considered much fitter for Bedlam, than to reason on moral subjects. And to say, they had no hand in the rebellion, but are, nevertheless, guilty of it, and deserve to be everlastingly punished in hell, on its account, would make the matter, if possible, still worse. How such an

absurdity as that we are now opposing, should ever have obtained credit with men of reason, and reflection, is strange-most unaccountably strange!

3. Such an imputation would be, not untrue only, but unjust also. If men are all guilty of Adam's sin, it follows, unless there can be guilt without condemnation, that they all deserve to be damned on that account. But to affirm that they are guilty of a crime which they never committed, and maintain, that they ought to be sent to hell, merely because another had deserved it, are sentiments so diametrically-so manifestfy at variance with every notion which we have of justice, that we do not hesitate to reject, with indignation, the sentiment from which they are derived.

him so.

4. To impute, or transfer one man's sins to another, is a thing utterly impossible. An innocent man may, by his own act, become guilty; but no one else can make Were the infinitely powerful Creator himself disposed to make an innocent person guilty, he could not, because, no power can make a man to be what he is not, no more than it can make him to exist, and not exist, at the same time; the one being as evident an impossibility

as the other. We could easily multiply arguments in refutation of the unscriptural and absurd dogma here opposed, did we not think it unnecessary. Indeed some of the most eminent calvinistic authors of the present day, have abandoned the doctrine of imputed sin, as being altogether untenable.

SECTION III.

Mankind do not derive a sinful and depraved NATURE from Adam, or from their more immediate ancestors.

THE awful fact, that all men, without a single exception, become sinners, has led great numbers to believe, and to teach, that the nature, or constitution of man, must be in itself sinful and polluted; and that this natural pollution, originating with Adam, has been propagated, from father to son, down to the present time. They think it impossible to account for the universal sinfulness and depravity of our race, on any other ground. It is argued that, as the nature of Adam had become sinful and depraved, he could only propagate a sinful and depraved offspring.*

"Adam begat a son in his own image, sinful and defiled, frail and mortal, and miserable like himself; not only a man like himself, consisting of body and soul; but a sinner like himself, guilty and obnoxious, degenerate and corrupt. Grace doth not run in the blood, but corruption doth. A sinner begets a sinner, but a saint doth not beget a saint." Henry on Gen. v. 3. "As like produces its like, if Adam became mortal and sinful, he could not communicate properties which he did not

This reasoning, although somewhat plausible, rests solely upon an hypothetical foundation. It is founded

on the supposition that, when Adam had transgressed the command of his Creator, his physical nature or constitution became sinful and depraved. This, however, is a mere gratuitous assumption, for which there is no rational, or scriptural evidence. The simple fact appears to be, that, when Adam fell, it was not his nature, but his conduct, which became sinful, To assert that the nature, or physical constitution of man is sinful, is manifestly absurd—about as rational as to talk of a sinful tree, or a depraved stone! It is impossible for any thing to be sinful, except the free actions of a moral agent. For, sin, being a wrong use of the moral powers, affects, not his physical constitution, but his moral character. We venture to assert that no man, in his sober senses, ever thinks of attaching either praise or blame, merit or demerit to any thing but conduct.

possess; and he must transmit those which constituted his natural and moral likeness: therefore all his posterity must resemble himself." Dr. A Clarke on Rom. v. at the end.

"Original sin is the fault and corruption of the NATURE of every man; and in every person born into this world, IT DESERVETH GOD'S WRATH AND DAMNATION." Ninth article of the church of England.

Others, pressed with the difficulties and absurdities connected with the doctrine of propagated pollution, have refused to explain their meaning in this old fashioned way. They tell us, "All men are born destitute of a predominant disposition to holiness; that all who come to moral action will sin and always sin BEFORE REGENERATION. Stuart on Rom. p. 576. This view, though less repulsive in its aspect, nevertheless, holds the necessity of INFANT regeneration, and consequently, involves the doctrine of transmitted moral depravity also.

If then, sin and moral depravity consist in wrong conduct only, it was plainly impossible for the nature of Adam to become sinful, through his violation of the Divine command; and the argument founded on that supposition, in favour of his propagating a sinful nature, is destitute of all rational proof.

If the physical nature of Adam was polluted by his fall, and that nature be communicated to all his seed, we beg leave to ask, whether this pollution attaches to the substance of the soul, or to that of the body? Moral pollution cannot belong to the body, because matter is incapable of moral defilement—incapable of moral character of any kind. Nor can moral pollution attach to the substance of the soul, because, as we have already seen, sin does not belong to substances but to actions. We can easily form an idea of the moral qualities of an action; but what conceptions have we of the moral qualities of a substance?

An objector may still urge, that the agent who performs sinful actions must himself be sinful-must, as the source of such actions, be constitutionally depraved. We answer, if wicked conduct alone renders a man sinful, then no man can be sinful until he has committed sin. Το deny this, is to affirm, that a person may be wicked before he is wicked, which is a self-evident contradiction. Adam, it will be granted, was a moral agent, and he transgressed the law of Paradise; but it will not, surely,

be affirmed that he was sinful before he committed his first sinful act! Yet he must have been, if the objection under consideration be of any weight. All that can be

inferred is, that Adam had the capacity, or power to do wrong; a power which is essential to free agency! and, without which, he could not have done either right or wrong-could not have been accountable for his actions. Hence, we presume, the case of Adam affords evidence, clear as demonstration itself, that actual sin does not necessarily imply a nature previously corrupted or depraved.

Should it be attempted to evade the force of these observations by saying, that sin may be committed inwardly, before it manifests itself in any outward act, according to the declaration of our Lord, in reference to adultery; we answer, that sin, when viewed in this light, is still an act—a decision of the mind in favour of evil, and not a constitutional derangement.

But when we are told that Adam begat children sinful and depraved like himself, perhaps we are to understand it of their moral character, and not of their physical nature or constitution. If this be what is meant, we may be permitted to ask, whether it be possible for man to have a moral character, independently of his own actions? If he can, it follows, that he may be wicked or righteous without being either! That is, he may be wicked, without acting wickedly; or he may be righteous,