Here concluded the fearch after the different forts of words, or parts of speech, from the difference of things: for none other apparently rational, acknowledged, or accepted difference has been suggested.

According to this fyftem it was neceffary that all forts of words should belong to one of these four claffes. For words being the signs of things, their forts must neceffarily follow the forts of the things fignified. And there being no more than four differences of things, there could be but four parts of fpeech. The difficulty and controversy now was, to determine to which of thefe four claffes each word belonged. In the attempting of which, fucceeding Grammarians could neither fatisfy themfelves nor others: for they foon difcovered fome words fo ftubborn, that no fophiftry nor violence could by any means reduce them to any one of thefe claffes. However, by this attempt and difpute they became better acquainted with the differences of words, though they could not account for them; and they found the old system deficient, though they knew not how to fupply its defects. They feem therefore to have reversed the method of proceeding from things to figns, pursued by the philosophers; and, ftill allowing the principle, (viz. that there must be as many forts of words as of things,) they travelled backwards, and fought for the

things from the figns: adopting the converfe of the principle; namely, that there must be as many differences of things as of figns. Mifled therefore by the useful contrivances of language, they fuppofed many imaginary differences of things: and thus added greatly to the number of parts of speech, and in confequence to the errors of philofophy.

Add to this, that the greater and more laborious part of Grammarians (to whofe genius it is always more obvious to remark a multitude of effects than to trace out one cause) confined themselves merely to notice the differences obfervable in words, without any regard to the things fignified.

From this time the number of parts of speech has been variously reckoned: you will find different Grammarians. contending for more than thirty. But most of those who admitted the feweft, acknowledged eight. This was long a favourite number; and has been kept to by many who yet did not include the fame parts to make up that number. For those who rejected the article, reckoned eight: and those who did not allow the interjection still reckoned eight. But what fort of difference in words fhould intitle them to hold a separate rank by themselves, has not to this moment been fettled.

B. You

B.

You feem to forget, that it is fome time fince words have been no longer allowed to be the figns of things. Modern Grammarians acknowledge them to be (as indeed Aristotle called them, ruubora wadnμalwv) the figns of ideas: at the same time denying the other affertion of Aristotle, that ideas are the likenesses of things *. And this has made a great alteration in the manner of accounting for the differences of words.

H.:

That has not much mended the matter. No doubt this alteration approached fo far nearer to the truth; but the nature of Language has not been much better understood by it. For Grammarians have fince pursued juft the fame method with mind, as had before been done with things. The different operations of the mind, are to account now for what the different things were to account before: and when they are not found fufficiently numerous for the purpofe; it is only fuppofing an imaginary operation or two, and the difficulties are for the time fhuffled over.

μεν αν τα εν τη φωνη των εν τη ψυχη παθημάτων συμβολαίων ταυλα ομοιωμαία, πραγματα. ARISTOT. de Interpretat.

So

*

So that the very fame game has been played over again with ideas, which was before played with things. No fatisfaction, no agreement has been obtained: But all has been dispute, diversity, and darkness. İnfomuch that many of the most learned and judicious Grammarians, disgusted with abfurdity and contradictions, have prudently contented themselves with remarking the differences of words, and have left the causes of language to shift for themselves.

B.

That the methods of accounting for Language remain to this day various, uncertain and unfatisfactory, cannot be denied. But you have faid nothing yet to clear up the paradox you set out with; nor a fingle word to unfold to us by what means you fuppofe Hermes has blinded philofophy.

H.

I imagine that it is, in fome measure, with the vehicle of our thoughts, as with the vehicles for our bodies. Neceffity produced both. The first carriage for men was no doubt invented to transport the bodies of those who from infirmity, or otherwife, could not move themselves: But should any one, defirous of understanding the purpose and meaning of all the parts of our modern elegant

carriages,

carriages, attempt to explain them upon this one principle alone, viz.—That they were neceffary for conveyance—; he would find himself wofully puzzled to account for the wheels, the feats, the fprings, the blinds, the glaffes, the lining, &c. Not to mention the mere ornamental parts of gilding, varnish, &c.

Abbreviations are the wheels of language, the wings of Mercury. And though we might be dragged along without them, it would be with much difficulty, very heavily and tediously.

There is nothing more admirable nor more useful than the invention of figns: at the fame time there is nothing more productive of error when we neglect to observe their complication. Into what blunders, and confequently into what disputes and difficulties, might not the excellent art of Short-hand writing (practised almost exclusively by the English *) lead foreign philofophers; who, not knowing

that

* "The art of Short-hand is, in its kind, an ingenious device, and of "confiderable usefulness, applicable to any language, much wondered at by "travellers that have feen the experience of it in England: and yet, though "it be above threefcore years fince it was firft invented, it is not to this day (for ought I can learn) brought into common practice in any other "nation." WILKINS. Epift. Dedicatory. Effay towards a Real Character.