❝ and a good while after, I had not the least thought that

66

any confideration of words was at all neceffary to it *."

H.

True. And it is very strange he should so have imagined †.

But

Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky mistake (for it was a mistake) which Mr. Locke made when he called his book, An Effay on Human Understanding. For fome part of the ineftimable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, reached to many thousands more than, I fear, it would have done, had he called it (what it is merely) A Grammatical ⋆ Effay, or a Treatife on Words, or on Language. The human mind, or the human understanding, appears to be a grand and noble theme; and all men, even the most infufficient, conceive that to be a proper object for their contemplation: whilft inquiries into the nature of Language (through which alone they can obtain any knowledge beyond the beafts) are fallen into fuch extreme difrepute and contempt, that even those who "neither have the "accent of chriftian, pagan, or man," nor can fpeak fo many words together with as much propriety as Balaam's afs did, do yet imagine words to be infinitely beneath the concern of their exalted understanding.

t "Ariftotelis profectò judicio Grammaticam non folum effe Philofophie partem, (id quod nemo fanus negat): fed ne ab ejus quidem cognitione "diffolvi poffe intelligeremus." J. C. SCALIGER de Caufis. Præfat.

"And lastly," fays Bacon, "let us confider the false appearances that "are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according "to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar fort: and although we think "we govern our words, and prefcribe it well-loquendum ut vulgus, fenti"endum ut fapientes ;-yet certain it is, that words, as a Tartar's bow, do "fhoot back upon the understanding of the wifeft, and mightily entangle

" and

But what immediately follows?" But when, having "paffed over the original and compofition of our * ideas, "I began to examine the extent and certainty of our

knowledge; I found it had fo near a connexion with "words, that unless their force and manner of fignification "were first well observed, there could be very little faid "clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which "being converfant about truth, had conftantly to do with "propofitions. And though it terminated in things, yet "it was for the most part so much by the intervention of "words, that they seemed scarce feparable from our general "knowledge."

And again," I am apt to imagine that, were the im"perfections of Language, as the instrument of knowledge,

"and pervert the judgment. So as it is almoft neceffary in all contro"verfies and difputations to imitate the wifdom of the mathematicians, in "fetting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, "that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that "we are fure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is in "queftions and differences about words."

Of the Advancement of Learning.

* It may appear prefumptuous, but it is neceffary here to declare my opinion; that Mr. Locke in his Effay never did advance one ftep beyond the origin of Ideas and the compofition of Terms.

❝ more

"more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controverfies that make fuch a noife in the world would of "themfelves ceafe; and the way to knowledge, and per"haps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does **

So that, from thefe and a great many other paffages throughout the Effay, you may perceive that the more he reflected and searched into the human understanding, the more he was convinced of the neceffity of an attention to Language; and of the infeparable connexion between words and knowledge.

"This defign (fays Wilkins) will likewife contribute much to the "clearing of fome of our modern differences in religion;" (and he might have added, in all other difputable fubjects; especially in matters of law and civil government;)" by unmasking many wild errors, that fhelter "themselves under the disguise of affected phrases; which, being phi❝lofophically unfolded, and rendered according to the genuine and natural "importance of words, will appear to be inconfiftencies and contradictions. "And feveral of those pretended myfterious, profound notions, expreffed " in great fwelling words, whereby fome men fet up for reputation, being "this way examined, will appear to be either nonfenfe, or very flat and jejune. And though it should be of no other ufe but this, yet were "it in these days well worth a man's pains and ftudy; confidering the "common mischief that is done, and the many impoftures and cheats that " are put upon men, under the difguife of affected, infignificant phrases." Epift. Dedicat.

B.

Yes. And therefore he wrote the third Book of his Effay, on-"the Nature, Ufe, and Signification of Language." But you fay, the whole of the Effay concerns Language: whereas the two first Books concern the Origin and Compofition of Ideas: and he expressly declares that it was not till after he had paffed over them, that he thought any confideration of words was at all neceffary.

H.

If he had been aware of this fooner, that is, before he had treated of (what he calls) the origin and compofition of Ideas; I think it would have made a great difference in his Effay. And therefore I faid, Mr. Locke's Effay is the best Guide to the first fort of Abbreviations.

B.

Perhaps you imagine that, if he had been aware that he was only writing concerning Language, he might have avoided treating of the origin of Ideas; and fo have escaped the quantity of abufe which has been unjustly poured upon him for his opinion on that fubject.

H.

No. I think he would have fet out juft as he did, with the origin of Ideas; the proper ftarting-poft of a Gram

I

marian

marian who is to treat of their figus. Nor is he fingular in referring them all to the Senfes; and in beginning an account of Language in that manner *.

B. What:

Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in fenfu, is, as well as its converfe, an antient and well known pofition.

Sicut in fpeculo ea quæ videntur non funt, fed eorum fpecies; ita quæ intelligimus, ea funt re ipsâ extra nos, eorumque fpecies in nobis. Eft enim quafi rerum fpeculum intellectus nofter; cui, nifi per fenfum reprefententur res, nihil fcit ipfe. J. C. SCALIGER, de caufis, L. L. Cap. lxvi.

"I fenfi (fays Buonmattei) in un certo modo potrebbon dirfi Ministri, Nunzj, Famigliari, o Segretarj dello 'ntelletto. E acciochè lo Efempio "ce ne faccia piu capaci,-Imaginianci di vedere alcun Principe, ilqual fe "ne ftia nella fua corte, nel fuo palazzo. Non vede egli con gli occhi "propj, ne ode co' propj orecchi quel che per lo stato fi faccia: ma col "tenere in diverfi luoghi varj Miniftri che lo ragguagliono di cio che fegue, "viene a fapere intender per cotal relazione ogni cofa, e bene speffo molto piu minutamente e piu perfettamente degli fteffi miniftri: Perchè quegli " avendo femplicemente notizia di quel che avvenuto fia nella lor città o "provincia, rimangon di tutto 'l refto ignoranti, e di facile poffon fin delle "cofe vedute ingannarfi. Dove il principe può aver di tutto il feguito "cognizione in un fubito, che fervendogli per riprova d' ogni particolar "riferitogli, non lo lafcia cofi facilmente ingannare. Cofi, dico, è l' In"telletto umano; ilquale effendo di tutte l' altre potenze e Signore e Prin

cipe, se ne sta nella fua ordinaria refidenza ripofto, e non vede nè ode "cofa che fi faccia di fuori: Ma avendo cinque miniftri che lo ragguaglian " di quel che fuccede, uno nella region della vifta, un altro nella giurifdizion "dell' udito, quello nella provincia del gufto, quefto ne' paefi dell' odorato, e queft' altro nel distretto del tatto, viene a fapere per mezzo del difcorfo "ogni cofa in univerfale, tanto piu de' fenfi perfettamente, quanto i fenfi

"e