And when you have given me fatisfaction on those points, you will permit me to ask you a few questions farther.

H.

You may learn its neceffity, if you please, from Mr. Locke. And that once proved, it follows of confequence that I must deny its abfence from the Latin or from any other language *.

B. Mr.

"Articulus nobis nullus & Græcis fuperfluus."

"Satis conftat Græcorum Articulos non neglectos a nobis, fed eorum: "ufum fuperfluum."

J. C. SCALIGER de C. L. L. Cap. lxxii.-cxxxi.

It is pleasant after this to have Scaliger's authority against himself, and to hear him prove that the Latin not only has Articles; but even the very identical Article 'O of the Greeks: for he fays (and, notwithstanding the etymological diffent of Voffius, fays truly) that the Latin Qui is no other than the Greek.

« Articulum, Fabio tefte, Latinus fermo non defiderat: imo, me judice,, planè ignorat."

G. J. VOSSIUS.

Displeased with the redundance of Particles in the Greek, the Romans “extended their difpleasure to the Article, which they totally banished." Notes on the Grammatica Sinica of Monf. FOURMONT, p. 54.

*

"L'Article indicatif fe fupplée fur tout par la terminaifon, dans les "langues à terminaifons, comme la langue Latine. C'eft ce qui avoit fait " croire

6.

B..

Mr. Locke! He has not fo much as even once mentioned the Article.

H.

Notwithstanding which he has fufficiently proved its neceffity; and conducted us directly to its use and purpose. For in the eleventh Chapter of the fecond Book of his Effay, Sect. 9, he fays," The ufe of words being to "ftand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those "ideas being taken from particular things; if every par❝ticular idea fhould have a diftinct name, names would "be endless." So again, Book 3. Chap. 3. treating of General Terms, he fays," All things that exist being "particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that "words, which ought to be conformed to things, fhould "be fo too; I mean in their fignification. But yet we "find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of words

"croire mal-à-propos que les Latins n'avoient aucun Article; & qui avoit "fait conclure plus mal-à-propos encore que l'Article n'etoit pas une partie "du difcours." COURT de GEBELIN, Gram. Univerfelle, p. 192.

The Latin quis is evidently

os; and the Latin terminations us. a, um, no other than the Greek article os, n. ov.

г

"name.

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"that make all languages, are General Terms. Which "has not been the effect of neglect, or chance, but of "reafon and neceffity. For, first, it is impoffible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar For the fignification and use of words depend❝ing on that connection which the mind makes between "its ideas and the founds it ufes as figns of them; it is "neceffary, in the application of names to things, that "the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and "retain alfo the peculiar name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. We "may therefore easily find a reason why men have never "attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every "leaf of plants or grain of fand that came in their way "by a peculiar name.-Secondly, If it were poffible, it "would be useless: because it would not ferve to the “chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up "names of particular things, that would not serve them "to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and "use them in talk with others, only that they may be "understood; which is then only done, when by use or "confent, the found I make by the organs of speech ❝ excites in another man's mind who hears it, the idea I "apply to it in mine when I speak it. This cannot be "done

66

"

"done by names applied to particular things, whereof I ❝alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them "could not be fignificant or intelligible to another who "was not acquainted with all those very particular things ❝ which had fallen under my notice."—And again, Sect. II.-" General and Univerfal belong not to the real "existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures " of the Understanding, made by it for its own use, and "concern only figns. Univerfality belongs not to things "themselves which are all of them particular in their "existence. When therefore we quit Particulars, the "Generals that reft are only creatures of our own making; "their general nature being nothing but the capacity they "are put into of fignifying or representing many Parti❝culars."

Now from this neceffity of General Terms, follows immediately the neceffity of the Article: whose business it is to reduce their generality, and upon occafion to enable us to employ general terms for Particulars..

So that the Article alfo, in combination with a general term, is merely a substitute, But then it differs from those substitutes which we have ranked under the general head of Abbreviations: because it is necessary for the communi

cation of our thoughts, and fupplies the place of words which are not in the language. Whereas Abbreviations are not necessary for communication; and fupply the place of words which are in the language.

B.

As far then as regards the Article, Mr. Harris seems at prefent to be the author most likely to meet with your approbation: for he not only establishes its neceffity, in order to circumfcribe the latitude of genera and fpecies," and therefore treats of it separately; but has raised it to a degree of importance much beyond all other modern Grammarians. And though he admits of only two Articles, "properly and strictly fo called," viz. A and THE; yet has he affigned to these two little words full one fourth part in his distribution of language: which, you know, is into" Subftantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Con"nectives."

H.

If Mr. Harris has not intirely fecured my concurrence with his Doctrine of Definitives, I must confess he has at lcast taken effectual care to place it compleatly beyond the reach of confutation.

He fays,

1. "The