those amongst the national representatives, who, being conversant in the san:e occupation, are able to state, and naturally disposed to support, the rights and interests of the class and calling to which they belong, the clergy alone are deprived of this advantage: which hardship is made up to them by introducing This is a flagrant incongruity in the constithe prelacy into parliament; and if bishops, tution; but it is one of those objections which from gratitude or expectation, be more obse-strike most forcibly at first sight. The effect quious to the will of the crown than those who of all reasoning upon the subject is, to dimipossess great temporal inheritances, they are nish the first impression; on which account it properly inserted into that part of the consti- deserves the more attentive examination, that tution, from which much or frequent resist- we may be assured, before we adventure upon ance to the measures of government is not ex- a reformation, that the magnitude of the evil pected. justifies the danger of the experiment. In a few remarks that follow, we would be understood, in the first place, to decline all conference with those who wish to alter the form of government of these kingdoms. The reformers with whom we have to do, are they who, whilst they change this part of the system, would retain the rest. If any Englishman expect more happiness to his country under a republic, he may very consistently recommend a new-modelling of elections to parliament; because, if the King and House of Lords were laid aside, the present disproportionate representation would produce nothing but a confused and ill-digested oligarchy. In like man

I acknowledge, that I perceive no sufficient reason for exempting the persons of members of either house of parliament from arrest for debt. The counsels or suffrage of a single senator, especially of one who in the management of his own affairs may justly be suspected of a want of prudence or honesty, can seldom be so necessary to those of the public, as to justify a departure from that wholesome policy, by which the laws of a commercial state punish and stigmatize insolvency. But, whatever reason may be pleaded for their personal immunity, when this privilege of parliament is extended to domestics and retainers, or when

ner we have a controversy with those writers of the small boroughs, especially the burgage who insist upon representation, as a natural tenure, contributes, though undesignedly, to right: we consider it so far only as a right the same effect: for the appointment of the at all, as it conduces to public utility; that is, representatives we find commonly annexed to as it contributes to the establishment of good certain great inheritances. Elections purely laws, or as it secures to the people the just ad- popular are in this respect uncertain: in times ministration of these laws. These effects de- of tranquillity, the natural ascendancy of wealth pend upon the disposition and abilities of the will prevail; but when the minds of men are national counsellors. Wherefore, if men the inflamed by political dissensions, this influence most likely by their qualifications to know and often yields to more impetuous motives.-The to promote the public interest, be actually re- variety of tenures and qualifications, upon turned to parliament, it signifies little who re- which the right of voting is founded, appears turn them. If the properest persons be elected, to me à recommendation of the mode which what matters it by whom they are elected? now subsists, as it tends to introduce into parAt least, no prudent statesman would subvert liament a corresponding mixture of characters long-established or even settled rules of repre- and professions. It has been long observed sentation, without a prospect of procuring that conspicuous abilities are most frequently wiser or better representatives. This then be found with the representatives of small boing well observed, let us, before we seek to roughs. And this is nothing more than what obtain any thing more, consider duly what we the laws of human conduct might teach us to already have. We have a House of Commons expect: when such boroughs are set to sale, composed of five hundred and fifty-eight mem- those men are likely to become purchasers, bers, in which number are found the most who are enabled by their talents to make the considerable landholders and merchants of the best of their bargain: when a seat is not sold, kingdom; the heads of the army, the navy, but given by the opulent proprietor of a burand the law; the occupiers of great offices in gage tenure, the patron finds his own interest the state; together with many private indi- consulted, by the reputation and abilities of viduals, eminent by their knowledge, elo- the member whom he nominates. If certain quence, or activity. Now if the country be not of the nobility hold the appointment of some safe in such hands, in whose may it confide part of the House of Commons, it serves to its interests? If such a number of such men maintain that alliance between the two branches be liable to the influence of corrupt motives, of the legislature which no good citizen would what assembly of men will be secure from the wish to see dissevered: it helps to keep the same danger? Does any new scheme of re- government of the country in the House of presentation promise to collect together more Commons, in which it would not perhaps long wisdom, or to produce firmer integrity? In continue to reside, if so powerful and wealthy this view of the subject, and attending not to a part of the nation as the peerage compose, ideas of order and proportion (of which many were excluded from all share and interest in minds are much enamoured,) but to effects its constitution. If there be a few boroughs alone, we may discover just excuses for those so circumstanced as to lie at the disposal of parts of the present representation which ap- the crown, whilst the number of such is known pear to a hasty observer most exceptionable and and small, they may be tolerated with little absurd. It should be remembered, as a maxim danger. For where would be the impropriety extremely applicable to this subject, that no or the inconveniency, if the king at once order or assembly of men whatever can long should nominate a limited number of his sermaintain their place and authority in a mixed vants to seats in parliament; or, what is the government, of which the members do not in- same thing, if seats in parliament were annexed dividually possess a respectable share of per- to the possession of certain of the most efficient sonal importance. Now whatever may be the and responsible offices in the state? The predefects of the present arrangement, It infalli- sent representation, after all these deductions, bly secures a great weight of property to the and under the confusion in which it confessHouse of Commons, by rendering many seats edly lies, is still in such a degree popular, or in that house accessible to men of large for- rather the representatives are so connected tunes, and to such men alone. By which with the mass of the community by a society means those characters are engaged in the de-of interests and passions, that the will of the fence of the separate rights and interests of this branch of the legislature, that are best able to support its claims. The constitution of most

If this right be natural, no doubt it must be equal; and the right, we may add, of one sex, as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of representation that we have heard of, begins by excluding the votes of women; thus cutting off, at a single stroke, one half of the public from a right which is asserted to be inherent in all; a right too, as some represent it, not only universal, but unalienable, and indefeasible, and imprescriptible.

people, when it is determined, permanent, and general, almost always at length prevails.

Upon the whole, in the several plans which have been suggested, of an equal or a reformed representation, it will be difficult to discover any proposal that has a tendency to throw more of the business of the nation into the House of Commons, or to collect a set of men more fit to transact that business, or in general more interested in the national happiness

and prosperity. One consequence, however, selves the whole government of the state: or, may be expected from these projects, namely, at least, so to obstruct the conduct of public "less flexibility to the influence of the crown." affairs, by a wanton and perverse opposition, And since the diminution of this influence is as to render it impossible for the wisest statesthe declared and perhaps the sole design of the man to carry forwards the business of the navarious schemes that have been produced, whe- tion with success or satisfaction. ther for regulating the elections, contracting the duration, or for purifying the constitution of parliament by the exclusion of placemen and pensioners; it is obvious to remark, that the more apt and natural, as well as the more safe and quiet way of attaining the same end, would be by a direct reduction of the patronage of the crown, which might be effected to a certain extent without hazarding further consequences. Superfluous and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be suppressed for the present; but provisions of law be devised, which should for the future restrain within certain limits the number and value of the offices in the donation of the king.

Some passages of our national history afford grounds for these apprehensions. Before the accession of James the First, or, at least, during the reigns of his three immediate predecessors, the government of England was a government by force; that is, the king carried his measures in parliament by intimidation. A sense of personal danger kept the members of the House of Commons in subjection. A conjunction of fortunate causes delivered, at last, the parliament and nation from slavery. That overbearing system which had declined in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his son. After the Restoration, there succeeded in its place, and, since the Revolution, has But whilst we dispute concerning different been methodically pursued, the more successschemes of reformation, all directed to the same ful expedient of influence. Now we remember end, a previous doubt occurs in the debate, what passed between the loss of terror, and the whether the end itself be good or safe: whe-establishment of influence. The transactions ther the influence so loudly complained of, can of that interval, whatever we may think of be destroyed, or even much diminished, with- their occasion or effect, no friend of regal goout danger to the state. Whilst the zeal of vernment would wish to see revived.But the some men beholds this influence with a jea-affairs of this kingdom afford a more recent atlousy which nothing but its entire abolition can testation to the same doctrine. In the British appease, many wise and virtuous politicians colonies of North America, the late assemblies deem a considerable portion of it to be as ne-possessed much of the power and constitution cessary a part of the British constitution, as of our House of Commons. The king and go. any other ingredient in the composition; to be vernment of Great Britain held no patronage that, indeed, which gives cohesion and solidi- in the country, which could create attachment ty to the whole. Were the measures of go- and influence sufficient to counteract that restvernment, say they, opposed from nothing but less arrogating spirit, which, in popular assemprinciple, government ought to have nothing blies, when left to itself, will never brook an but the rectitude of its measures to support authority that checks and interferes with its them: but since opposition springs from other own. To this cause, excited perhaps by some motives, government must possess an influence unseasonable provocations, we may attribute, to counteract these motives; to produce, not as to their true and proper original, (we will a bias of the passions, but a neutrality; it not say the misfortunes, but) the changes that must have some weight to cast into the scale, have taken place in the British empire. The to set the balance even. It is the nature of admonition which such examples suggest, will power, always to press upon the boundaries have its weight with those who are content which confine it. Licentiousness, faction, en- with the general frame of the English constivy, impatience of control or inferiority; the tution; and who consider stability amongst the secret pleasure of mortifying the great, or the first perfections of any government. hope of dispossessing them, a constant willing- We protest, however, against any construcness to question and thwart whatever is dictat- tion by which what is here said shall be ated or even proposed by another; a disposition tempted to be applied to the justification of common to all bodies of men, to extend the bribery, or of any clandestine reward or solicitclaims and authority of their orders; above all, ation whatever. The very secrecy of such nethat love of power, and of showing it, which gotiations confesses or begets a consciousness resides more or less in every human breast, and of guilt; which when the mind is once taught which, in popular assemblies, is inflamed, like to endure without uneasiness, the character is every other passion, by communication and en- prepared for every compliance: and there is couragement: these motives, added to private the greater danger in these corrupt practices, designs and resentments, cherished also by po- as the extent of their operation is unlimited pular acclamation, and operating upon the and unknown. Our apology relates solely to great share of power already possessed by the that influence, which results from the acceptHouse of Commons, might induce a majority, ance or expectation of public preferments. Nor or, at least a large party of men in that assem- does the influence, which we defend, require bly, to unite in endeavouring to draw to them-any sacrifice of personal probity. In political,

the vicissitudes of political interests and passions, may one day arm and point this power against the executive magistrate; when we attend to these considerations, we shall be led perhaps to acknowledge, that there is not more of paradox than of truth in that important, but much-decried apopthegm, "that an independent parliament is incompatible with the existence of the monarchy."

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

THE first maxim of a free state is, that the laws be made by one set of men, and administered by another; in other words, that the legislative and judicial characters be kept separate. When these offices are united in the same person or assembly, particular laws are made for particular cases, springing oftentimes from partial motives, and directed to private ends : whilst they are kept separate, general laws are made by one body of men, without foreseeing whom they may affect; and, when made, must be applied by the other, let them affect whom they will.

above all other subjects, the arguments, or ra- | nual grants of money to the support of the nether the conjectures on each side of the ques-cessary functions of government ;-when we tion, are often so equally poised, that the wisest reflect also what motives there are, which, in judgments may be held in suspense: these I call subjects of indifference. But again; when the subject is not indifferent in itself, it will appear such to a great part of those to whom it is proposed, for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to collect and weigh the reasons by which either side is supported. These are subjects of apparent indifference. This indifference occurs still more frequently in personal contests; in which we do not often discover any reason of public utility for the preference of one competitor to another. These cases compose the province of influence: that is, the decision in these cases will inevitably be determined by influence of some sort or other. The only doubt is, what influence shall be admitted. If you remove the influence of the crown, it is only to make way for influence from a different quarter. If motives of expectation and gratitude be withdrawn, other motives will succeed in their place, acting probably in an opposite direction, but equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of the question. There exist, as we have seen, passions in the human heart, which will always make a strong party against the executive power of a mixed government. According as the disposition of parliament is friendly or adverse to the recommendation of the crown in matters which are really or apparently indiffer- For the sake of illustration, let it be supposent, as indifference hath been now explained, ed, in this country, either that, parliaments the business of the empire will be transacted being laid aside, the courts of Westminsterwith ease and convenience, or embarrassed with Hall made their own laws; or that the two endless contention and difficulty. Nor is it a houses of parliament, with the King at their conclusion founded in justice, or warranted by head, tried and decided causes at their bar: it experience, that because men are induced by is evident, in the first place, that the decisions views of interest to yield their consent to of such a judicature would be so many laws; measures concerning which their judgment de- and in the second place, that, when the parcides nothing, they may be brought by the ties and the interests to be affected by the law same influence to act in deliberate opposition to were known, the inclinations of the law-maknowledge and duty. Whoever reviews the kers would inevitably attach to one side or the operations of government in this country since other; and that where there were neither any the Revolution, will find few even of the most fixed rules to regulate their determinations, questionable measures of administration, about nor any superior power to control their prowhich the best-instructed judgment might not ceedings, these inclinations would interfere have doubted at the time; but of which we with the integrity of public justice. The conmay affirm with certainty, they were indiffer- sequence of which must be, that the subjects ent to the greatest part of those who concurred of such a constitution would live either with. in them. From the success, or the facility, out any constant laws, that is, without any with which they who dealt out the patronage known pre-established rules of adjudication of the crown carried measures like these, ought whatever; or under laws made for particular we to conclude, that a similar application of hon- persons, and partaking of the contradictions ours and emoluments would procure the consent and iniquity of the motives to which they owof parliaments to counsels evidently detrimen-ed their origin.

tal to the common welfare? Is there not, on Which dangers, by the division of the legis the contrary, more reason to fear, that the pre-lative and judicial functions, are in this counrogative, if deprived of influence, would not be try effectually provided against. Parliament long able to support itself? For when we re- knows not the individuals upon whom its acts flect upon the power of the House of Commons will operate; it has no cases or parties before to extort a compliance with its resolutions from it; no private designs to serve; consequently, the other parts of the legislature; or to put to its resolutions will be suggested by the consideath the constitution by a refusal of the an-deration of universal effects and tendencies,