gument again, I wish him to consider how the case stood under the Old Testament, before he repeats his assertion that an oath is no command among the commands of religion. Out of many texts to this purpose, I will quote but two. In Deut. vi. 13. we find this positive command, Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by his name.' And in Isaiah xlv. 23. we read these words of God: I have sworn by myself, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return; that unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear:' where the reader may observe that the solemn worship of God, and solemn swearing by his name, are both joined together as acts of religion by God himself, though his lordship says expressly, an oath is very improperly called religion. His lordship begins his third head with asserting that an oath was contrived for the service of human life in this world. Contrived by whom? By men, I suppose, he means. An oath indeed is appointed or required by men in many cases; but that it is a human contrivance is his lordship's discovery. A test of an inward disposition cannot be contrived, because nothing can be such a test that does not naturally signify the thing required to be signified; and therefore if an oath does not in its own nature signify a disposition and obligation to speak truth, and to perform covenants, no contrivance can ever give it such signification. But however, let it be a contrivance; still it was a contrivance to make religion a test, and his lordship allows it to be a lawful contrivance; and the consequence must be, that religion may lawfully be made a civil test, which is the thing I affirmed, and the thing his lordship denied. 2. It is affirmed that the end of an oath is wholly secular and worldly. I have already showed his lordship that this observation is ill grounded, and have given instances of the application of an oath in cases that are not secular and worldly. What I have now to add is, that supposing it true, it is nothing to the purpose. Religion, say I, is made a civil test when an oath is required. An oath, says his lordship, is confined to cases that are secular and worldly. And what then? Need we contend about this? If religion is the test when an oath is required, and an oath be confined to civil matters, it follows very strongly that religion is a civil test whenever an oath is required. Yet, says his lordship, here lies the difference; the sacrament was not instituted for the purposes of this life. To which I answer, that it was as much instituted for the purposes of this life as faith and hope in God, since this faith and hope are principally intended to be preserved by it. And these are the religion on which an oath is founded; and therefore there is no difference in this respect between the religion which is the test in one case, and that in the other. As to what his lordship here adds about the perverting the sacrament, and turning it from its original design, it has been already considered; and all that appears is, that his lordship has no distinct notion of this matter, and seems to know as little of the law in this point, as he tells us he does in the case of the supremacy. And as there is no turning aside the institution of Christ to purposes of this life by any law or statute relating to the test, so this whole third head is built on a mistake in point of fact, on supposition that the law has done what it never attempted to do. The fourth head has nothing to do with the question before us; it has no relation to the religion that is made the test, either in one case or the other; but to the use made of the test itself, which is quite another matter. The bishop says an oath is not an instrument of partiality, but of justice, which may or may not be true, as the case happens. He affirms also, that the sacramental test is the means of partiality; which I have shown not to be true in the present case. But it is possible that religion may be made a test in order to serve an ill purpose; and yet there may be no ground to affirm with his lordship that religion ought not to be made a civil test. When a highwayman makes you swear not to prosecute him or discover him, the oath is very ill applied, and to the obstruction of justice; and yet it would be ridiculous to argue from hence against the nature of the test required in an oath in all cases whatever. So in the other case, supposing the sacramental test to be ill applied in one instance, what is that towards proving that the sacrament is abused whenever it is made a test, because religion must not be a civil test. If all that his lordship means is, that he dislikes the purposes intended to be served by the sacramental test, let him argue his political case on political reasons, and let religion be left out, and not brought in only to make the show, when something else in reality lies at the bottom. The fifth head is a long one; but to make amends for its length, it has the less of substance. His lordship begins with observing, "that few are excluded from the use of oaths;" and in the other part of the comparison complains that the holy sacrament is made "the instrument of excluding many Christians and protestants from-civil offices." Here the comparison is lame; the parts of it are not suited to one another: "few are excluded from the use of oaths;" the other part of the comparison then should be, “but many are excluded the use of the sacrament." Which is not true; for the test act excludes none who are willing to take it; so far from it, that his lordship complains that it tempts many to take it against their judgment. If we try the comparison the other way, and begin with what his lordship says of the sacrament first, that "it is an instrument of excluding Christians and protestants from offices," then the difference which the bishop endeavors to show between the test of an oath and of the sacrament, by thus comparing them together, requires that it should be denied of an oath, that" it is the instrument of excluding Christians and protestants-from offices." But neither is this true; for the oath of supremacy excludes many Christians, the oath of allegiance many protestants, from civil offices. So that in whatever view you take it, this comparison will yield nothing to the bishop's purpose. But allowing the bishop all this, yet his main point is not advanced for if few are excluded from the use of oaths, and if many are excluded from offices by the sacramental test, yet it will not follow that religion is not the test in both cases; or that there is less religion in an oath than in the sacrament. Nay, the very contrary follows from the bishop's own argument in this place: the reason why few are excluded the use of an oath, is, as his lordship tells us, "because to be allowed to take an oath is the right of all who profess to believe a Providence." But the sacrament none but Christians can take; and now, reader, judge of his lordship's argument: thus it stands : An oath is founded on that principle and belief which is common to all men who have any religion: the sacrament is founded on a principle and belief which none but Christians have therefore there is less religion in an oath than in the sacrament. Whereas it must needs be that those principles of religion (such as the belief of a God and of his providence) which are common to all religious profession, and without which no religion could be professed, are as properly and strictly religion as any principles can be, and the obligations arising from them make strictly religious duties. The five observations and the five heads of difference being thus displayed, his lordship collects all his own mistakes, and calls them, “the argument drawn from the use of oaths." He is pleased to give us in about seven lines five properties of an oath; every one of which is either false or nothing to the present purpose, as I have distinctly shown. All therefore that I have to say to the argument dressed up by his lordship, is this, that I had no hand in it; it is not the argument from the use of an oath, as I urged it; but it is his lordship's own intirely; and if he is pleased with it, I have no inclination to disturb his enjoyment. This way of putting arguments and propositions on an adversary is an art peculiar to his lordship; it may be a good cover for a bad cause, but can never be a proper defence of a good one. The conclusion of his lordship's answer is all spent in such misrepresentations; which shows plainly to every intelligent reader where his lordship places the greatest strength of his cause. But give me leave here to wonder that a Christian bishop should take so much pains to undervalue the religion and sanctity of an oath, which the very heathens had in the greatest veneration: the Egyptians punished perjury with death, as including two the greatest crimes, impiety towards the gods, and a subversion of the strongest foundation for trust between men. Look into Grotius, Sanderson, Puffendorf; they all define an oath to be a solemn religious assertion; and Puffendorf expressly says, "recte juramentis summa religio tribuitur."* Sanderson more fully: "quod autem (juramentum) sit actus religiosus constat primo ex auctoritate scripturæ, Deut. vi. 13. ubi Moses ita populum alloquitur, Dominum Deum tuum timebis, et ipsi servies, et per nomen ejus jurabis.' Ex quo loco concludunt uno ore scholastici, juramentum esse actum cultus (ut illi vocant) latriæ, i. e. cultus sacri soli Deo debiti. Constat secundo ex consensu omnium populorum, apud quos, etsi unius naturæ lumine ducerentur, sanctissima semper est habita juramenti religio; usque adeo ut ipsa sanctitatis, religionis, aliaque his cognata vocabula apud rerum gentilium scriptores vix ulla alia in re frequentius usurpata occurrant, quam in hac materia juramentorum: et quum plurima ipsis alia sacra haberentur, jurijurando tamen soli, non alia de causa quam quod inter tot sacra sacerrimum quodammodo esset, peculiari quodam jure sacramenti nomen remansit. Constat tertio ex evidentissima ratione: quia juramentum tendit in honorem Dei; per agnitionem veritatis, scientiæ justitiæ, et potentiæ divinæ." You see how this great man asserts the religion of an oath from the authority of Scripture, the consent of all people, and the evidence of reason; but all this could not restrain his lordship from writing down the religion of oaths; and for this only reason, because it stood in his way; a reason which has often carried his lordship into great extremes. I remember once, when he was urged (in a dispute about government) with the example of our blessed Saviour's suffering as applied by St. Peter, he made no scruple to affirm, "that the example of our Lord is much more peculiarly fit to be urged to slaves than to subjects :"+ a doctrine which will make the ears of a Christian tingle, and ought to make him read with caution a writer so fond of his own notions as to take such steps to defend them. * De Jure Naturæ, p. 332. Amst. 1704. + Answer to Dr. Atterbury, p. 65. |