...experience, therefore, we may define a cause to bed)i object,folhwtd by another, and where all the objects, similar 'to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, hi other words, wfure, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance...

...even of Hume himself is sometimes quite as strong as this. One of his definitions of cause is, — ' where if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.' p. 88, Inquiry. And again ' 'tis universally allowed, (says he) that matter, in all its operations,...

...Jirst, are followed by objects timilar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the Jirst olject had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance...conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form...

...experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be, An object followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first, are followed by objects similar...the first object had not been, the second never had exitted." This last circumstance, if very rigidly examined, is not admissible into a just definition...

...be an ob" ject followed by another; and where all " the objects similar to the first are follow" ed by objects similar to the second ; or, in " other...first object " had not been, the second never had ex" isted." Course without a contradiction in terms ; and, finally, show, that Custom and Habit alone...

...may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all tlie objects similar to t/ie first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first oty'ect had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind,...

...to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, ifthejirst object had not been, the second never had existed....conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form...

...experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, ifthejirst object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys...

...containing the original definition, we may be sure of, from what fol- , lows; for he goes on to say, " or in other " words, where if the first object had not " been, the second never had existed;" but this idea expresses a much stncter necessity of connexion than does the relation of any number...

...We may define a cause to be an object followed by another ;" and again, in his third definition, " The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect." This doctrine has been very generally adopted by nearly all the Scottish metaphysicians,...