show that there is no innate principle at all, distinct from Reason, whose office it is to show the loveliness of virtue, and the hatefulness of vice, and to prescribe the path of duty. Such a notion is directly opposed to the numerous convincing testimonies above adduced from the wisest philosophers. It will be shown, how far it is opposed to the testimony of Scripture.

Locke admits that "a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature," and that "several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality;" "which," he says, "can only be the will and law of God"—a will and law, according to his system, discovered either by reason or extraordinary revelation, and in no other way— that is, partially by reason and more fully by divine revelation. Yet, as if the law of nature could do nothing for them, he asks the question, after enumerating the moral enormities "practised in different ages and countries without remorse of conscience"-" where then are those innate principles of Justice, Piety, Gratitude, Equity, Chastity? or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules?"" There is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on, which is not somewhere or other slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by prac2 B 2

tical opinions, and rules of living quite opposite to others."

It may be noticed that through great part of the 3d Chap. of the 1st Book of his Essay, Locke takes for granted that all these enormities are practised without remorse, nay, with general unqualified assent, -such as, the uncondemned and unscrupled practice of exposing children to perish in woods by famine or wild beasts, "among whole nations of the most civilized people," and of burying them alive with their deceased mothers; among others, the killing their parents "without any remorse at all," among others, "the rearing up their own children to devour them;" among others, Revenge and Cannibal-appetite accounted their chief virtues; and even many whole nations without the vestige of an idea of God, without religion or any form of worship!*

Though we might be prepared to see a fearful picture of the depravity of human nature and to own its truth; and though the nations of the earth are deplorably sunk in wickedness, so that one is almost reluctant to step forward as the advocate of humanity to defend it from such a charge; yet the position, above stated, contains so strong a reflexion upon our benighted fellow-creatures-of the same origin with ourselves the same blood-the same natural endowments, sympathies, and feelings heirs, too, of the same glorious immortality; that I venture to think

* Essay, Book 1. Chaps. 3 and 4.

few persons could be found who would give credit to one half of these rumours, without at least asking for proof upon proof of their authenticity. For, even if the evidence for acts so revolting to our feelings were ever so strong, one would still linger in the hope, and wish to believe, that they were not true. That I may notice no other than the last; even before the Christian era, Plutarch and Cicero both declared that there was no nation to be found upon earth so savage as to be without some conception of a God. Yet a Christian philosopher of the 18th century discovers that these illustrious heathens were wrong!-wrong in a vital principle of religion-the universal diffusion of the divine spirit among men the cardinal point of Christian doctrine.

It is to be observed that these enormities are not spoken of as casual deviations from the rule of morality; they are not spoken of as practices for which the nations themselves might possibly assign some sort of reason, religious or civil, to justify their usages, and thus, by way of excuse, to cover the violation of some natural duty; which would itself show their internal sense and acknowledgment of those duties: but they are spoken of as practices universally approved among whole societies of men, the rule of virtue subverted, and that of vice passing current in its place, without remorse, without conscience, nay with general consent.

It would be almost as credible that whole societies of men might be found, who should systematically

agree to call honey bitter and wormwood sweet, as that, among whole communities, virtue should be accounted vice, and right and wrong should be rendered so indiscriminately acceptable to the natural feelings of the mind; even setting aside every consideration of the expediency and usefulness of virtue to society. For there is a natural congruity in virtue to the human heart, and an incongruity in vice; as there is a congruity in music to the ear, and in sweets to the taste.

We know that there are perverted tastes and senses.

some human beings of But this is a state con

trary to nature, or the original institution of things; and one might as well believe that whole communities should agree to fix certain agreeable or disagreeable qualities to the sensible objects in question, just as the humour of different societies might dispose them to vary these relations, as that mankind should be brought to consider gratitude under any circumstances hateful, and ingratitude amiable :-for this may be given as one of the examples of Locke's general proposition. Though man may sink himself below the brute in depravity, when he is actuated by vicious propensities, yet it is scarcely possible to believe that, in their cool moments, any tribes on the face of the earth should so completely and systematically mistake the distinguishing characters of right and wrong. For it would be a libel against Reason, as well as against Moral principle and Humanity; and if such a state existed, it would be as fair to argue

that such human beings were devoid of a rational faculty, because they acted so irrationally, as that they were without a Conscience or moral Principle, because they acted so immorally. But if the first impressions of virtue and vice are equally acceptable to the cool and unadulterated human heart, there can be no such implanted principle.

The admission of this author is, indeed, of some value that, "certain moral truths may be discovered and moral rules receive approbation among mankind by the light of nature." But, if this light of nature is not meant to include some knowledge, however obscure, of that eternal law of Righteousness, which requires a degree of natural revelation to unfold it, the previous admission will not much qualify the ground which Locke has taken, and is far from reconciling his conclusions either to Reason or Scripture. Locke does not deny that man may attain to a knowledge of his duty by the right use of his natural abilities. He affirms the proposition; and so far, it may be said, there is no just reason for opposing his argument. If, indeed, it was only a question whether the principles of morality are innate, or are dis. covered in a secondary way by some circuitous process of the intellectual faculties; provided it was acknowledged, that grounds were laid in the nature of man for their early discovery, and that they are by some means or other made known; we should not perhaps have much cause of disagreement. But, when he further asserts that whole societies of men may